## Content

Introduction	4
Arendt's political theory: issues concerning the method	
Phenomenology of the common world	15
Analytics of human faculties	20
Arendt and the existential philosophy	26
Totalitarianism and the destruction of the political	
The analysis of totalitarianism	42
A debate on the nature of totalitarianism. Arendt and Voegelin	52
Natural law and the difficulties of founding human rights	60
The critique of the foundation of human rights	65
The human condition as vita activa	
Modernity and the status of the self	74
Between the polis and modern society. Theories of the public sphere	78
"The public world". Arendt versus Heidegger	91
Vita activa and the human nature	96
Travaliu și consum	101
Work and the genesis of the common world	104
Action and the work of art	111
Revolution and the institution of the political	
The political-social difference	120
Revolution and freedom	127
Plurality and politics	128
Power and communication	132
The architectonics of human faculties	
The theory of temporality	135
The status of thinking within the architectonics of faculties of the mind	139
A dialogue about thinking: Arendt and Heidegger	146
Love, world and plurality	148
The status of willing	155
Judgement and the status of the political	157
Conclusion	164
Bibliography	167

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In the first chapter, entitled *Arendt's political theory: issues concerning the method*, we analyzed the method Arendt applied in developing her work. There are two perspectives from which we can look at this method: a first perspective involves finding sources and intellectual influences for Arendt's theory, the second involves a review of how Arendt reflected on her own methods and a confirmation of the existence of a well-differentiated method in Arendt's work, namely an understanding of the status that Hannah Arendt assigns to method throughout her work. More specifically, we establish in this chapter the use that the phenomenological current and existential philosophy assume in Arendt's philosophy. Certainly, the two philosophical schools of thought were established as a main source of inspiration for Arendt. But what Arendt makes from these philosophical schools thinking is to take from them certain elements of the method and link them with her own line of thinking, which involves rethinking the doctrine of faculties, this time not only of spiritual faculties, but as human faculties. Arendt succeeds to extend the Kantian doctrine of faculties to the entire human life seen as vita activa (active life).

Normally after the debate about the method, the theoretical lineages and after the announcement and schematization of the arendtian architectonical project, the second chapter of our thesis focuses on those premises that have lead towards Arendt's analysis of the human condition. Entitled *Totalitarianism and the destruction of the political*, the second chapter of the thesis deals with the totalitarian phenomenon. We focus here on Arendt's concept of totalitarianism, primarily but not exclusively using the work *The Origins of Totalitarianism*. Even if it fitted the structural-politological paradigm, the arendtian concept of totalitarianism is radically different from the current one that is used in post-war historical and social sciences, because it is founded on the notion of an

unpredictable and inexplicable event, as well as on the idea of an essay to amend human nature through terror and ideology.

Throughout the third chapter, we are in the second stage of reconstructing the architectonics of human faculties. We will focus our attention on the manner in which Arendt analyzes the faculties belonging to the vita activa, as well as their dynamic relationship occurred among them within what the author defines as the human condition. In this chapter, the concept of the human condition is interpreted as part of Arendt's attempt to overcome the metaphysical foundations such as those involved in the idea of human nature. The concept of human condition is not about man's essence which would reveal through a metaphysics of subjectivity, but rather the orientation towards "what we do" in practice. An analysis of both the labor and work and then the action becomes mandatory for both the arendtian approach and for this point in our analysis.

Related to the problem of the public world, in the fourth chapter of our thesis we analyzed the phenomenon of revolution, which we propose as a model for Arendt explanation of the authentic constitution of a political domain. We thus demonstrate that the idea of revolution is so intimately linked the the idea of freedom and power, the last two being also exhaustively explained in volume *On revolution*. Arendt conceives therefore the revolution as a construction of a political space of freedom, where people are able to govern themselves. The arendtian plea goes towards establishing an autonomous political space, whose purpose is not extrinsic, but only intrinsic, that of guaranteeing freedom. Therefore, in such a public space, possible only under the conditions or, less commonly, as a result of revolution, freedom can manifest itself in another way than in the negative one, as non-interference, non-involvement of the state or of others in the private sphere of individuality, and namely in a positive sense, that is as the manifestation on all levels, of the political capacity for self-government.

The final chapter aims to crown our restoration project of Arendt's architectonic of human faculties. If our work till this point examined the active life and faculties that it enhances, at this point of our enterprise becomes necessary the treatment of the other three faculties which belong to the life of the mind, that is thinking, willing and judging. Thus we complete the picture of human faculties based primarily on the experience of the

contemplative faculties in the inner life of the individual, and secondly we analyze their expression and consequences in public life.

After thematizing temporality as experience of contemplative life, the final chapter of our thesis demonstrates how Arendt linked in various ways the three spiritual faculties to the political domain, even if thinking and willing cannot constitute the architectonic basis for action its political meaning. If in the case of thinking and willing Arendt makes a philosophical history of these faculties, the judgment is interpreted narrowly, its meaning regarding only the Kantian faculty of judging, that is a reflective type of judgment. The philosophical history of thinking and willing undertaken by Arendt has implications also for the domain of the political, even though the author does not give these faculties a relevant architectonical role concerning the political.