Fallacious and Non-Fallacious Argumentation: Debate Format Analysis
Doctoral thesis summary

Dorina Loghin (dorinaloghin@hotmail.com)
Faculty of Letters, "Babeş-Bolyai" University, Cluj-Napoca
September, 2010

Abstract

The present study wishes itself an examination of the way in which the theory of argumentation precepts apply to pragmatics from a pragma-dialectic perspective with special reference to the theist-atheist type of debate, debate being by definition a configuration of dialogic communication approachable from both perspectives. The argument cases and argumentation instances will be operated on with tools that are specific to informal rather than formal logic. This automatically circumscribes our approach to the area in which natural language use is informal, particularly context-sensitive, and controlled by rules that wish themselves free of the rigid constrictions of formal logicality.

Key words: pragma-dialectic, discourse analysis, fallacy, reasonableness, dialectification, functionalisation, socialisation and externalisation, sophistry.

II. Structure of the thesis
Preamble

The aim of the present thesis is to make a scrutiny of the occurrence of fallacious passes in atheist-theist debates.

The study of fallacies is of no recent concern to scholars interested in the art of argument making, this interest dates back to ancient times, more precisely to the Greek Antiquity, when it first dawned on a great philosopher's mind, Aristotle, to take the magnifying glass and hunt for the mistakes that occur in logical thinking and its expression in speech.

No decent study can be performed in the absence of the argumentative support that contains the reasonably accepted configuration of its structure, and since 'fallacy' is a term which allows for manifold interpretation, an exhaustive study of this ever-multiplying and, at the same time, chameleonic phenomenon, would be hardly possible. That is why anyone interested in taking a journey to the heart of reasoning – an attempt with results applicable in practically any domain of investigation – would have to choose the route that would best serve the real, implicit purpose or purposes of the investigation.

We will therefore attempt to follow the pragma-dialectical line, at the moment the most generous and welcoming to research and investigation, traced by the Dutch school of argumentation and subsequently taken over, parsed and reformulated efficiently by other schools and scholars in the domain.

Preferably, we should agree on a self-evident universal aspect that shows us that the phenomenon of deviance is normal and that it is present within every life area simply because life exists according to rules, and those rules are permanently broken, in a kind

of perpetual dialectic game of doings and undoings. Once some form of its manifestation is begotten, so will its exception, in an almost instantaneous riposte.

In reference to (social) standards and norms, classical sociologist Émile Durkheim notes that the deviance, the infraction of a norm, becomes subsequently the very mechanism through which norms are created and reinforced.

We propose to look at the mechanisms of disruption that are functional on linguistic level within the field of pragmatics and inside its subfield called debate, through the combined lenses of philosophy, rhetoric, religion and sociology.

In principle, the debate is a formal method of interactive and representational argumentation, and a structural analysis performed on it has to have in view the principles and rules that technically govern argument formation. A type of dialogic exchange of information or mere opinions, formal and informal, found in a variety of forms of expression, such as the persuasion dialogue (critical discussion), the information-seeking dialogue, or the eristic dialogue, negotiation, or deliberation, debate is a combination of all these under a unique identity and probably with a broader area of argument applicability than the any of the other varieties.

Despite its organisational formality, but also because of its conformity to the spontaneous nature of human dialogue, debate shelters under its umbrella the *informal* element of communication as well, with its the occurrence of the unplanned (passes) and the unexpectedness of the debaters' reactions to the arguments they are presented with.

Logical informality is the substance of argument in its everyday usage, which, because of its broad terrain of manifestation, is laxer in nature than formal arguments, confined as they are to mathematically rigorous norms.

The buffer element between formality and informality, at least in debate configuration, is the *burden of proof*, which tilts the balance of the arguments employed by the debaters in favour of one register or another. Actually, it is desirable to maintain an optimal balance between the burdens, of proof, on the affirmative side, and that of rejoinder, on the negative side. The burden of proof is assumed "to prove that a change is needed," while the burden of rejoinder, presupposes that its bearer has "the obligation to attack the affirmative arguments once the burden of proof has been established. In such cases when "the negative runs a counterplan, the roles of burden of proof and of rejoinder are reversed."[1]

Argumentation modelled on debate is one that is also *content*-oriented, apart from it being *form*-oriented, as is the case of logical argumentation, where the major concern is not with the particular *content* of arguments but with their *general structure* and *form*. After all, the content element, is ultimately responsible for the phenomenon of argument contextualisation.

Moreover, the present study wishes to undertake an examination of the application of argumentation to *pragmatics* (debate being part of it) by looking at the phenomena from the perspective of the pragma-dialectical argumentative precepts. The argument cases and argumentation instances will be operated on with tools that are specific to informal rather than formal logic. This automatically circumscribes our approach to the area in which natural language use is informal, particularly context-sensitive, and controlled by rules that wish themselves free of the rigid constrictions of formal logicality.

---

[1] Bruce Najor, "Burden of Rejoinder", 2007, http://sdiencyclopedia.wikispaces.com/Burden+of+Rejoinder

And last but not least, there is the *rhetorical* component to be considered in argument formation within the frame of debate, rhetoric being, on the whole and essentially, a technique of persuasion. Logical consistency and expositional accuracy and pertinence are part of the requisite of the debate event, whose ultimate purpose is to employ persuasion in order to facilitate the adherence to the issues brought into discussion (subject to debate). Debate is a confrontation of arguments where the winner is always the best. The argument that turns out to be strategically and in terms of its subtlety and refinement superior to its competitors is declared winner by a forum consisting of an official deliberating bodies and the audience.

Chapter I: Argument and its fallacies – theoretical considerations

Chapter contents

This chapter is mainly focuses on aspects of argument from a constructional, general-theoretical perspective. It treats problems such as:

- *components of argument, what is and what is not an argument* (e.g. conditions to be fulfilled for any communicative segment to be considered argument: its statements to have *truth value*, one of which (the *premise*), at least, must provide *evidence* for another claim (the *conclusion*).

– *deductive, inductive and abductive arguments*

(a) In d*eductive* arguments, the premises provide *certain* guarantee for the truth of the conclusion. The soundness of the argument can be established by the fact that the truth of the conclusion is prefigured by the truth of the premises. This can be determined through entailment specific to formal logic or through mathematical necessity.

Ex. Paula works either at Mackey's or at Byrne's. If Paula works at Mackey's, then Paula works in a grocery. If Paula works at Byrne's, then Paula works in a grocery. Therefore, Paula works in a grocery. The key to the credibility of a deductive conclusion lies in the premises. Since the conclusion must follow from the premises, the only way for a deductive argument to be considered invalid is if one of the premises is proven false.

b) *Inductive* arguments, no matter how strong, *do not* provide certain guarantee for the truth of a conclusion. Despite its weakness, however, its conclusion *might* still be true, but due to this structural fragility, the truthfulness of the conclusion is doubtful. In this type of argument if the premises are true, the conclusion *may* be *true* but it *may* as well be *false*. The inductive type includes arguments dealing with statistical data, generalizations from past experience, appeals to signs, evidence or authority, and causal relationships.

Italians are known to be very good singers.

Paolo is Italian.

Therefore Paolo is a very good singer.

Paolo may or may not be a good singer, despite his being Italian.

- the *difference* between inductive and deductive arguments does not have to do with the *content* or subject matter of the argument. The same utterance may be used to present either a deductive or an inductive argument, depending on the *intentions* of the person advancing it.

- Per Martin-Löf defines *proof* as the agent "that which makes a (hypothetical) judgement evident, in other words, turns an enunciation into a theorem (or 'proposition' in the traditional sense). For proving a conclusion you need more than a good argument to it.

The premises from which the proof starts must also be true (the word 'sound' is sometimes reserved for valid arguments with true premises) and must be already 'given'

– i.e. accepted or acceptable at a stage when the conclusion is not (you cannot, for example, prove a true conclusion from itself, even though you would be arguing soundly)." (Ulf Schünemann, "Logic and Reasoning")

Therefore, we may conclude that logic *and* rhetoric together *form the basis of reasoning.* A thorough understanding of both will significantly increase the chances of making good decisions and decrease the chances of being fooled by faulty arguments or clever use of words.

(c) *Abduction*

Abductive reasoning, or abductive inference, is what Charles Sanders Pierce called 'guessing'. This happens when we *think* (= guess) that something has taken place because of certain empirical evidence. It is a form of hypothesising over a *surprising* phenomenon or fact based on *sufficient*, *but not necessary* explanatory condition for the circumstances that led to its occurrence. Abduction can be considered useful in explaining empirical observations, without, however, giving us the 100% certainty to make them rules or axioms. They are what they are: means of hypothesising.

- *truth, validity and soundness in arguments*

An argument is *valid* when from true premises a true conclusion is inferred through *logical derivation* from the premises.

A *sound* argument is an argument with all its claims true, namely *true* premises and true conclusion. *Unsound* arguments are arguments with at least one of the premises false.

- *inference*

When we infer something, when we arrive at a conclusion or we form an opinion, we rely in this on known facts or evidence.

- *implication and tautology*

In *implication*, the conclusion that can be drawn from something, although it is not explicitly stated. It is common to deductive reasoning, where the word "implies," is represented by " =>". a => b can be translated by "if a is true, b is also true."

a = "Any house has (at least) a door." (true)

b = "A door is used for entering." (true)

For a => b, we have "If the house has a door, it is used for entering."(true)

Even if *a* is false, for example, if we replace 'house' with 'apple' (a = Any apple has a door) the implication remains true.

A *tautology* is an assertion which remains *true* whatever way we formulate it. *Rhetorical* tautologies are series of statements containing a *single argument* which is *repeated over and over again without bringing in any new information.*

- *formal and informal arguments*

- the division into *formal* and *informal* arguments is established on basis of the strictness or laxity of their built-up – the degree of formality or of informality is established according to the *nature* of the *claim* – its vagueness or clarity – and the *cohesion* in *evidence* succession, the element that is responsible for the configuration of the argument. In the *formal* argument, the conclusion is supported by *clearly*-formulated claims and *orderly* evidence succession. Also, the evidence must come from credited and verifiable sources.

The *informal* argument does not have the proper substance to properly convince. It's very poor in persuasive force but, after all, it is not persuasiveness this type of argument should employ. It is made to highlight an issue or to make an assertion – we have already

seen how 'strong' or impactful assertions are – that can act as an incentive to discussion on controversial issues. The reasonableness condition of conflict resolution is hardly applicable in such contexts, yet it represents a requirement nevertheless."[2]

- *formal* arguments are the *operational objects* of formal (pr symbolic) logic and are governed by mathematical rules, logic being by definition the realm of formality (Concise OED),

Informal arguments, unlike the logical ones, are present in communication in natural languages and are thoroughly employed as study objects by critical thinking.

The presence of a *formal fallacy* in a deductive argument does not imply anything about the argument's premises or its conclusion. Both may actually be true, or even more, probable, as a result of the argument (e.g. appeal to authority or argument by/from authority/*argumentum ad verecundiam*), but the deductive argument is still invalid because the conclusion does not follow from the premises in the manner described. Also, an argument can contain a formal fallacy even if it is not deductive, for instance an inductive argument that incorrectly applies principles of probability or causality can be said to commit a formal fallacy.

While fallacies of the formal type are rather fix in number, the group of informal fallacies is considerably larger, and is still expanding as new and new approaches enter the scene of argumentation and rhetoric. Some of such passes, no longer than, say, a couple of decades ago, we did not even suspect to be fallacies at all, as in the case of many of the attitudinal fallacies.

Formal fallacies are found only in deductive arguments with identifiable forms. One thing that makes them appear reasonable is the fact that they look like and mimic valid logical arguments, but are in fact invalid.

1st premise: Water is fluid. 2nd premise: Quicksilver is fluid. Conclusion: Water is quicksilver/ Quicksilver is water.

Both premises in this argument are true but the conclusion is false. The defect is a *formal fallacy*, and can be demonstrated by reducing the argument to its bare structure: A is C; B is C and A is B. We can replace A, B and C by other words and the argument would still be invalid and for the very same reason (Money is fluid; Water is fluid; Money is water.)

We can thus say that it can be helpful to reduce an argument to its structure and ignore content in order to see if it is valid.

Informal fallacies are therefore regarded as defects which can be identified only through an analysis of the actual *content* of the argument rather than by looking at its make-up.

premise 1: Emotional unbalance causes depression. (true)

premise 2: Depression is synonymous with economic dearth. (true)

conclusion: Emotional unbalance causes economic dearth. (false)

The structure is valid: A = B; B = C and A = C.

Since we have an ambiguous context, generated by the two meanings of the term 'depression', we can speak of a special case of fallacy, namely of *equivocation*, which is an *informal fallacy*.

In the present study, the focus is by and large, on informal fallacies

---

[2] Source: "Formal vs. Informal Arguments", http://writing.colostate.edu/about/contact.cfm

- *syllogism, enthymeme*

A syllogism is a classical form of argument, of deductive nature, in that its structure seems to be one that is most easily recognised and appropriated by and large, in that they always contain *two* premises and *a* conclusion, that is, three terms. Two of the three statements are called premises (major and minor) and the third statement is the conclusion that derives from them. In fact, the very etymology of the word contains this information. In Greek, *syllogismos* (συλλογισμός) means 'inference' or 'conclusion.'

John Woods regards a syllogism to be "a (classically) valid argument, none of whose premisses is redundant and whose conclusion is neither identical to nor immediately inferential from any single premiss, hence is derived without circularity."[3]

The three types of syllogism are: conditional, categorical and disjunctive. The first two syllogistic structures are uniform or homogenous, in that it is implied that there is a 'sameness' or similarity of the two assertions contained in the premises (A is of a certain nature, then B is of the same nature):

If A is true, then B is true (that is if A then B) – conditional

C is contained in A and, therefore, C is contained in B – categorical

If A is true, B is false (or, if B is true, A is false) – disjunctive

The frame of the third type, the disjunctive syllogism, as its name shows, implies a *disjunction*, which leads to choice-making between two statements, one of which is the reverse of the other (A or B).

Enthymemes are syllogisms that leave part of the argument unstated.

In the example "X is a Catholic priest, therefore he is unmarried," the premise "catholic priests are not allowed to marry" is considered to stand to reason, thus it is left unstated)

- *the pragmatic input of implicatures*

Grice's distinction between what is said and what is implicated has been greatly elucidating with respect to the relation between semantics and pragmatics "Paul Grice urges anyone who engages in a conversation to play fairly to each other, namely he thought that the partners should behave in such a way as to help the conversation follow its normal course towards its finality. He said one should "make contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."[4]

These requirements lie at the heart of Grice's principles related to human conversation especially that related to cooperation. In a conversation the first to fulfil the requirements of the cooperative principle is the speaker, who, in fact provides a 'model' to be taken by the speakers to follow and enter the conversation. The listeners acknowledge that these requirements have been met by the way they react to what they are being told by the speaker. The communicated message should thus be *comprehensible*. However, the meanings contained in the message are not always explicitly conveyed, in which situation, one should have to look for the *hidden implications* that are contained in it. Grice called these not overt implications *implicatures*.

---

[3] John Woods, "The Concept of Fallacy is Empty – A Resource-Bound Approach to Error", http://philos.unipv.it/emabardo/filcog/shared_folder/Lezione_12/woods.pdf
[4] Paul Grice, "Logic and conversation", 1975, in *Syntax and Semantics*, 2004,No 3: Speech Acts: 22-40, http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/453/GriceLogicDisplay.pdf

"A: What do you think of Werner's course?" "B: I'm actually considering taking up text interpretation."

- *fallacies: points detailed*
- *form and content*

A *logical* or *formal fallacy* represents a flaw in the structure of a deductive argument which renders the argument invalid.

a) The division into *formal* and *informal* arguments is established on basis of the *firmness* or *laxity* of their built-up – the degree of formality or of informality is established according to the *nature* – vagueness or clarity – of the *claim* and the *cohesion* in *evidence* succession that induce the configuration of the argument. In the *formal* argument, the conclusion is supported by *clearly*-formulated claims and *orderly* evidence succession.

Also, the evidence must come from credited and verifiable sources.

The *informal* argument does not have the proper substance to properly convince. It's very poor in persuasive force, but, after all, it is not persuasiveness this type of argument should employ. It is made to highlight an issue or to make an assertion that can act as an incentive to discussion on controversial issues. The reasonableness condition of conflict resolution is hardly applicable in such contexts, yet it represents a requirement nevertheless.

b) The presence of a *formal fallacy* in a deductive argument *does not* imply anything about the argument's premises or its conclusion. Both may actually be true, or even more probable as a result of the argument (e.g. appeal to authority or argument by/from authority/*argumentum ad verecundiam*, or, in Latin, *argument to respect*), but the deductive argument is still invalid because the conclusion does not follow from the premises in the manner described. By extension, an argument can contain a formal fallacy even if the argument is not a deductive one; for instance an inductive argument that incorrectly applies principles of probability or causality can be said to commit a formal fallacy.

c) While fallacies of the *formal* type are rather fix in number, the group of *informal* fallacies is considerably larger, and is still expanding as new and new approaches enter the scene of argumentation and rhetoric. Some of these, no longer than, say, a couple of decades ago, we not even suspected to be fallacies at all, like many of the attitudinal fallacies.

Formal fallacies are only found only in deductive arguments with identifiable forms. One thing that makes them appear reasonable is the fact that they look like and mimic valid logical arguments, but are in fact invalid.

1st premise: Water is fluid.

2nd premise. Water is a beverage

3rd premise: Quicksilver is fluid.

Conclusion1: Quicksilver is a beverage.

(Conclusion 2: Quicksilver is water.)

Both premises in this argument are true but the conclusion is false. The defect is a *formal fallacy*, and can be demonstrated by reducing the argument to its bare structure: A is C; B is C and A is B. We can replace A, B and C by other words and the argument would still be invalid and for the exact same reason (Bears eat honey; I likes honey. I am a bear.)

We can thus say that it can be helpful to reduce an argument to its structure and ignore content in order to see if it is valid.

7

Informal fallacies are therefore regarded as defects which can be identified only through an analysis of the actual *content* of the argument rather than by looking at its make-up.
premise 1: Emotional unbalance causes depression. (true)
premise 2: Depression is synonymous with economic dearth. (true)
conclusion: Emotional unbalance causes economic dearth. (false)
The structure is valid: A = B; B = C and A = C.
Since we have an ambiguous context, generated by the two meanings of the term 'depression', we can speak of a special case of fallacy, namely of *equivocation*, which is an *informal fallacy*.
In the present study, the focus is by and large, on informal fallacies.
- *historical overview on the study of fallacies*
Aristotle noted his studies concerning such errors in *De Sophisticis Elenchis* (*Sophistici Elenchi*), an appendix to the *Topics*, where he mentions thirteen types of fallacies. The studies of argument and its shortcomings was taken over by Medieval European scholars, after which time the concern over them seemed to have entered a period when previous information was verified, processed and ascertained. Future rearrangements and reconsiderations of the previous information were to follow only with the information boom of the second half of the twentieth century, when qualifies expertise brought back to attention this complex phenomenon. It now made the object of interest of many apparently separated disciplines such as communication studies, psychology, and artificial intelligence, beside the more consecrated ones, philosophy, rhetoric and logic.
The most outstanding contribution in the field of argumentation also in what regards fallacious passes was initiated in the 1980s by a group of theorists from the University of Amsterdam lead by the distinguished professor Franz H. van Eemeren and his collaborator Rob Grootendorst.
- *the Curtis Taxonomy of Logical Fallacies*
- *discussion of some fallacies*
- two fallacies of (grammatical) analogy (composition and division); ambiguity; equivocation; no true Scotsman; quoting out of context; two relevance fallacies (appeal to authority and appeal to emotion and desire)
- *conclusion*

The ever growing number of fallacious forms in argument making is growing, reason for which their study and interpretation remains a wonderful challenge still, a promise of a matching number of perspectives for future research. The work with argument and its global implications for human life is one that merits lifelong dedication, which, without any promises for easily-obtained results, does promise however unthinkable satisfactions.

The present research work is merely an attempt to gather, re-order and interpret some aspects of argument making and its deviations from the accepted norms, aspects that bear the imprint of previous notable contributions.

After the incursion into the general field of argumentation, we have selected and stopped over those fallacies in argument that are significantly related to the general topic and have not been discussed in other chapters.

An issue we considered worth including in this chapter is Maurice Finocchiaro's 'conciliatory' attempt with regard to fallacy treatment. Looking critically at the various approaches to fallacies, Finocchiaro distinguishes *three main stream lines*, and adheres to

on of them himself. While admitting their merits, he detaches himself from the mathematical-formalist bias proposed by Woods and Walton as well as from the empiricism of experimental psychologists. The former he considers to be rather rigid in its orderly conventionalism and formalism, the latter maybe too empirically excessive, displaying a "value-free attitude" and, more importantly, because it regards fallacies not necessarily as related to reasoning but to cognitive activities, such as perception.

Through his own stand, Finocchiaro advocates the idea, bordering to some extent on Grootendorst's own position, according to which a fallacy is produces only "within the framework of a given practitioner's conception of the argument he is commenting upon." He also agrees with the dialectical position on argument treatment, which doesn't regard the fallaciousness of an argument as an objectively verifiable fact but rather as the result of the intersubjective interaction of the persons engaged in a dialogue." This last point of view on fallaciousness in argument making is probably closer to our approach to fallacies due to the fact that debate is an optimal ground to study the aspect of subjectivity in opinion making, with specific application to the conflict of opinion context.

Chapter II: Pragma-dialectical and Rhetorical Argumentation in Dialogue Frame
Chapter contents

Since the present thesis proposes to apply the theoretical approaches present in argumentation, especially the pragma-dialectical standpoint, to the analysis of fallacious passes occurring in three debates, in this chapter we propose to focus on the evaluation of the critical discussion, a type of dialogic interaction considered analogous to persuasion dialogues. Persuasion dialogue, on the other hand, forms the pivotal structure in debates. If persuasion dialogues are characterised by informality, in that they are common to every-day speech interactions, or opinion exchanges, debates are organised *frame-structures* that house speech interactions that are, or at least are devised to be, more formal in nature. These conventionalised structures are subject to strict rhetorical-argumentative rules.

The informal talk of the common conversation or dialogue is a free-flowing course of utterance exchange, in which the conversants are more or less equally (un)informed.

In debate, as Glazer and Rubinstein show, the participants adopt conflicting, contradictory positions about the decisions that should be made, the reaching of the appropriate conclusion being dependent on several aspects and outcomes that occur during the conversation. Unlike in the informal talk that is carried out more or les unceremoniously in casual contexts, in debate the debaters are the informed party, and their dialogue is meant to inform an uninformed party, in this case, the audience.

We will try to look into the argumentation engaged in such dialogue and see the way in which the pragma-dialectical theory applies to debate argumentation, in general, and to resolution making, in particular. After a brief analysis of the *pragma-dialectic* logo, we will also make some historical references which reveal the auspicious conditions which provided ground for the emergence of this theory.

This trend started taking life back in the early eighties at the initiative of Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst as their work was inspired by the Aristotelian dialectics and rhetoric, – on which they worked and eventually developed it according to the models offered by the dialectical theory of critical rationalists – and the Searlean

direct and indirect speech acts theories. In terms of dialogic communication in natural languages, the pragma-dialectic approach recommends a support framework for the process of rational dialogue development, seen as a system of four principles named *dialectification*, *functionalisation, socialisation* and *externalisation.*

The pragma-dialectical orientation throws new and more elucidating light on the initial understanding of the concept of argumentation as disciplinary field. This is so because it takes communication exactly for what it is, namely an interaction among participants which is profiled against the context of a discourse that can influence it in a negative or positive way, depending on the situational environment in which the interaction takes place. From this angle considered, argumentation renews its studies also from the Popperian perspective, an approach which rests on objective normative, contrastive evaluation procedures made in the critical rationalist spirit.

To this perspective, the pragma-dialectical thought trend attaches the pragmatic dimension with special emphasis on Grice's language philosophy and discourse analysis and, last but not least, the inclusion of the theory of speech acts for the practical application of the theoretical-ideal model of communicative instance.

According to van Eemeren Grootendorst, the pragma-dialecticism, viewed from now on as an integrative trend, pleads for a systematic engagement of the two coordinates, the pragmatic and the dialectic, as base for all research in the domain of argumentation. Thus, one of the first perspective-changing proposals made by pragma-dialectics is the implementation of the four principles necessary for investigation procedures.

All the four principles focus on the speech act, as core element of the communicative intercourse.
- the first principle, *functionalisation*, asks that discourse be treated as a purposive act.
- the second principle, *socialisation*, highlights the interactive role of the speech act
- *externalisation* focuses on the relation between the speech act and its contribution to the communicative act, namely the resulting *propositional* and *interactional commitments*.
- *dialectification* sees the speech acts dynamically, in their active exchange between participants, a perspective on which the entire edifice of critical discussion rests, and which is actually considered the ideal model for it. (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 52-53).
- *the speaker-listener tandem*
No conversation–based communication can be imagined in the absence of a listener. Within the monologic frame, the listener is either the *speaking self*, engaged in a self-reflexive act – she who speaks speaks *for* herself – or it is the *group* called *audience*. In organised persuasion, however, dialogic interaction such as debate, negotiation, critical discussion, etc., the audience plays a major part. The role of the audience in this kind of contexts will also be discussed in the present paper, especially because it represents a defining element that separates logic from argumentation, an issue on which the rhetorical theory of Perelman-Olbrecht-Tyteca and that of the pragma-dialecticians are in agreement.

Also, the chapter focuses on issues related to the distinction between a *dialogic* and a *multilogic* discussion, both grounded ultimately on a basic requirement, namely that of *reasonableness*, a prerequisite first postulated by Chaïm Perelman, which he always opposed to *rationality*. The concept was competently adopted and subsequently adapted

by the pragma-dialectic school, where it was used mainly in studies related to the ways in which differences of opinion are "resolved."

- It would be inappropriate to omit mentioning the impact the new pragma-dialectical theory has on various fields of communication, as it systematically combines normative insights from philosophical dialectics and dialogue logic with pragmatic insights from the Gricean speech act theory and discourse analysis.

- The present chapter also makes note of issues such as the *indexical* support in argumentation in relation to the propostional content and the aspect of *dramatism*, seen as an important ingredient of the argumentative communication. The concluding part of the chapter proposes some critical reactions to some of the pragma-dialectical methodology.

- An overview study which does not claim to be exhaustive in any respect, this paper is an attempt to bring together some elements that would be useful for further research in the field of argumentation in general, and which could throw light on untrodden tracks that may contain valuable answers to issues that still wait for them.

Chapter III: The contribution of Discourse Analysis to Argumentation. Discourse in theist-atheist controversy

Chapter contents

Deriving etymologically from the word 'course', any discourse can be imagined as a stream of communication (communicative flow), which, the existence and progress of which is related to a context. The context fulfils the roles of source and support for the discourse, that is it provides it with a *context*, which is crossed by the communicative stream on its way to its destination. The purpose of its flow is to *convey a message from source to destination.* Once the message reaches destination, is received and decoded, it returns to the source. Three key elements define any course: the point of *initiation* (source), the *destination* (target), the *flow* (action), which connects the source to the destination.

In communication, the flow is the carrier of a message, written or spoken, one at a time, in normal communication. The message moves to and fro, from source to target and, depending on the case, back from target to source. The source is the proponent/ sender and the target is the recipient, receiver or beneficiary of the message.

Today discourse analysis, a proteic and eclectic area of investigation, is employed by many fields of human activity, whether of social or of purely scientific orientation, its central axis being the communicative event, oral or written. Beyond doubt, the discourse phenomenon has multiple and obvious social implications, the latest interest being to a great extent in the way in which language, whether oral or written, reflects the socio-political realities of the moment.

- discourse-based controversies

It would be no exaggeration if we said that one of the most conflict-ridden terrains of human discourse is religion. Ever since *homo sapiens* has made the evolutionary leap and became *homo religious*, he has attempted to translate the experiences related to this (newly discovered – by him) dimension of his life into *language*, and employ that language in order to establish a dialogue with his fellow beings. As soon as he voiced his spiritual experiences, the counter reactions occurred almost instantly, his arguments being rebutted by those fellow beings of his who couldn't, didn't, or simply wouldn't understand him. Hence, one of the biggest and lasting 'wars' ever to trouble mankind broke out: the clash between those who believe and those who refuse to believe that life

was sourced by a supernatural force referred to by some as Deity. Mankind was split into the antagonistic parties called theists and atheists. As expected, their discourses reflect the whole arsenal of their ideological fight, the language employed by them being the expression of their overall mentality, cultural biases, feelings, beliefs and social practices.

Human endeavour is by definition dialectical, communication included, therefore it is but normal to regard the controversial type of dialogue – seen as strategy of arriving at the truth by logical argument exchange – as being marked by dialecticism as well.
In one of the analysed debates, Reza Aslan, a debater himself, contends that: "The most significant factor in the way one understands one's religion, in the way one interprets one's religion, is not that religion itself, it's not the religion itself, it's your *social context.* According to Walton and Macango "all human communication is grounded upon what is already known or accepted as information that can be taken for granted, and makes verbal interaction possible. We can call this basis of human communication "common ground" or "common knowledge", adopting respectively a linguistic or an argumentation terminology." [5]

- discourse community

A particular *type of dialogue* is established within a particular group of individuals by convention and, in order for the information to be commonly-accessible and facile in usage, all the members of a given communicative group must be familiar with it. This particular type of dialogue is established on basis of the complex linguistic networkimg of *discourse*, or informational matrix, which involves the use of both linguistic and metalinguistic factors. Metalinguistics is an aid in the investigation of discourse communities and their dialogic relation in that it studies "dialogue relationships between units of speech communication as manifestations and enactments of co-existence." The psycholinguistic factor which is integrated in discourse community studied by metalinguistics focuses on "behavioural acts in the cognitive context of subjects who perform them." For the analysis of any discourse community, the psychological factor plays a major role, so much so as the individual is the participant in its formation on basis of his individuality, a characteristic which is to a great extent psychologically determined.

- the social dimension of discourse

It is important to note here that discourse is also to be analysed according to its function as indicator of social practices, social order and the deviations from that order, and also according to the function it fulfils in the making up of social realities.
In discourse formation, the linguistic *register* plays an important part in that it represents, as language variety, each social group which uses language in a certain way, based on a certain lexical agreement (selection) and with a certain semantic encoding, which, in turn will be established as conventionally mutually acceptable by both the speaker and the hearer involved in a communicative act. The dialectical perspective on language use in social contexts always takes into consideration the discourse community too.

- argumentation and discourse analysis

Argumentation cannot be conceived in the absence of its discourse, the support for the components of the argumentative activity. The argumentative discourse, essentially oriented towards persuasion, must be studied in its close interdependence with

---

[5] Walton & Macagno, "Classification and Ambiguity: the role of definition in conceptual systems", in *Studies in Logic Grammar and Rhetoric*, 16 (29), 2009: 3.

the argumentative reality. It is in this context that van Eemeren and Houtlosser bring into discussion the importance of *strategic maneuvering*, a conflict-resolution tool also mentioned by us in the previous chapters, looked at from the perspective of the joint action of the rhetorical and dialectical dimension of argumentation. As we have shown, through discourse, the rhetorical strategy participates in the shaping of the audience in by modifying their opinions, their values and their beliefs.

Chapter IV: Debate and its fallacies
Chapter contents

Before approaching the domain of debate in all its complexity, one has to prepare thoroughly for both the understanding of its methodology and for the subsequent efficient mastery of its operating tools, which will eventually bring the freshly-initiated debater to the realm of success. This success means much more than material satisfaction, – this concept is or should be irrelevant to the genuine debater – it means self-esteem. By winning the competition, the debater has taken yet another step up the social value hierarchy. To attain such success, however, one has to focus not only, or, better said, not predominantly on the competitive component in a debate but rather on the substantive skills that underlie the critical mind, and on the advocacy skills which are central to the advancement of productive and useful social concepts. Too often, we feel, our society fails to feature in the individual these important skills, whereas debate can offer them generously this precious chance. The three basic skills that need focusing on are the argumentative skills, the persuasive skills and the public speaking skills.

Argumentation is the use of reasoning and logic to try to make points and convince people about the validity of our points.

Persuasion is the process of using any and all possible tools to convince the audience that our ideas, our approaches and our concepts are good and profitable and something that they would want to embrace themselves.

The problems tackled in this chapter relate to issues such as
- the definition of concept: characteristics, structure, types
- the place of debate in society
- the mastery of the art of debate
- argumentation used in debate
- Toulmin's scheme: pro and cons
- debate and the fallacies that mar its argumentation
- the process of refutation
- selection of issues that would serve as basis of disagreement according to quality, quantity, probability, time allocation, or moral requirements
- Henry Johnstone's *ad hominem argument*
- *proof* , its role of in argument making, its refutation
- debate rules and strategies
- fallacies: hasty generalisation; transfer fallacies (of composition and of division); of reputation (straw person); irrelevance fallacies (*non sequitur*); avoiding the issue/shifting the ground/changing the subject; false dichotomies; *ad ignorantiam*; *ad populum*; appeals to: emotion, authority, tradition, humour; ambiguity; equivocation; wishful thinking; pathetic fallacy; cultural bias, etc.

Chapter V: On the Great Clash
Chapter contents
      The theist-atheist confrontation whatever its venue, still remains a very old and unsolved predicament.

      Epistemology is the branch of philosophy that teaches us how to make the best choices of our life, that is, what principles should guide us when making these choices. It diverges into two directions, the epistemology of science and religious epistemology, each of which has developed its own axiology. Their axiological systems became so different that the two, now separate, domains ended up at variance with each other. This is how religious epistemology and the epistemology of science are now two c domains of human endeavour set in constant antagonism.

      The confrontation between the two areas of access to knowledge has often being referred to as *conflict*, *dissension* and *segregation*, rather than *cooperation* or *productive dialogue*. But beyond the antagonistic aspect of the confrontation, the ultimate goal of either party involved in it is access to *true* knowledge, or Truth.

- defending and attacking: presenting opinions and supporting facts
In many religion-centred debates the major conflict is structured around the conflict of opinions between believers and non-believers related to the existence (or non-existence) of a Creating Deity. The thesis of the theists contains the apology of that religious doctrine, which is attacked by the atheist counterparts, who bring arguments that aim at proving that those claims are wrong.

- either side apologetics
Apologists usually engage in formal speech or give an explanation to reply and rebut the charges. The legal content of the word was transferred to other domains as well, especially philosophy and religion, which used cognate terms, also implying the study of the defence of a doctrine or belief. The apologists' defence is based on in-built principles, which makes them almost inattackable. They consider their doctrine perfectly rational, beneficial and superior to any other doctrines, reasons for which they strive to acknowledge it. In belief-related domains of knowledge, apologetics offers a rational basis to defend the proposed faith against any protestation, ill-intended or misperceived, and to expose that error unfalteringly to the public.

- skepticism, atheism, and naturalism
Ontological or methodological by formation, naturalists oppose or overlook the domain of the supernatural. Since atheists or sceptics display the same attitude towards the so-called 'supernatural' (the Deity being part of it), they are sometimes found among the militants for the concept of 'natural world', one that can be explained through scientific experimentation and processed through logical reasoning. Very similar to the theist, and ultimately not unlike the atheist outlook, naturalism exercises benevolent and moral conduct, which results in creating a climate favourable for social welfare and wellbeing. The atheist position detaches itself from this line in that it recurrently fingerpoints a malevolent, unjust and inefficient, almost 100$ scriptural, Deity, of no good use whatsoever for mankind.

- disputing the burden of proof; Douglas Walton's opinion on *presumptive* reasoning, which is neither deductive nor inductive but is "based on burden of proof". Unlike deductive reasoning, "it is subject to retraction once new premises enter into the evidentiary picture in a disputation." (Walton, 1998: 711) Also, presumptive reasoning is

supported by *conversational* logic, the structural argumentative logic necessary for the evaluation of argument employed in communication.

One of the principles invoked most actively in theist-atheist controversy the *burden of proof principle*, according to which the truth claimant of a proposition becomes the bearer of the burden of proof and is duly expected to provide verifiable proof, or warrants, in support of their claims. The absence of cogent argumentation justifies the opponent to render the proponent's claim unfounded and thus reject it.

- *the support of argumentation*

- theistic argumentation and atheistic counter-argumentation: prima facie warrants for the existence of God; the argument from religious experience; the argument from belief, the moral argument; the argument from evil, the argument from reason; the 'free will' argument; the teleological argument, or the argument from design; Pascal's Wager;

- either side fallacies

- context-related argument relevance in dialogue. What is and what is not fallacy.

The context-based analysis of fallacies is also backed by the perspective of *commitment* in dialogue, which is "a decisive moral choice that involves a person in a definite course of action, a distinctive personal engagement, which, in its deeper form, comes from the individual's heart or inner conscience. […] one's commitments are personal – that is, indexed to a distinct person or individual – and they may even be, in some cases, private and only partially accessible to others." (Walton and Krabbe: 14)

- *material fallacies*

begging the question/ circular argument (*petition principii, circulus in probando*, the fallacy of *false cause* (*non sequitur,* which means means "it does not follow"), the fallacy of *many questions (plurium interrogationum)*, the fallacy of the *consequent* (a variety of *irrelevant conclusion*), the fallacies of *accident* and the *irrelevant conclusion* (*ignoratio elenchi*), which, in turn, includes the *ad* arguments *(a) ad hominem, (b) ad populum, (c) ad baculum, (d) ad verecundiam.*

These fallacies are instruments by means of which the speaker manipulates the audience by obscuring the real question – one of the meaning carried by the word 'fallacy' comes from the Latin 'falsus', which means 'false, or *deceptive.*'

- *verbal fallacies*

Such fallacies are met in speeches or in texts when the speaker/writer uses improper or ambiguous words and reaches a false conclusion. They are *conventional fallacies* (of composition, division, accent, equivocation) or *figures of speech* which generate confusion regarding the metaphorical and the concrete usage of words.

- *fallacies of reason*

a. *Relevance fallacies* (appeal to improper authority, red herring, drawing the wrong conclusion, using the wrong reasons, *ad hominem*, straw person, casuistry (misleading subtle reasoning), guilt by association, appeal to fear, appeal to tradition, *ad populum*, the bandwagon fallacy, etc.);

b. *Acceptability Fallacies* (fallacious use of language, *circulus in probabdo*, fallacy of composition, fallacy of division, false dichotomy, faulty analogy, distinction without a difference, pseudo-precision, begging the question (*petitio principii*), inconsistency and incompatibility, etc.);

c. *Sufficiency fallacies* (hasty inductive generalization, arguing from ignorance, omission of key evidence, ignoring the (counter-)evidence, confusion of necessary & sufficient

conditions, the gambler's fallacy, subjective fallacy, converse accident (hasty generalisation), *argumentum ad ignorantiam,* slippery slope*, non sequitur*, wishful thinking, *tu quoque,* special pleading, etc.);

d. *Rebuttal fallacies* (red herring, straw person and poisoning the well).

- *emotion appealing strategies*: appeal to ridicule, appeal to emotion, needling.

- *other fallacies analysed in debates*: fallacy fallacy, naturalistic fallacy, presentism, slanting, loaded language, false analogy, false dilemma, *post hoc, ergo proper hoc*, argument from adverse consequences (appeal to fear), appeal to pathos, flamboyance, Biblical literalism.

- *can there be a real winner of an atheist-theist debate*?

Should we be really be chasing for 'proofs' to speak of the existence of God? The pressing urge on either side for proof submission could probably be considered a possible reason to blame this great dissension on. On thing seems certain for now: the lack of evidence on both camps hampers a lot the coming to a viable, peace-making conclusion. The resolution of the conflict is still waiting for its 'advent'.

Chapter VI: Corpus Analysis

Chapter contents

- *a few retrospective considerations – a bird's eye view on debate argumentation*

- *success in communication*

An important issue to be mentioned in relation with dialogic communication is the concept of success. Succeeding in our communicative exchange does not have to mean knocking our opponent down by all means and 'soaring' as winners as a result of a competitive confrontation. What should prevail in such situations is the intention of the participants to reach a reasonable agreement, that is, an agreement that is reason-based in that it equally takes into consideration and respects the opinions of each/both confronting sides. It is true that the incentive of any discussion is the existence of a difference in opinions between participants. Each party targets the attaining of success in dialogue, translates in the winning of the confrontation. This is characteristic of debate, eristic dialogues, persuasion dialogues of the critical discussion type, and negotiation.

Success in communication is a highly constructive relational mechanism within which the motivational component acts as stimulus for progress towards the proposed target, and the reasonable resolution of the conflict brings about the elicitation of positive feelings from the participants.

In three *two-person debates* an analysis was carried out as to how arguers commit fallacies during the disputation of the proposed theme.

- *debate analysis*

The fallacies that mar the argumentation of the participants in the three debates proposes for analysis are grouped according to the criterion of doctrine affiliation and not according to the group to which the respective fallacies belong. Thus, the fallacies are rendered into fallacies committed by atheists and fallacies committed by theists.

It is important to note here that the arguments accepted as valid or correct by emitting party are fallacious from the viewpoint of the doctrinal principles of the opposing party, and the other way round. Therefore the direction of the present analysis is imposed rather by the doctrinal orientation of the participants in the debates than by strict tenets of the logical analysis.

One of the most recurrent offenses committed by either side with the same frequency, seems to be the result of the employment of the *ad ignorantiam* fallacy. Of course, to keep it company are other argumentative deformities, the distribution of which is uneven, as it can be seen from the performed analysis.

However, if we were to refer to the type of fallacies, the prevalent fallacies are not necessarily those who affect the structure and are part of formal logic, but rather those who target the content, and ar of the informal type. Such are the fallacies that that appeal to emotion rather than the logical, structural fallacies. It is but normal that in hot-spirited dialogic situations it is the *context* that orchestrates the whole situation and that therefore the type of fallacy that is being committed is one that attacks the *content* and more seldom the form.

Debate I: *Christopher Hitchens vs. Al Sharpton*: "God is not Great"
New York Public Library (NYPL), May 7, 2007
Moderator: Jacob Weisberg
Debate II: *Christopher Hitchens vs. Frank Turek*: "Does God Exist?"
Virginia Commonwealth University, November 9, 2010
Moderator: Timothy Hulsey
Debate III: *Reza Alsan vs. Sam Harris*: "Religion and Reason"
L.A. Public Library, Los Angeles, December, 2007
Moderator: Jonathan Kirsch

1. Conclusions to the 'great clash' predicament

While theists think they have found the explanation with respect to the origin, meaning and purpose of life, atheists offer us their scepticism, doubt and negation. Nick Bostrom thinks that "this doubt could be reinforced by pointing out certain internal difficulties with the deist's explanation", such as the existence of the Creating Deity, or, say, the problem of evil. Theists keep providing – some will say ironically 'conjuring up' – more and more metaphysical arguments that have still remained echoless for want of sound foundation in the logically-trained, empirical mind of their opponents, except, perhaps, "the argument from the apparent design of biological organisms", which, Bostrom notes, "was harder to dismiss."[6] If for a very long time man used to resort to Deity-related justifications whenever the issue of existence in general and personal life in particular was brought up, ever since Darwin appeared on stage to recite his astonishing and revolutionary theories, an increased dissidence from this attitude has become manifest and which, in the spirit of the snowball effect, is growing and growing still. Naturalism and theism have begun their dissension, with, apparently, an ever increasing number of adherents on the part of the former. Until recently, as the balance seems to have returned to symmetry. And this should hardly surprise us, since is it not that man is primarily empirically-oriented and only secondly, spiritually? The answers that we derive from the contingent reach us first and are thus perceived as more credible, due to their palpable nature. The ones provided by the second category, by comparison, ask for extra efforts, ones that can only be made with help from the second coordinate of our assembly, the spiritual dimension.

---

[6] Nick Bostrom, "Is there a God? The Evidence for and Against", http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints /god/god.html

2. Final conclusions

The present study has proposed to bring together and compare various opinions and theories about the building and the harming of argument and place them on a neutral area of analysis, that of debate. We thought that this can serve us best our plans to fructify these observations by taking the right line of investigation for a study that was expected to match as faithfully as possible the proposed blueprint. The theories and opinions bright under lenses regard argument making in authentic oral production, and are to a great extent related to context-based argument appropriacy and inappropriacy.

Of the two choices, and using argument correctness as analytical support, we concentrated mostly on the latter, on argument fallacies, more exactly on how and in what circumstances they are most likely to occur.

The argument analyses proposed by formal logic did not make the object of our investigation, but instead we tried to follow the guidelines proposed by informal argumentation approaches, mostly the critical pragma-dialectical ones.

The theories of discourse and discourse analysis, with reference to the contribution of conversation analysis to pragmatics and argumentation, were also regarded as helpful to our endeavour. As we consider that any theoretical study should materialise in practical application, we selected to subject to corpus analysis the debate format, a context which is known to provide good ground for this kind of investigation and research.

We have decided for the informal approach because it is the informal argumentation that is more likely to turn fallacious in dialogue given its laxity, spontaneity and context-shifting propensity (context mobility). Toulmin once remarked that "*good* human reasoning is rarely valid or inductively strong," and this proves once more true, especially if we were to we turn an 'honest', critical eye on debate.
Another reason would be that in this domain research is profuse and diverse, in special when it comes to the ever-growing sophistication of fallacious passes, which makes rich fodder for future research, whatever the domain of investigation. In this sense, the debate format provides a perfect venue where we can watch how players carefully calculate and time their moves in order to make the best shot send the ball exactly in the intended spot. The limited time allotted for the passes is influential in how those passes are made. If one has a good hand and shoots precisely over the net, the ball will be sure to fall correctly in the adversary's territory. In order to be a good 'hitter', a debater should have practised the art of debating thoroughly and long, with all the due mastery of the labour tools: rhetoric (persuasion, and wit), logic and dexterity. Logic mastery helps the debater joggle with sound *or* unsound argumentation, depending on the strategy *they* decide to employ: the fair-play or charlatanry.

John Bush notes that even though logic is indeed an indispensible tool in argument making, it is not the only available tool. *Plausibility* is one of them, an aspect that transcends the strict logical rules, and also *timing*. "Under time pressure, the debater will have to bring together various facts, insights, and values that others share or can be persuaded to accept, and then show that those ideas lead more or less plausibly to a conclusion."[7] After evaluation and final decision making, the most plausible and

---

[7] John Bush, "Logical Fallacies and the Art of Debate", http://f4fs.org/logical-fallacies-and-the-art-of-debate/

convincing argumentation is declared winner, sometimes by omitting logical rigour and thwarting expectancy.

Alfred C. Snider, the 'debate teacher' whose instructions we have carefully followed and whose directions we have applied extensively in this paper, points out that, apart from the noble truth finding mission, debate also induces in its participants the spirit of competitivity. Yet, he jocundly remarks, "if you think a fallacious argument can slide by and persuade the judge to vote for you, you're going to make it, right? The trick is not getting caught."

Statistically, the proportion of fallacies identified on the two sides involved in the analysed debates is uneven. In the three analysed debates we have found that the fallacies committed by the atheist debaters exceeded the number of fallacies committed by the theists. However, these are opinions that leave room for 'rebuttals'. The tougher, the better, we should say.

Due to the complexity and ever-changing, constantly-renewing nature of the specialised information and research, the present endeavour does not claim to be a conclusive study but rather an embryonic proposal that might be taken over, improved and used for further, specialised investigation. We will also never claim to have attempted to offer *the* solution to the Deity predicament. This is one problem in front of which our expertise proves unfortunately too limited.

Cited sources per chapter

a) Preamble

References

Anscombre, J.-C. & O. Ducrot. (1983). *L'argumentation dans la langue*. Brussels. Pierre Mardaga.

Finoccharo, Maurice, A. (1987). Six Types of Fallaciousness: Toward a Realistic Theory of Logical Criticism. In Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto (eds.), *Fallacies, Classical and Contemporary Readings*. The Pensylvania State University Press, 1995: 120-130.

Finoccharo, Maurice, A. (2005). *Arguments about arguments: systematic, critical and historical essays in logical theory*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. (1984). *The Theory of Communicative Action:* Vol. I, *Reason and the Rationalisation of Society*, Boston, Beacon Press, translation and notes by Thomas McCarthy.

Heeny, Tom. (1995). Henry Johnstone's *Anagnorisis*: Argumentum ad Hominem as Tragic Trope of Truth. In *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, Vol. 28, No. 4: 388-404. Penn State University Press.

Marga, Andrei. (2006). *Argumentarea*, Editura Fundatiei Studiilor Europene, Cluj-Napoca.

Oléron, Pierre. (1983), *L'argumentation*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.

van Leeuwen, Theo. (2007). Legitimation in discourse and communication, In Teun A. van Dijk (ed.), *Discourse & Communication journal,* Vol. 1 No. 1: 91-112.

Ziegelmuller, W., George, Kay Jack & Dause, Charles. (1990). *Argumentation, Inquiry and Advocacy*, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey.

Webography

Goodwin, Jean. (2001). Henry Johnstone, Jr.'s Still-Unacknowledged Contributions to Contemporary Argumentation Theory. In Anthony Blair Ralph H. Johnson, Hans V. Hansen, Christopher W. Tindale (eds.), *Informal Logic* – Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice, Vol 21. No 1, J., www.phaenex.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic

Iten, Corinne. (2000). The relevance of Argumentation Theory. In J. Rooryck (ed.), *Lingua*, Volume. 110, Issue 9, 665-699, http://www.phon.ucl.ac.uk/publications/WPL/99papers/iten.pdf

Najor, Bruce. (2007). Burden of Rejoinder., http://sdiencyclopedia.wikispaces.com/Burden+of+Rejoinder

b) Chapter I

References:

Austin, John, Langshaw. (1975). *How to Do Things with Words,* Oxford University Press.

Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R. & Snoeck Henkemans, F. et al. (1996). *Fundamentels of Argumentation Theory. A Handbook of Historical Backgrounds and Contemporary Developments*, Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Finocchiaro, Maurice. (1987). Six Types of Fallaciousness: Toward a Realistic Theory of Logical Criticism. In Hans V. Hansen and Rovbert C. Pinto (eds.), *Fallacies, Classical and Contemporary Readings*. The Pensylvania State University Press, University Park, 1995: 120-130.

Eemeren, Frans, H.van, Garssen, Bart, Meuffels, Bert. (2009). *Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules.* Heideelberh: Springer Dordrecht.

Grice, Paul. (1975). Logic and conversation. In Cole & J. Morgan(eds.), *Syntax and Semantics,Volume 3: Speech Acts*, P. New York: Academic Press. Reprinted in *Studies in the Way of Words*, ed. H. P. Grice: 22–40. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989.

Hansen, Hans. (1996). Aristotle, Whateley and the Taxonomy of Fallacies. In *Practical Reasoning : International Conference on Formal and Applied Reasoning*, FAPR' 96, Bohn, Germany.

Mayer, Milton. (1966). *They Thought They Were Free: The Germans*, *1933-45,* University of Chicago Press

McGlone, Mathew. (2005). Contextomy: The art of quoting out of context. In *Media, Culture & Society*, Vol. 27, No. 4: 511-522. SAGE Publications.

McKeon, Richard, ed. (2001). *The Basic Works of Aristotle, De Sophisticis Elenchis (On Sophistical Refutations)*. Pickard-Cambridge, W. A. [1941]. New York: Modern Library.

Rottenberg, Annette T. (1994). *The Structure of Argument*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Russell, Bertrand. (1995). *A History of Western Philosophy* Book-of-the-Month Club: 93

Schick, Theodore and Lewis Vaughn. (1998). *How to Think About Weird Things: Critical Thinking for a New Age*, 2nd ed., Mayfield.

Sapir, Edward. (1929). The Status of Linguistics as a Science. In D. G. Mandelbaum E. (ed.) Selected Writings in Language, Culture, and Personality. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1095: 160-166

Steiner, George. (1998). *After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation*. London: Oxford University Press

Walton, Douglas. (1992). *Plausible Argument in Everyday Conversation*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992: xiii + 320.

Walton, Douglas N. (1994). *One-Sided Arguments: A Dialectic Analysis of Bias*, State university of New York Press.

Woods, John. (2008). *Arguments about arguments: systematic, critical and historical essays in logical theory* by Maurice A. Finocchiaro. Cambridge University Press, 2005. In *Informal Logic*, Vol. 28, No. 2: 193-202. Book review.

Whorf, B. L. (1940). Science and Linguistics. In *Technology Review* 42(6): 229-31, 247-248.

Whorf, B. L. (1956). *Language, Thought and Reality*. J. B. Carroll (ed.). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Webography

Cline, Austin. (2010). Flaws in Reasoning and Arguments: Sophistry Deliberately Flawed and Fallacious Arguments, http://atheism.about.com/od/logicalflawsinreasoning/a/sophistry.htm

Coleman, D., Robert. (2006). What is Circular Reasoning?, http://www.numeraire.com

Copi I.M., & Burgess-Jackson, K. (1996). *Informal logic*, Upper Saddle River: Prentice-Hall.

Curtis N.. Gary. Taxonomy of Logical Fallacies and How to Use the Taxonomy, Fallacy Files, http://www.fallacyfiles.org/taxonomy.html

Davis, Wayne. (2010). Implicature, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/implicature/

Dowden, Bradley. (2003). Fallacies. In *The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*,
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/f/fallacies.htm

Downes, Stephen. (1995-2010). Stephen's Guide to the Logical Fallacies. Brandon, Manitoba, Canada. (The Guide should be referenced as follows: Stephen Downes. Stephen's Guide to the Logical Fallacies. Brandon, Manitoba, Canada, 1995-2010).

Anonymous author. (2003). Deductive and Inductive Arguments, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/d/ded-ind.htm

Gilbert, M.A.. (2004). Emotion, argumentation and informal logic., http://www.yorku.ca/ gilbert/argthry/ argthry/arg-papers/mag2004-Emotion-il.pdf

Greenwell, William S., Knight, John C., Holloway, C. Michael, Jacob J. Pease. A Taxonomy of Fallacies in System Safety Arguments.. http://www.cs.virginia.edu.

Kies, Daniel. Using Logic in Composition., http://papyr.com/hypertextbooks/comp1/logic.htm

Labossiere, Michael C. (1995). Fallacies., http://www.nizkor.org/features/fallacies.

Lloyd-Kelly, Martyn and Wyner, Adam. Arguing with Emotion.,
http://wyner.info/research/Papers/WynerEmoArgScheme.pdf

mathew. (1997). Logic & Fallacies. Constructing a Logical Argument., http://www.infidels.org/news /atheism/logic.html

Lowe, E.J. (2003). Logic and Reasoning., http://web.cs.mun.ca/~ulf/gloss/logic.html

Moulton, J.. Paul. Symbolic Logic – Implication., http://science.jrank.org/pages/6671/Symbolic-Logic-Implication.html

Rayside, Derek, Campbel, Gerard T. (2000). An Aristotelian Understanding of Object-Oriented Programming. OOPSLA workshop on Advanced Separation of Concerns, in *Logic and Reasoning.*, http://web.cs.mun.ca/~ulf/gloss/logic.html.

Straker, David.   Aristotle's 13 Fallacies., http://changingminds.org/disciplines/argument/fallacies /aristotle_fallacies.htm

Streveler, Paul. (2005).[1999]. Richard the Sophister. In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/richard-sophister/

Vickers, John. (2010), [2006]. The Problem of Induction. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2010 Edition)*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2010/entries/induction-problem

Wong, Kai-Yee (2008). Implicatures, conditional strengthening and argumentation. http://phil.arts. cuhk.edu.hk/~phidept/papers/kywong/Implicature_NNC.pdf.

Walton, Douglas. (2005). Justification of Argumentative Schemes, University of Winnipeg , http://philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2005/2005_1.pdf.

Woods, John. (2008). The concept of fallacy is empty: A resource-bound approach to error. In Lorenzo Magnani and Li Ping (eds.), *Model Based Reasoning in Science, Technology and Medicine*, 64: 69-90. http://philos.unipv.it/emabardo/filcog/shared_folder/Lezione_12/woods.pdf.

Zenker, Frank. (2010). *Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness. Empirical Research Concerning the Pragma-Dialectical Discussion Rules*. Frans van Eemeren, Bart Garssen and Bert Meuffels Dordrecht (eds.), 2009, Springer. Book review. http://cogency.udp.cl/ediciones/3/ Cogency_v2_n1_11.pdf.

c) Chapter II

References

Blair, J., Anthony. (1988).The limits of the dialogue model of argument. In *Argumentation*, Volume 12, Number 2: 325-339.

Crosswhite, James. (1995). Is There an Audience for This Argument? Fallacies,Theories, and Relativisms. In *Philosophy & Rhetoric*. Vol. 28, No 2: 134-145. Penn State University Press.

Eemeren Frans, H, van. (2009). *Strategic Maenuvering in Argumentative Discourse*. John Benjamins Publishing Company.

Eemeren, F.H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Snoeck Henkemans, Francisca, A. (2002). *Argumentation: Analysis, evaluation, presentation,* Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Eemeren, Frans, H.van, Grootendorst, R. (2004) *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation: The pragma – dialectical approach*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Eemeren, F.H. van, Houtlosser, P., & Snoeck Henkemans, A.F. (2007). *Argumentative indicators in discourse: A pragma-dialectical study*. Argumentation Library, vol.12. Dordrecht: Springer.

Sillars, Malcolm O., Ganer, Patricia. (1982). Values and Beliefs: A Systematic Basis for Argumentation. In *Advances in Argumentation Theory and Research,* ed. J. Robert Cox and Charles A. Willard: 184–201. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP.

Walton, Douglas, Krabbe, Erik. (1995). *Commitment in Dialogue. Basic Concepts of Interpersonal Reasoning*. State University of New York Press.

Walton, Douglas. (2005). *Argumentation Methods for Artificial Intelligenece in Law*. Berlin:Heidelberg. Springer.

Webography

Braun, David. (2007). Indexicality., Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu /entries/indexical

_____ .(2009). *Examining Arguments in Context: Fifteen Studies on Strategic Manoeuvring*. Frans H. van Eemeren (ed.). Benjamins Publishing Company

_____.(2002). *Advances in Pragma-Dialectics*, Frans H. van Eemeren (ed). Amsterdam: Sic Sat / Newport News, VA: Vale Press, http://www. humanities.mcmaster.ca/~hitchckd/advances.htm

_____.(2008). *Controversy and Confrontation: Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory*. Eemeren, Frans H. van, Garssen, Bart (eds.). Amsterdam and Phildelphia. John Benjamins

Freeman, James B. (2006). A place for Informal Logics within Pragma-Dialectics. In Houtlosser, Peter, Van Rees, Agnes (eds.), *Considering Pragma-Dialectics*, Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates: 63-75.

Hitchcock, David. (2002). *Advances in Pragma-Dialectics*, Frans H. van Eemeren (ed.), Amsterdam, Sic Sat/Newport News, VA: Vale Press. Book review.,
http://www.humanities.mcmaster.ca/~hitchckd/advances.htm.

Kauffeld, F. (2007). Commentary on F.H. van Eemeren, P. Houtlosser and A. F. Snoek Henkemans: "Dialectical profiles and indicators of argument moves." In H.V. Hansen, *et. al.* (eds.), *Dissensus and the Search for Common Ground*: 1-5. Windsor, ON: OSSA.,
http://jakemachina.com/OSSA/pdf/221_Kauffeld_on_vanEemeren_et.al.pdf.

Klumpp, James F. (1993). A Rapprochement between Dramatism and Argumentation. In *Argumentation and Advocacy* 29: 148-63., http://terpconnect.umd.edu/~jklumpp/research/rap.htm.

Lumer, Christoph. (2010). Pragma-Dialectics and the Function of Argumentation. In *Argumentation* Volume 24, Number 1: 41-69., http://www.unisi.it/ricerca/dip/fil_sc_soc/A071.1_Lumer_Pragma Dialectics.pdf

Whaley, Bryan B., Samter, W. (2006). *Explaining communication: contemporary theories and exemplars*. Mahwah, N.J. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

------------------ *Argumentative dialogue*, https://academictech.doit.wisc.edu/ideas/otr/communication /forms-of-dialogue/argumentative.

Zenker, Frank. (2007). Pragma-Dialectic's Necessary Conditions for a Critical Discussion ,
http://jakemachina.com/OSSA/pdf/840_Zenker.pdf.

d) Chapter III

References

Austin, J. L. (1975). How to do things with words (2nd ed.). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brown, Gillian, Yule, George. (1983). *Discourse analysis*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Budd, John. (2002). Discourse Analysis and the Study of Communication. *in LIS*

Library Trends, Volume 55, Number 1, Summer 2006: 65-82.

Dewey, J. (1933). *Experience and Education.* New York: Macmillan.

Fowler, Roger. On Critical Linguistics. In Caldas-Coulthard, C. Rosa, Coulthard, Malcom (eds.). *Texts and Pracitces – Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Taylor and Francis Group, Routledge, 1996: 3-14.

Day, Ronald. E., (2000). Tropes, history, and ethics in professional discourse and information science. In *Journal of the Society for Information Science*, Volume 51, No 5: 469-475.

De Saussure, F. (1959). *Course in general linguistics*. New York: Philosophical Library.

Dreyfus, H. L., & Rabinow, P. (1983). Michel Foucault: Beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Fairclough, Norman. (1989). *Language and Power*, Pearson Education Limited.

Grice, P. (1989). *Studies in the way of words*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Gumperz, John, Joseph. (1982). *Discourse strategies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Marga, Andrei. (2006) *Argumentarea*. Cluj-Napoca: Editura Fundaᴑiei Studiilor Europene.

Sacks, Harvey. (1992). *Lectures on conversation*, Blackwell Publishing.

Schlier, Heinrich, "παρρησία, παρρησιάζομαι," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich (eds). Ann Arbor: Eerdmans, 1967. Vol.V: 871ff.

Searle, J. R. (1969). *Speech acts: An essay in the philosophy of language*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stubbs, Michael. (1983). *Discourse analysis: The sociolinguistic analysis of natural language*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Thornbury, Scott. (2005). *Beyond.the Sentence - Introducing discourse analysis*, Macmillan Publishers Limited.

Van Dijk, T.A. (1998). Discourse Structure. In *Ideology. A multidisciplinary Approach.* London: Sage Pubications Ltd: 200-210.

Webography

Antaki, C., Billig, M., Edwards, D., Potter, J. (2003). Discourse Analysis Means Doing Analysis: A Critique of Six Analytic Shortcomings. In *Discourse Analysis Online*, vol.1, no.1., http://www.shu.ac.uk/daol/previous/v1/n1/index.html.

Hammersley, Martyn. (2002). Discourse Analysis: a bibliographical guide, http://www.ali.iup.edu /pdf%20articles/hammersley%20DA%20bib.pdf

Walton, Douglas, Macagno, Fabrizio. (2009). Classification and Ambiguity: the role of definition in a conceptual system. In *Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric* 16 (29).

Ziv, Yael. Discourse Analysis.,

http://pluto.mscc.huji.ac.il/~mszivy/Ziv_Y_Discourse_Analysis_proof01.pdf

e) Chapter IV

References

Woods, John. (2008). The concept of fallacy is empty: A resource-bound approach to error. In *Model Based Reasoning in Science, Technology and Medicine*, 64, Lorenzo Magnani and Li Ping (eds.), 69-90.

Aristotle. *On Sophistical Refutation,* eBooks@Adelaide, 2007.

Bradshaw, Martha; Lowenstein, Arlene. (2007). *Innovative Teaching Strategies in Nursing and Related Health Professions*. Mississauga, Ontario: Jones and Barteltt Publishers.

Bryan Horner, Winifred. (1988). *Rhetoric in the Classical Tradition,* Palgrave: Macmillan

Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein. (2006). A Study in the Pragmatics of Persuasion: a game theoretical approach. In *Theoretical Economics* 1: 395-410.

Huber, B. Robert., Snider Alfred, C. (2006). *Influencing through argument*. New York: International Debate Association.

Snider, Alfred, Schnurer, Maxwell. (2002). *Many sides: debate across the curriculum.* New York: International Debate Education Association.

Webography

Casey, P., Brian. (1984). An Intrduction to Academic, Parliamentary and Cross-examination Styles of Debate. Revised by John Fillitier, 2004., http://debatingsociety.ca/ns/publications/Introduction-Debating_Styles.pdf

Cyprus, Sheri. (2003/2011). What is a Debate?, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-debate.htm

Fillitier, John, D. (2004). An Introduction to Academic Debate – Alberta Debate and Speech., http://www.albertadebate.com/adebate/ resources/styles/academic.pdf

Institute of Ideas – Debating Matters Competition, http://www.debatingmatters.com/takingpart/debatetimingandstructure.

Flynn, Colm. Debate Training. World Debating Website,
http://worlddebating.blogspot.com/search/label/Training.

Glazer, Jacob and Ariel Rubinstein. (2001). Debates and Decisions, On a Rationale of Argumentation Rules. In *Games and Economic Behavior*, 36: 158-173 (pdf. http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/62.pdf)

Shotter, John. Instead of Theory Critique and debate: Voloshinev's unending, dialogically-structured participatory mode of inquiry., http://pubpages.unh.edu/~jds/Voloshinov.htm

_____. Developing a Central Claim.Writing Studio, Duke University,
http://uwp.duke.edu/uploads/assets/developing%20a%20central%20claim.pdf

_____. Developing Strong Thesis Statements. Purdue Online Writing Lab http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/588/01/)

f) Chapter V

References

Ayer, Alfred, Jules. (2001), [1946]. *Language, Truth and Logic*. London: Penguin Books Bowker, John. (2000). Introduction to *Oxford Concise Dictionary of World Religions*, Oxford University Press.

Corlett, Angelo, J. (2010). *The Errors of Atheism*. New York: The Continuum International Publishing Group.

Damer, Edward, T. (2001). *Attacking Faulty Reasoning*, Wadsworth/Thomson Learning Inc.

Dawkins, Richard. (2006). *The God Delusion*, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company.

Eemeren, F.H. van, & Grootendorst, R. (1995). The Pragma-Dialectical Approach to Fallacies. In *Fallacies – classical and contemporary readings*, Hans V. Hansen and Robert Pinto (eds.). The Pennsylvania State University Press: 130-144.

Frossard, André. (1990). *Dieu en Questions*. (Romanian translation: *De ce să trăim □i alte întrebări despre Dumnezeu*, translated by Irina Eliade) Bucuresti: Editura Humanitas.

Hawking, W. Stephen. (1998). *A Brief History of Time- from the Big Bang to Black Holes*, A Bantam Book Publishing History.

Jackson, Frank, Cameron. (1982). Epiphenomenal Qualia. In Tim Mulgan (ed.), *Philosophical Quarterly*, Volume 32, No 127: 127-136.

Jordan, Jeff. (2004). Divine Love and Human Suffering, In *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Vol. 56, No. 2./3: 169–178.

Kelemen, Deborah. (2004). Are Children ''Intuitive Theists''? Reasoning about Purpose and Design in Nature. In *Psychological Science*, Volume 15, Number 5: 295-301.

Linville, Mark. (2009). *The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology,* William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (eds.). Madden MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Maizen, Stephen. (2010). Ordinary Morality Implies Atheism. *In European Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, Volume 2, Number 2: 107-126.

Russel, Bertrand. (1957). *Why I Am Not A Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects*, Paul Edwards (ed.). London: George Allen & Unwin.

Smith, George. (1989). *Atheism: The Case Against God*. New York: Prometheus Books. Streng, Frederick J. (1970). The Objective Study of Religion and the Unique Quality of Religiousness. In *Journals of Religious Studies*, Vol.6, Issue 3. Cambridge.

Tindale, Christopher, (2006). Constrained maneuvering - Rhetoric as a Rational Enterprise. In *Argumentation*, Volume 20, Number 4: 447-466.

Walton, Douglas N., Krabbe , Erik C.W. (1995). *Commitment in Dialogue – Basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning*, New York: State University New York Press.

Walton, Douglas N. (1994). *One-Sided Arguments: A Dialectic Analysis of Bias*, State University of New York Press.

Walton, Douglas. (1998). A Pragmatic Model of Legal Disputation. In Notre Dame Law Review, Vol. 73 No. 3: 711 – 736.

Walton, Douglas, N. (2004). *Relevance in Argumentation*. In Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (eds.). Mahwah: New Jersey.

Walton, Douglas, N. (2006). *Fundamentals of Critical Argumentation*, Cambridge University Press.

Webography

Ahmadi, Ahmad. Three Topics in Theological Philosophy. In *al Tawhid Islamic Journal*, *Qum*, Iran, vol 1 # 3, http://www.al-islam.org/al-tawhid/theological_philosophy/2.htm.

Carr, Taylor. (2010). The Moral Argument for God, http://www.godlesshaven.com/articles/moral-argument-for-god.html

Clark, Tom, W. (2006). Denying the Little God of Free Will: The Next Step for Atheists? – An open letter to the atheist community, http://www.naturalism.org/atheism.htm.

Clark, Tom, W. (2008). Projecting God: The Psychology of Theological Justification. In *Naturalism.Org*. http://www.naturalism.org/projecting_god.htm.

Cline, Austin. Genetic fallacy, Ad Hominem Fallacies of Relevance. In About.com, Agnosticism/Atheism, http://atheism.about.com

Conway, Timothy. (2005). Meister Eckhart – nondual Christian Mystic Sage. In Enlightened Spirituality.Org.,

http://www.enlightened-spirituality.org/Meister_Eckhart.html

Curtis, Gary, N. Fallacy Files., http://www.fallacyfiles.org/index.html

De Beule, Joachim, (2008). (Logical) Fallacies, methods of scientific research..,

http://arti.vub.ac.be/cursus/2010-2011/mwo/fallacies.pdf.

Eemeren, F. H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2000). Rhetoric in pragma-dialectics. In

Argumentation, Interpretation, Rhetoric, 1. 10th AFA/SCA Conference on Argumentation in Alta (1997) Retrieved from www.argumentation.spb.ru/2000_1/index.htm.

Enyart, Bob. (2010). A Christian Answer to Euthypro's Dilemma., http://www.theologyonline.com/ forums/showthread.php?t=47024.

Fridman, Michael. (2008). Pro-Bible Atheism., http://anadder.com/pro-bible-atheism

Fowler, Thomas, B. (2007). Reductionism, Naturalism, and Nominalism: the 'Unholy Trinity' and its Implications for the Science/Religion Dialogue.,

http://www.metanexus.net/magazine/tabid/68/id/10031/Default.aspx.

Gish, Duane, T. Brainwashed., http://www.skepticfiles.org/evolut/evolve7i.htm.

Goodenough, U., & Deacon, T. W. (2003). From Biology to Consciousness to Morality. In *Zygon Journal of Religion and Science*, 38 (4): 801-19.,

http://www.missouriwestern.edu/orgs/polanyi/TAD%20WEB%20ARCHIVE/TAD30-3/TAD30-3-pg6-21-pdf.pdf

Greenwell, William S., Knight, John C., Holloway, C. Michael, Jacob J. Pease. (2006). A Taxonomy of Fallacies in System Safety Arguments., http://www.cs.virginia.edu.

Hagin, Stephen. (2005). Fallacies of diction. In *Argumentation and Logic*, English 1102/03, 07 &10. Kennesaw State Univeristy., http://ksuweb.kennesaw.edu/~shagin/26diction.pdf

Haldeman-Julius, E. (1931). The Meaning of Atheism, Little Blue Book No.1597, Haldeman-Julius Publications., http://www.infidels.org.

Hardwick, Joe. How to Understand and Apply Reason.,
http://moderndeism.com/html/understanding_reason.html

Johnston, Patrick. Proofs for the Existence of God – Even Atheists Presuppose God's Existence – the transcendental refutation of atheism., http://www.rightremedy.org/booklets/47

LaFave, Sandra. Open and Closed Concepts and the Continuum Fallacy; The Problem of Religious Language., http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/flew.html.

Laar, Jan Albert van. (2010). Argumentative Bluff in Eristic Discussion: An Analysis and Evaluation. In *Argumentation*, Vol. 24, Nr. 3, 383-398, http://www.springerlink.com.

Lindsey, Donald. A List of Fallacious Arguments., http://www.don-lindsay-archive.org.

Martin, Michael. (1997). The Gap in Theistic Arguments., http://www.infidels.org

Martin, Michael. (2000). The Naturalistic Fallacy and Other Mistaken Arguments of Paul Copan., http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/nat_fallacy.html.

Metacrock. (2006). Arguments for the Existence of God.
http://www.godsci.com/gsi/doxa/god/args/00_IntroGod.html

Muehlhouser, Luke. (2009). What is Morality, metha-ethics in plain talk. In *Common Sense Atheism*, http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=772.

Muehlhauser, Luke. (2009). Theism, Atheism, and the Genetic Fallacy. In *Criticism of Atheists*, General Atheism, http://commonsenseatheism.com/?p=1280.

Neuman,Yair, Weinstock, P. Michael, Glasner, Amnon. (2006). The effect of contextual factors on the judgement of informal reasoning fallacies. In *The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, Psychology Press*. Taylor and Francis Group, 59 (2): 411- 425.
http://www.psypress.com/qjep

Parsons, Keith. (2011). Naturalism and Norms., http://secularoutpost.infidels.org/

Ridge, Michael. (2008). Moral Non-Naturalism. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*,
http://www.illc.uva.nl/~seop/archives/win2008/entries/moral-non-naturalism/

Ruggiero, Tim. Logical Fallacies., http://www.philosophicalsociety.com/Logical%20Fallacies.htm

Schadewald, Robert. (1986). Scientific Creationism and Error., http://www.talkorigins.org/faqs/cre-error.html , reprinted from *Creation/Evolution* (v. 6, n. 1: 1-9) with permission from the author.

Smith, George. (1976). *Atheism: The Case Against God*, renamed as "How to Defend Atheism" by Internet Infidels.Org., http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/george_smith/defending.html.

Steup, Matthias. (2006),[2001]. The Analysis of Knowledge. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/.

Tanner, Julia. (2006). The Naturalistic Fallacy. In *Richmond Journal of Philosophy* 13., http://www.richmond-philosophy.net/rjp/back_issues/rjp13_tanner.pdf

Reppert, Victor. (1998). The Argument from Reason., http://www.infidels.org

Tremblay, Francois. (2011). The Euthyphro Dilemma., http://www.strongatheism.net/library /atheology/euthyphro_dilemma/

Thornhill, Chris. (2011). Carl Jaspers. In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*,
http://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=jaspers

Walton, Douglas, N. (1998). A Pragmatic Model of Legal Disputation. In *Notre Dame Law Review*, Vol.73: 711-735.

Walton, Douglas, N,. (2005). Justification of Argumentation Schemes,
http://philosophy.unimelb.edu.au/ajl/2005/2005_1.pdf

Woody, C.C. (2003). The Freewill Argument – Atheism scores against Arminianism!?!.,
http://www.freerepublic.com

Whitman, Glen. (2005). Argumentation – Fallacies and the Art of Debate, Debate webpage,
http"//www.csun.edu/~dgw61315/index.html

h) Chapter VI

References

Flew, Antony. (2007). *There Is a God: How the World's Most Notorious Atheists Changed His Mind*. New York: HarperOne.

Antony Flew. (1950). Theology and Falsification. In Joel Feinberg (ed). *Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems of Philosophy*, Belmont, CA: Dickenson Publishing Company, Inc., 1968: 48-49.

Deacon, T.W. (1997). *The Symbolic Species: The Co-Evolution of Language and the Brain*, New York: W.W. Norton.

The "Summa Theologica" of St. Thomas Aquinas. Part I QQ I.-XXVI. Literally

translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Second and revised edition**.** London: Burns Oates and Washbourne, Vol. 1, 1920.

Webography

Anonymous author. Eternal Torment in Hell – a Scriptural teaching? In *The Harvest Herald*.,
http://www.harvestherald.com/pdf/eternal_torment_not_scriptural.pdf.

Bacchiocchi, Samuele. (1997). Hell: Eternal torment or annihilation? In *Immortality or Resurrection? A Biblical Study on Human Nature and Destiny*. Berrien Springs, Michigan: Biblical Perspectives.,
http://www.biblicalperspectives.com/books/immortality_resurrection/6.htm.

Bechtold, Henry (2011). Eternal Torment In Hell: Is It Biblical?. http://searchwarp.com/swa704281-Eternal-Torment-In-Hell-Is-It-Biblical.htm.

Bostrom, Nick. Is there a God? The evidence for and against, http://www.anthropic-principle.com/preprints/god/god.html.

Bush, John. Logical Fallacies and the Art of Debate, http://f4fs.org/logical-fallacies-and-the-art-of-debate/.

Henning, Martha L. (1998). Friendly Persuasion: Classical Rhetoric., http://courses.durhamtech.edu/perkins/aris.html.

Pagin, Peter. (2008). What is communicative success? In *Canadian Journal of Philosophy***,** 8855 Volume 38, Number 1, March 2008: 85-116,. http://www.canadianjournalofphilosophy.com/PDFs/cjp38-1--085-116--Pagin.pdf

The Illogic Primer: Inductive Fallacies, http://afterall.net/illogic/490539 (for the fallacies quoted in the footnotes)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CITED SCHEMES

1. The Curtis taxonomy

The Fallacy Files: Taxonomy of Logical Fallacies

2. Toulmin's model of argument