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Doctoral thesis summary
Genesis of romantic Leninsm. A theoretical perspective over the
international orientation of Romanian communism, 1948-1989

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Key words: romantic Leninism, theory of international relations, international relations, ideology, foreign policy

Introduction

The stake of the present paper consists in the ideological analysis and theoretical deciphering of the international policy of Romanian communism during the period it held political power, 1948-1989. The sources consulted for this work are various, starting with archival documents and propagandistic materials and ending with books and scientific articles, relatively divergent regarding Romania's international orientation in the above mentioned period.

To start with, the theoretical framework of the thesis is outlined, consisting in four major theories of international relations (IR) – realism, pluralism, Marxism and social-constructivism – stressing the main ideas and analytic methods of each. My aim is to prove tha social-constructivism is the most appropriate theory to clarify the international orientation of Romanian communism. Of course, foreign and international policy is not be analyzed without taking into account internal affairs and, in the case of Leninist regimes, the subsequent ideological element, perhaps their most important dimension. Therefore, these two aspects were particularly insisted upon in this thesis.

Next comes the conceptual framework, which encompasses an ideological analysis of different types of Leninisms present in different periods in the Soviet Union: revolutionary Leninism, post-revolutionary Leninism, Europeanized Leninism, Asianized Leninism, systemic Leninism and post-bolshevik Leninism. These varieties of Leninism are used in respect to the different chronological segments researched upon and dependent on the ideological contribution to the configuring of romantic Leninism, the concept best suited for understanding the ideology of Romanian communism after 1965, both in internal and foreign affairs.

After the presentation of the theoretical and conceptual instruments, the Sovietization process of Eastern Europe is taken into account, insisting upon the case of Romania. The analysis is centered on the international level, but also evaluates the internal political metamorphoses which, correlated with the discretionary interventions of the Soviet Union, allow the local communists to gradually obtain power, eliminating the historical parties and

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imprisoning their members. In January 1948 the political status of Romania is transformed from monarchy o popular republic. In this context, due to reasons analyzed in the chapter, different scission lines appear within the new political elite which will end partially in 1952 with the political neutralization of Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu. Gheorghiu-Dej successfully managed to marginalize its most important rivals. But its political power will not be fully consolidated until the passing of the de-Stalinization shock, which seriously weakened the position of the general secretary of Romanian Workers Party (RWP).

The next chapter focuses on the impact of de-Stalinization upon the communist world and on the revolutions from Hungary and Poland. I am interested here especially on the strategies developed by the leadership of the Romanian Popular Republic (RPR) managed to soften the impact of de-Stalinization and to gain the trust of the new Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, up to the point where the Red Army troops still stationing in the country were retreated. Another point of interest is the so called „left-wing deviation". Seizing the moment of political vendettas when Stalin was condemned by Khrushchev at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chişinevschi tried to create a coalition against Gheorghiu-Dej, aiming at overthrowing him. Why did they fail and what were the consequences of their intention are just a few that I tried to partially answer in this chapter.

The last period of Dej's leadership is centered on two main international events. The first one is the conflict between RPR and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). Because the most developed countries of the 'socialist camp' – Czechoslovakia, The German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union – wanted the specialization of production in two main directions, industrial and alimentary, RPR being included in the second category, the Bucharest leaders protested, arguing in ideological, political and economical terms in favor of accelerating the level of industrialization. The dispute was temporarily solved by renouncing the Soviet claim regarding the integration and supra-nationalization of the economies of socialist countries. Closed to the divergence between RPR and CMEA is the position of Bucharest leaders regarding the Sino-Soviet conflict, on opportunity from which Dej and its camarilla obtained, trough diplomatic acrobacies, important economical and political benefits, furthering their rift with Moscow.

The 'Ceausescu epoch' is structured in the same way, on tree main chapters. The first one problematizes the concept of romantic Leninism, an ideological construct underlining the Romanian policies in that period, both internal and external, focusni next on Ceausescu's ascension and on the famous dissident political gestures of the new Romanian Socialist Republic (RSS) in the second half of the 1960s, which caused displeasure in Moscow and the sympathy

and finances of the West. I analyze next the ideological flux form 1971, which I referred to as the manifest moment of romantic Leninism.

The 1970's do not bring major changes in the foreign policy of RSS. The most important events of the decade are the openness of Romanian economy towards Western international organisms, together with the highly mediatized Helsinki conference were the main topics were European security and human rights. Communist regimes were weakened by the recognition of human rights, which conditioned their foreign policies and increased dissidence at home. Another central point of this chapter lies in the ideological conexions between the internal and foreign policy of romantic Leninism.

Finally, the last stage of Ceausescu's leadership is characterized by the pronounced totalitarian drifts of the regime, consequently ending with its progressive international isolation. After 1985, when Michael Gorbachev took power in the Soviet Union, the RSS was becoming more and more an outcast of the 'socialist camp', while condemning the latter's 'bourgeois' tendencies, perceived as being ideologically disintegrating and politically coercive.

After the empirical research, the final chapter consists in a theoretical analysis of the material using the four IR theories mentioned above. I discuss, in this chapter, the motives for which social-constructivism is a better theoretical instrument than pluralism, realism and even Marxism – in understanding the international policy of Romanian communism and the ideological dimension underlying it.

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Methodologically, this thesis is structured on two major parts: an empirical and a theoretical one. The empirical part, which covers the chronological interval between 1948 and 1989, was written with the help of comparative historical analysis, together with document analysis. The international politics of the Romanian communist regime was placed in context, stressing upon its relation with the Soviet Union, but also its perspectives regarding the main tendencies of world politics. Beside secondary literature, published and unpublished documents were consulted, bringing forward ideological and political aspects.

The theoretical part, although reduced in size when compared to the evenimential analysis, as it is normal after all, includes in exchange many types of scientific methodologies. Besides applying the four main theories of IR – realism, pluralism, Marxism and social-cosntructivism – upon the historical interval investigated, I have made use, in the first place, of ideological analysis and then, to a less extent, anthropological, political psychology and discourse analyses.

Theoretical framework

The present paper consists in a theoretical evaluation of the international policy of communist Romania, stressing on the ideological dimension of the process. Four major theories used in the study of IR – realism, pluralism, Marxism and social-constructivism – will comprise the instrumentary needed for the analysis. The theories were mentioned in the order of their importance within the IR discipline; as for their relevance to the study of the empiric material, the succession will support major changes. We shall see next the main premises and assumptions of each of these theories.

Realism

Supported by a millenar intellectual tradition which starts with Tucydides, goes trough Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz and reaches the 21st century trough authors like Hans Morgenthau, Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin or John Mearsheimer – realism represents the main current in IR, despite the numerous and powerful critics it had to face for several decades now.

To each IR theory corresponds, to a more or less extent, a political ideology (in scientific, not dogmatic or militant terms, as the notion will be applied to the concept of Romantic Leninism, developed in the thesis). Accordingly, realism represents the international facet of conservatism, an intellectual current developed along thousands of years within the military Greek and roman doctrines, then under the protective aegis of roman-catholic theology and, last but not least, as a reaction against the rational project of modernity. Here lies one of the first aspects that differentiates realism from other IR theories: its anteriority regarding the enlightenment philosophy which created modernity. Pluralism, Marxism and social-constructivism are all intellectual projects that claim themselves, with no exception, from the critical legacy of the French Revolution.

Realism operates, as the other theories of IR, with several basic concepts.[1] Methodologically, studying the causes of wars, Waltz distinguishes tree 'images': the first one, which considers that international conflicts appear first in the mind of the leader, and only then materialized; the second one, were wars emerge due to the internal constitution – political,

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[1] In order to simplify the reading of the text, I will mention here the main souces used trough out this chapter: Dunne, Kurki, Smith: 2010; Steans, Pettiford: 2008; Dougherty, Pfaltzgraff: 1997; Halliday: 1994; Baylis, Smith, Owens: 2008; Viotti, Kauppi: 1999; Taylor (ed.): 1980; Lobell, Lipsman, Taliaferro: 2009; Morgenthau: 2007; Carr: 1947; Niebuhr: 1977; Guzzini: 2000; Waltz: 2001; Waltz: 2007; Miroiu, Ungureanu: 2006; Buzan: 2000; Wendt: 1999; Gilpin: 1981; Mearsheimer: 2003; Nye, Keohane: 2009; Nye: 2009; Ball, Dagger: 2000; Copilaş: 2009a.

economical, social or ideological – of states, an explicative factor superior to the simple psychology of the leader and, finally, the last image, regarded by Waltz as the most important: the international structure, composed of the power fluctuations of states which, globally, become independent of their intentions – 'the distribution of capacities within the system' in Waltz's terms and deterministically press upon the international behavior of each 'unit' (state). Although all tree images (later renamed 'levels of analysis' and including a larger analytical area, limited not only to conflicts) are useful in deciphering the international policy of a state, according to Waltz, only the systemic one is indispensable. This study is placed within the second analysis level, an assumption which will be insisted upon in the last chapter of the paper, but it does neglect neither the third, nor the first level

Waltzian realism is also known as neorealism or structural realism. The intellectual configuration of neorealism would have not existed in the absence of classical realism thea preceded it. Here, names like Hans Morgenthau, Edward Carr or Reinhold Niebuhr are central. Waltz's first image is the most important in the case of classical realism. Human nature, corrupt, immoral, coward or vindictive lies at the basis of all reprehensible things in the world. One can see the contribution of catholic theology to this type of realism: the 'original sin' with which every person is born, lives and dies gives the extent of human interrelations and implicitly of international politics: violent, anarchical structured by ambitions, egoism and power will. Directly connected to the people which inhabit them, sharing the same human nature, relist states will behave as their subjects. Only the plan of action is changed: the patterns realists identify in interpersonal relations can be easily extrapolated on the global politics stage.

Pluralism
This theory of IR is the equivalent of the liberal tradition of political thinking. Consequently, its main assumptions problematize the international environment from a considerably different perspective than the realist one. During the interwar period, the dispute between classical realism and idealism – the label which realists attributed to the contemporary liberal current – is tendentiously denominated in an effort to bring about a depreciative impression over the international orientation of liberals. The term idealism is used even tody; I will use it myself, in the absence of a better one and in order to avoid confusions. The dispute between realism and idealism is known in the literature of the discipline as the 'first great debate'. The liberal arguments for 'collective security' which could have been put into practice trough a progress of the idea of peace, the interpretation of human nature as ameliorable, not inevitably decayed and conceiving the historical process in terms of progress, both material and moral and therefore social – were ridiculed by realists of the time, especially by Carr. He reproached idealists

excessive credulity in human nature and in the possibilities of its amelioration and consequently of international politics and the flagrant irresponsibility they encountered fascism for example, not reacting vigorously in order to prevent its ascension.

If realism appeared to be absolutely victoriuous against idealism, after 1945, the situation begun to change. As the war faded into past, replaced by wellbeing and economic progress, liberalism stared to be a more and more appreciated theory of IR. Starting with the classic assumption of commerce as creator of richness and added value, liberalism could successfully affirm itself in an relatively relaxed and prosperous international environment, although still dominated by realist principles.

The opposition between neoliberalism and neoliberalism became known as the 'second great debate' in IR. Distinct from classical liberalism, based on individuality, political rights, free market and human rights, neoliberalism stresses upon the role of international institutions as creators of stability and security. By educating states in order to overcome an immature, anarchical environment, to paraphrase Barry Buzan, neoliberal institutions also project an international environment structured on economic rather than political coordinates, were governments are treated as mere annexes of global economic processes upon which they have no direct control and by which are almost determined. Economy and politics became, trough institutions and international relations, interdependent (Nye, Keohane: 2009). Neorealism and neoliberalism share many common features, the most important being the recognition of the international structure; it depends less that the first insists upon its political dimension and the last on its economical dimension: the two currents are complementary. The Bush administration has proven this empirically; theoretically, many social-constructivists share the same conviction.

Marxism

Although by Marxism is generally understood as a corpus of sociological analyses with no special emphasis on international relations, but by global economical processes and tendencies which have created and still create stages of the historical development of humanity – this intellectual current and especially its ramifications have taken into account more and more the interactions between states, while preserving the sociological methodology of Marxism and circumscribing them to the social global context to which they belong.

Marxism, made possible by the Enlightenment's intellectually revolution which has opposed the critical rationality of individuals to the dogmatic catholic theology, considersthe flow of history as being subjected to well defined stages, each of them configured by the ratio between forces of productions (inventions, progress) and relations of production (the stabilizing of a social-economic system which gradually becomes oppressive trough its own structure,

acting like an impediment to development). Each 'mode of production' ('primitive commune', 'slaverist', 'feudal', 'Asian' and 'capitalis'), meaning society, composed by an economic 'structure' and a cultural, political and religious 'superstructure' determined by the structure – an ideology in the sense Marx and Engels used the term in their *German Ideology* – dialectically transforms itself, in the sense that the forces of production defeat at some point the stagnant relations of production trough the form of a revolution; next, the victorious production forces will gradually become, on their turn, relations of production, waiting to be defeated by new forces of production and so on. The Marxist dialectic is materialist: it argues that there are objective forces which guide human development and manifest themselves independently of human will. On the other hand, an often ignored component of Marx's thought is that these forces mean absolutely nothing in the absence of human management: the ratio between the two parts is therefore complementary, not asymmetrical.[2] Moreover, as Margot Light insists, Marx contested at the end of his life that he tried to offer objective laws to guide the entire development of human evolution: the 'Asian mode of production', by example, firmly contradicts its historical scheme, due to geographical, social and economical circumstances highly different from the European ones. Far from being discouraged by this, Marx simply recognized that he has theorized an '«historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe… [not] an historic-philosophic theory of the general path of development prescribed by fate to all nations, whatever the historical circumstances in which they find themselves»' (Marx in Light: 1988, 78).

Marx was firmly convinced that the revolutionary process must follow, in order to be complet and not to degenerate in one of the many 'ideologies', the development stages described above. The Revolution, in Marx's acception, is an emancipator project based on the conscietization of the economic and social oppression to which is subjected the majority living within the capitalist mode of production and the overcoming of national limits, constructed 'from above' and which divide and weaken the proletariat in favor of capitalism. The whole capitalist mode of production must be overcome, especially the 'fetishism of goods' (consumerism, in contemporary terms), in order for the people to regain their humanity. The process will be a violent one, Marx argued, because capitalism speculates all the interstices between the forces opposing him and, sooner or later, it ends up appropriating them. It is not sufficient to have an equitable goods distribution, the whole capitalist process of production must be changed, because it inevitably generates inequalities that polarize societies. Morality is therefore insufficient to resolve the economic problem of modernity, being nothing more than one of the many 'idealist'

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[2] The main titles used in this chapter are: Marx, Engels: 1949; Marx, Engels: 1956, Marx: 1957; Marx: 1954; Marx: 1987; Engels: 1967.

illusions. If a capitalist decides to treat his workers better than the others, his costs of production will increase and its profits diminish. Once again, the necessity of a violent overcome of capitalism emerges: less radical solutions will only end up being incorporated or effectively swept away by capital. In this point, Marx once again revised its opinion in time. He claimed that the revolution could be implemented also by parliamentary means in some developed states, were the relations of production and revolutionary consciousness are mature enough to allow it.

Social-constructivism

Social-constructivism, a new theory of IR developed in the last years of the Cold War, is today much appreciated.[3] As a post-positivist theory, it aims to create a new onthology, neither as radical as the postmodern one, nor relativist. In Emmanuel Adler's terms, constructivism seizes the 'middle ground' between, on one hand, the restructuring of the scientific principles of knowledge and, on the other hand, the empirical validation of the affirmed results (Adler: 1997, 2005). Between the emphases upon interpretation existent in the post-positivist philosophical currents, respectively the classical rationalist perspective of modernity, centered on the individual. For Adler, ,

> constructivism aspires and to some extent has managed to find a middle ground between a rationalist perspective that focuses on individuality and universality and an interpretive perspective that takes contextual knowledge, contingency, and human interpretation to be the hallmarks of social reality. This middle ground can be found in constructivists' attempts to highlight: (a) the role of agency (individuals and states) in the construction of social reality; (b) the global or cosmopolitan context within which transnational communities develop; (c) the importance of general normative principles that can be learned by communities through the logic of communicative argument and persuasion;(d) the notion that even though, as Ashley has argued, the practical community in IR may be the transnational community of realists, it is also true that in the last several decades a competing community of liberals has arisen (mainly in Europe) that opposes the realists and endeavors to make liberal international practice a self-understood reality; and (e) the argument that social practice helps bridge between the ideational and discursive world and the material world (Adler: 2005, 5-6).

Before analyzing the main concepts trough which it operates, one must mention the fact that constructivism aims to be not just another theory of IR, but a whole new onthology, a new way of conceiving social existence and the articulations putting it into act: it has therefore higher ambitions than the anterior theories. We have reached now the third great debate of IR. That of positivism (constructivists include here, undifferentiated, realism, pluralism, Marxism and their

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[3] In this sub-chapter are used the same sources as in those on realism and pluralism. The exceptions are cited in text.

derivates, having as methodological base, as mentioned, the distinction between facts and values, respectively between researcher and the object of research) and post-positivism, thought currents that contest these arbitrary divisions, considering that positivists ignore the social complexity which makes possible all these 'hard' interactions and concepts used by positivists, never bothering to problematize them

Social-constructivism has deep roots in the innovative sociological approaches from the second half of the 20th century, a period when 'hard' social structures enounced and analyzed by Emile Durkheim, or even Max Weber, are being more and more contested. The static scientific approach of the 19th century is contested in the name of the intersubjective dynamics of social groups, permanently constituted and reconstituted trough the interaction between agents (individuals, non-governmental organizations) and structures (networks of political, administrative, institutional, common law power), having a constitutive role in social functionality. Structures create 'norms' and 'resources', Anthonny Giddens argues. Normes represent legal ways trough which agents produce resources. Along tis process, trough a set of well defined practices, the agents effectively reproduce the structures, an environment out of which they cannot be imagines after all. Agents are not, however, passive instruments used by structures, but conscious which can and must reconstruct the structures created, in the end, by their own interactions. On their turn, structures permanently interact, these dynamics constituting after all the moving force of society. Constructivists make use of the agent/structure sociological distinction, extrapolating it at the international relations level. Anticipating the methodological confusion which can emerge from here, Harry Gould proposes taking the problem into account on different levels of analysis. 'The agent is the part, the structure the whole. At the next level of analysis, the original structure/whole is now the agent/part, while at the inferior level of analysis, the original agent/part is now the relevant structure/whole' (Gould in Kubálková, Onuf, Kovert: 1998, 96).

By interacting, agents and structures create the social environments in which we live. Therefore, social reality, with all the objects and subjects that define it, is socially constructed. Material factors do not exist indepdendent of our perceptions and capacity to socially construct them, attributing them new semnifications in the day to day life. Here, constructivism splits in several branches. Without very much details, we can identify two major types of constructivism: one were material factors exist outside the social environment, and a more radical form of constructivism, were the whole world, including 'hard' material factors, are socially constructed. In the first category, Alexander Wendt, a central name of social-constructivism, stresses that as much as we socially construct the sea, we can still drown in it in certain circumstances. Accordingly, as much as we try to construct the reality of flying pigs, this will not be possible

because, simply, pigs do not fly (Wendt: 1999). Therefore, Wendt continues, there are natural forces independent of the will and human possibilities of influencing them. Radical constructivists, Nicholas Onuf especially, affirm that all reality experienced by a person or community during their lives is socially constructed. This does not mean that the influence of natural forces is not recognized, but that their influence, impact and knowledge can only be a sum of social construction. The sea drowns us in certain circumstances, yes, but the act of drowning is a social construction, and so is the sea; none can exist outside human interpretations and actions which give them meaning and manage them in socially knowledgeable ways. Pigs do not fly, but only humans imagine that they would; therefore, this is another social construction.

Language, experience, culture, habits, traditions, fears, aspirations, hopes, all these social constructions produced by peremptory, dynamic and flexible interactions between agents and structures, gradually sediment identities. These are individual or social, and they represent the central concept of social-cosntructivism. Wendt:

> In the philosophical sense an identity is whatever makes a thing what it is. This is too broad to be of use here, since then even beagles and bicycles would have identities, and so I will treat it as a property of intentional actors that generates motivational and behavioral dis-positions. This means that identity is at base a subjective or unit-level quality, rooted in an actor's self-understandings. However, the meaning of those understandings will often depend on whether other actors represent an actor in the same way, and to that extent identity will also have an intersubjective or systemic quality. John may think he is a professor, but if that belief is not shared by his students then his identity will not work in their interaction. Two kinds of ideas can enter into identity, in other words, those held by the Self and those held by the Other. Identities are constituted by both internal and external structures (Wendt: 1999, 224).

Identities are not fixed and permanent, as realist, pluralists or Marxists tend to perceive it – but dynamic and flexible, reflecting the ratio between agents and structures at different levels of analyses, from local to global.

Constructivism is, beside a theory, an emancipator program which, unlike postmodernism, is trapped neither by relativism, nor by ignoring empirical methodologies. Wendt sustains in this sense that practice is still the best criteria for testing theories. Furthermore, he theorizes at international level tree 'cultures of anarchy', a hobbesian, Kantian and lockean one, these representing essentially the social and normative progress human history has made until now. Wendt warns that, although we have left behind the hobbesian anarchy functioning according to the principle 'homo homini lupus' and were actors did not recognize their onthological legitimacy, we have not managed to overcome lockean anarchy were, although the

actors reciprocally recognize themselves the right to exist, they act in a competitive environment, preferable of course to the conflictual, hobbesian one, but less desirable then the cooperation determined by common values of the international Kantian environment which makes its presence more and more felt. But international Kantianism remains an aspiration, and, in order to realize it, we all have to socially construct it to the point were it could transform itself into norms, practices and international institutions. (Wendt: 1999, 246-312).

Despite its generous intentions, Wendt's constructivism does not benefit from a methodology suitable to social sciences. The problem of empirical analysis is very important in social-constructivism, questioning even its disciplinary status (see Kukla: 2002). This empty space is best covered, I argue, by Nicholas Onuf's works (1989; Onuf in Kubálková, Onuf, Kovert: 1998, 58-78). Onuf proposes, in order to overcome the methodological dualism agent-structure, the concept of rules, operationalized along with that of norms. Rules (generally laws) and norms (moral behavior dispositions in a given society) find themselves at the junction between agents and structures, essentially constituting both sides. Agenst use rules to follow their interests, mostly material, while for structures rules stabilize and homogenize the social framework in which agents act, reproducing in this way its existence. Each agent acts rationally, following the maximization of its own interest with a minimal cost on the ground of an anterior legislation and ethical code.From the point of view of the outside observer, agents do not seem to always act rationally, but this is due to the complexity of social existence and the impossibility to comprise it and exhaust it in scientific terms. From their point of view, agents act rationally, and therefore we can conclude that rationality itself is a social construct dependent on the culture values, interests and customs of societies, even if these different rationalities can intersect and superpose themselves on certain levels.

Rules and the ways agents use them can and usually have unintended consequences. 'When rules have the effect of distributing the advantage inequally', Onuf writes, 'the result is rule which is the second general propriety of political society' (Onuf: 1989, 22). Leaving aside the tautology existent in the term 'political society' – a society is inconceivable in the absence of a regulatory political factor – Onuf suggests that major social inequalities produce political despotisms. The absolutist tentation is permanently lurking in the shadow of plural societies, and its up to us to keep it there, trough rules as equitable and efficient as possible.

Onuf's rules and norms can also be understood with the help of other onstructivists. John Ruggie, for example, distinguishes between 'regulative rules' and 'constitutive rules'. As Wendt, Ruggie argues that 'materialis' theories of IR (positivist as we have named them) take statest and the international system as something fixed, without questioning their content or formation process. But states do not pre-exist the international system, as 'materialists' consider, neither is

the system conceivable with reference to them. Actors and international structure constitute themselves trough permanent interactions. Therefore, the 'regulative rules' of 'materialists' are isufficient in offering a profound perspective over the international system and the global social world; only the 'constitutive rules' of constructivists can do this (Ruggie: 2002, 22-24). Ted Hopf, on the other hand, considers that more important than social norms are social practices which they entail. Only the practices of social agents can offer a true understanding of the complex juxtaposed, uperposed and often conflicting social processes which structure modern political communities. I agree partially with Hopf's position, despite the fact that is hard to understand were norms end and practices begin. The present study is not sociologic but, in very large terms, politologic. I do not analyze the social constitution of communist Romania's foreign and international policy, but its political imposition 'from above', in other words, internally, but also externally, trough the prism of Leninist ideology and the political practices associated with it. If the angle of analysis would have been 'from below', I do not see why Hopf's model would have not explained satisfactorily the Romanian identity during the communist period as it was relationed with the international practices of the regime and the thick propagandistic textures associated with these; on the other hand, Hopf analyses convincingly the Russian identities in the Khrushchev period, respectively the transition between the Eltsin period and the beginning of Vladimir Putin's leadership (Hopf: 2002). But I propose a research how an 'above' imposed identity, 'paramodern' (Matei: 2007) – I will explain the term at the right moment – reflected in the thinking and international activity of Romanian communism, at first, and, complementary, in the regime's relations with the society. Consequently, Onuf's rules and norms are much more useful here than Hopf's social practices.

Finally, Onuf considers international anarchy as an unintended consequence of the activity of statal agents, suverans, independent and interdependent. As any unintentioned consequence of social agents, it can be gradually removed, trough conjugated efforts (Onuf in Kubálková, Onuf, Kovert: 1998, 58-78). Here, the difference between Wendt's moderate constructivism and Onuf's radical constructivism is best seen: international anarchy is given and static in the end; it can only be cosmetized, humanized, Kantianized, but not overcome. But Onuf argues in this terms: international anarchy, as structurant as it is, represents, along with other products of human activity, totalitarianism, war, hunger, oppression, injustice etc. – unintended consequences of actors which have resulted from powerful structures and partisan norms, more powerful than agents, which could not have done anything else, trough current social practices, then reproduce them. Trough new norms agents can identify new paths of socialization, less inclined towards undemocratic leadership (rule) and more commited to flexibilizing the structures, indispensable on their turn to any social project. Of course, it is infinitely easier to

reach this conclusion with theoretical then practical means. On the other hand, radical constructivism imagines at least convincing alternatives that could one day be socialized; realism, pluralism, Marxism – although it offered the conceptual instruments necessary for letting behind the positivist paradigm – even Wendt's moderate constructivism, all these theories are captive to the positivist scientifical specter and belong eventually to the past.

Therefore, I will use Onuf's theoretical model to analyze the empirical material of the thesis, the international politis of communist Romania. Next I will discuss the conceptual framework of the thesis, consisting in several varieties of Soviet Leninism, in order to explain the influence of this ideological metamorphosis over romantic Leninism, the Romanian type of Soviet ideology that durable imprinted the 20th century.

Conceptual framework. From Lenin to Gorbachev: varieties of Soviet Leninism

The most important mark left upon the 20th century was that of Lenin and Leninism (Gellately: 2008). The teachings of the man who stands as a symbol for the Bolshevik revolution represented the ideocratic matrix that gave birth to Fascism, a twin ideocracy and basically a "socialist heresy" (Muravchik: 2004) – and stood at the core of all metamorphoses experienced by Soviet Leninism.

The relationship between Marxism and Leninism is a very delicate and much debated one. Did Lenin put into practice the essential teachings of Marx, or did he mostly distort them? I incline toward the second explanation, although I am not trying to deny that there is a certain undeniable filiation between Marx and Lenin. First of all, we have to understand that Marx was a German philosopher, very prone to action indeed, but still a philosopher, while Lenin was a half-learned political activist. Marx's philosophy was open, auto-reflexive, based on empirical findings, with a strong sense of morality and social responsibility (Popper: 2005, 270), while Lenin's ideology was closed, dogmatic, indifferent to empirical realities and amoral, rejecting dialogue, compromise and negotiations as bourgeois categories that undermine the revolutionary conscience of the proletariat (Lenin: 1946). One must primarily take into account that, unlike Marx, Lenin belonged to what in Eastern Europe and especially in tsarist Russia was called the *intelligentsia*; a group of intellectuals with radical democratic ideas, persecuted by the political regime and not understood, indeed even rejected, by the very peasant people it tried to illuminate. Therefore, along the second half of the 19th century, the Russian intelligentsia went through a process of radicalization and gradually developed a messianic sense of its mission, closing itself to inter-social dialogue and empirical realities. The intelligentsia members turned

ideas into weapons, amputating their critical and auto-reflexive functions; most of them became terrorists, opting for a shock-therapy to immediately and radically cure Russia from its social and political backwardness. Even Marx complained, in the last years of his life, that his *Capital* was wrongly interpreted by Russian social-democrats (Berdiaev: 1994; Besançon: 1993; for an analysis of Russian intelligentsia see Pomper: 1993). This was the social-intellectual milieu that gave birth to Lenin and Leninism: highly different from the warmly bourgeois and intellectual atmosphere in which young Marx grew up.

Revolutionary Leninism

By *revolutionary Leninism* I understand the teachings and actions of Lenin himself, not the enormous mystifications that his image and his books became subject to right after his death. From the Bolshevik-Menshevik split (1903) to the October Revolution and (partially) to Lenin's death, Leninism was, truistic as it may sound, a powerful, revolutionary movement. It was hugely emancipatory: for workers, who saluted it as an end to tsarist oppression and a promise of a better life, for peasants, who were promised the object of their all-time dream, land, and received it for several years, only to be confiscated by the state starting with 1928, when Stalin launched the collectivization process. But it was Lenin who argued in the first place that the land must be collectivized because peasants engaged in free trade activities are actively supporting capitalism and undermining the revolution. Other social categories who benefited from the revolution were artists and women. Cultural activities were experiencing a blooming effervescence once the tsarist censorship was abolished, while women, led especially by the famous Bolshevik lady Alexandra Kollontai, were ostentatiously affirming their newly found emancipated identity consisting of civil rights and social-political equality with men (Figes: 1998).

Post-Revolutionary Leninism

This concept covers what in Soviet history is usually known as Stalinism. Stalinism is often understood as an extreme bureaucratization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and a total loss of revolutionary ferment. The most frequent argument sustaining this hypothesis is Stalin's "socialism in one country," an ideological innovation aimed to stabilize and consolidate the young Soviet regime. If Lenin believed and struggled for a simultaneous revolution in the most developed European countries as a condition for the survival of the Russian revolution and the victory of the global one, after his death this kind of wishful thinking made room for harsher political realities. Stalin did not renounce the aim of achieving global communist revolution, but argued that this must be done progressively, taking into account the

unequal contradictions which undermine capitalism – and starting from a revolutionary center, namely the Soviet Union.

> "What else is our country, that of «socialism under construction», if not the basis of world revolution? But can it be a real basis of world revolution if it is not capable of building the socialist society? Can it remain the greatest attraction center for workers of all countries, as it undoubtedly is now; if it is not capable to defeat, within its own borders, the capitalist elements from its economy, to victoriously construct socialism? I believe not! But does it not follow from here that distrust in the victory of constructing socialism, preaching this distrust leads to discrediting our country as a basis of world revolution, and that discrediting our country leads to the weakening of the world revolutionary movement?" (Stalin: 1952a, 146).

Europeanized Leninism versus Asianized Leninism: the Sino-Soviet conflict and its devastating effect over the revolutionary substance of Leninism

After Stalin, the Soviet Union and the whole communist world went through major changes. So did Leninism. De-Stalinization, "peaceful coexistence", "state of all people", all these new ideological conceptions advanced by Nikita Khrushchev reflected a "de-radicalization" of Leninism, to use another concept developed by Robert Tucker (Tucker: 1969, 187-188). The new Soviet leader was truly committed to Leninism and tried to restore what he believed to be its original essence, eliminating in the process the Stalinist perversion of Leninism (Crankshaw: 1971, 3-9). He was described by Andrei Grachev, a former foreign policy advisor of Gorbachev, as "the last sincere believer in the possible of the world communist cause"; after his removal in the autumn of 1964, "the ideological dimension of Soviet foreign policy was gradually reduced to rhetoric and propaganda", while the political factors became now the most important ones.

> Of course, rhetoric devoted to the continuous advance of the "world revolutionary process" still could be heard in the public statements of Soviet leaders and continued to occupy an honorable place in the political reports of the General Secretary to Party congresses. Yet it was mostly meant for internal consumption and used as one of the elements of the stabilization mechanism of the system. It was increasingly evident that the actual foreign policy of the Soviet Union, although maintaining some relation to its ideological origin, had sacrificed its revolutionary ambition for the sake of great power pragmatism (Grachev: 2008, 12-13).

Showing (sometimes) a certain degree of political responsibility, Khrushchev understood that a violent confrontation between Socialism and Capitalism (as Lenin theorized) within the

new, nuclear international context, would be catastrophic, endangering the idea of communism itself. This did not meant a renunciation of the ideological confrontation between the two "camps" of the Cold War, but rather the extrapolation of the struggle from the political and military field to that of economical, social and cultural competition. Khrushchev, a convinced Leninist, really believed that odds were on his side. Although retrospectively proved wrong, his legacy of *Europeanized Leninism* played a major role within the internal economy of the ideocratic concept.

Relaxing the international ideological tension, inclining toward Western political values like negotiations and compromise, taking the European Common Market as a model while nevertheless competing with it, trying to restore "legalist socialism", freeing from Gulags or rehabilitating some 20 million people and diminishing control over East European satellite regimes (Taubman: 2005), renouncing thus the "intrasystemic" perspective for the "intersystemic" one (Shafir în McCauley: 1987, 156-158) – are reason enough for naming Khruschevite Leninism "Europeanized Leninism."

Leninism, even in the era of Lenin, but most visibly in the era of Stalin, needed a strong centre from which to launch its assault over reality. If Leninism as an ideology is somehow flexible, adapting itself to the particularities of the society it plans to assault, Leninism as revolutionary discipline must by firmly rooted in one single centre. This is the meaning of "democratic centralism": party members are allowed to debate and criticize until a common decision is made; after that, no further debates are permitted, for they can only be counter-revolutionary because they undermine the "unity of action" and the sheer efficiency of the party itself. The Moscow centre trough which Leninism started its assault over "bourgeois" reality, trying desperately to replace it with its own, phantasmagorical, ideologized reality – found itself contested, in the beginning of the 60's, by an alternative Beijing center. Another "autonomous" Leninist regime was competing with the classical centre in order to win supremacy over international communism. A truly unique situation that would end in the implosion of any remaining revolutionary substance in Leninism (Copilaş: 2009b, 89-111).

Asianized Leninism despised Europeanized Leninism as an ideological capitulation in the confrontation with global Capitalism (or imperialism, in a more vilified, Leninist sense). It stood for a total rejection of compromise with the enemy and it cynically claimed it was not afraid of war, even nuclear: even if half the earth's population would have died, Mao Zedong argued, imperialism would have been defeated and the remaining half could safely advance toward communism. Moreover, the Soviet Union was harshly accused of renouncing the struggle for global revolution, of boycotting it in other Leninist regimes (like China) and of becoming revisionist because of its recent endorsement of the Eurocommunist thesis that under certain

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conditions, societies might become socialist by parliamentary paths rather than violent revolution. For the Chinese this was tantamount to the betrayal of Leninism. In turn, the Soviets accused the Chinese of "leftism", a danger Lenin had warned agains in his writings and consisting of romantic revolutionary intransigence that might imperil the success of the revolution itself (Copilaş: 2009b, 97-102).

Who won? No one. Who lost? Leninism. The force and the prestige of the international communist movement was irremediably affected, and its (even formal) unity forever lost. The revolutionary substance of Leninism was gone. Still, it continued to exist in wholly unprecedented forms, just like it does today.

Leninism sistemic

To begin with, *systemic Leninism* seems to be a conceptual contradiction. And it is a contradiction, an ideological oxymoron to be precise. How can Leninism be systemic, when its sheer essence is above all revolutionary? Can we still talk about Leninism without referring to revolutionary texture? I believe so, even if we have to understand that, from now on and until the Soviet Union's implosion, we are talking more or less about emasculated Leninism.

Prin leninism sistemic înțeleg ideologia Uniunii Sovietice de-a lungul epocii Brejnev, în By systemic Leninism I mean the ideology of the Soviet Union during the Brezhnev era, especially the period that started with the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe and continued into the early 80's. It was now that, strange as it might appear, Leninism developed characteristics that brought it very close to conservative politics. Classical, revolutionary Leninism was dead and buried; it was replaced by a surrogate of Leninism, a petrified, empty shell of ideological hyper-dogmatism, excessive bureaucratization and "bourgeois" commodity that paralyzed (almost) all party members. The revolutionary consciousness was gone, although impulses of revolutionary Leninism were still to be found within the old Stalinist, even Leninist guard.[4]

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[4] Viaceslav Molotov vehemently blames, in his conversations with journalist Felix Chuev, the loss of revolutionary Leninism. At "the XXIVth party Congress", held in 1971, Leonid Brezhnev stated: "«We can now enjoy breathing freely, working well and living calmly.» The «living calmly» part was particularly addressed to the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks could not accept that. With people enjoying a calm life, the Bolsheviks are no longer needed. They become totally unnecessary. The Bolsheviks are always in the thick of the fray, leading the people, overcoming obstacles. For what would they be needed if life proceeded calmly? The Social Democrats would be much more appropriate. They would be perfectly suited. They would submit, so to speak, to this spontaneous movement of capitalism". Chuev, *Molotov remembers*, 222. This quote is perfectly illustrative of what Robert Tucker means by "mass-movement regimes".

Post-Bolshevik Leninism

Post-Bolshevik Leninism defined its ideological identity by sharply opposing systemic Leninism and post-revolutionary Leninism. "Socialism must be freed from all that is pseudo-socialist, from all distortions and deformations stemming from the personality's cult period (i.e., Stalinism), from the period of command system domination, from stagnation, we must give back its authentically Leninist sense." (Gorbaciov: 1988b, 17; see also Gorbaciov: 1987a, 7-25; Gorbaciov: 1988a, 13-15; *O nouă viziune...*: 1988, 27-29). At the same time, it tried to push Europeanized Leninism to "go all the way" to reaching and applying the ultimate consequences deriving from it. Chernenko's successor never stopped claiming that he was a "child of the 20th Congress" (Taubman: 2005, 648; Gorbaciov: 1988c, 26). Gorbachev's domestic and foreign initiatives were authentically reformist and, most important, were not necessarily induced from outside by coercive actions (American republicanism - Beschloss, Talbott: 1994), but from a restless internal struggle to reimagine the Leninist identity on the eve of the 21st century. "The extraordinary political moves, the proposals for unexpected compromise, the unilateral gestures and concessions all would have been inconceivable in the framework of the traditional logic of superpower confrontation." (Grachev: 2008, 6). Or, in Gorbachev's own words, "today's world has become too small and fragile for wars and power politics" (Gorbaciov: 1986, 83).

Post-Bolshevik Leninism's vigorous appeals for "democratizatsiya" and "new thinking" in internal affairs and "reasonable sufficiency" in international relations were doubled by deep cultural and institutional reforms: *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Why did they fail? Was Leninism too crippled to be reformed? Not necessarily. The problem was that Gorbachev tried a colossal reform of Leninism using non-Bolshevik ways. For the first time in its history, Leninism voluntarily abandoned "democratic centralism": criticism could be spoken openly, even against the party and its decisions. This "bourgeois" freedom of criticism corroded Leninism from inside so fast and so complete that it virtually amazed all its observers. Furthermore, again for the first time in history, Leninism tried to *reform* itself from the inside, not *adapt* itself to the particularities of the bourgeois societies it was meant to assault. In fact, post-Bolshevik Leninism voluntarily renounced its assault on "bourgeois" reality: it chose to emasculate itself. As Stephen Senfield put it, "«Gorbachev's 'new thinking' has enabled moral absolutism to establish a precarious foothold in the fortress of official ideology»" (Senfield în Brown: 1997, 222). As I intend to prove, post-Bolshevik Leninism did considerably more than that: it openly embraced what can be called "bourgeois 'moral absolutism'".

How? First by renouncing the aim of global revolution. At the CPSU's 27th Congress, held in 1986, Gorbachev clearly stated that "stimulating revolutions from outside, the more so with military means, is *useless and inadmissible*" (Emphasis mine)" (Gorbaciov: 1986, 15; see

also Gorbaciov: 1987b, 110-121). In Archie Brown's words, "Gorbachev, with his new emphasis on global concerns and universal values, was, in effect, abandoning the idea of a final victory of Communism and legitimizing both a political and economic diversity and an international co-operation which transcended ideological divisions" (Brown: 1997, 223-224). Furthermore, post-Bolshevik Leninism renounced "the revolutionary conquests of socialism" like East Germany (Gorbaciov: 1994, 119-132; 249-252) and finally the whole of Eastern Europe. That would have been an inconceivable gesture for all other varieties of Leninism analyzed here.

Second, post-Bolshevik Leninism centered its program on humans as individualities rather than on humans as societies. The anthropological approach of revolutionary Leninism and its successive forms was thus turned upside down. This "humanistic universalism" (Brown: 1997, 221), as Archie Brown referred to it, was understood by Gorbachev as it follows: "We see socialism as a system of authentic, real humanism, in which's conditions man appears effectively as 'the measure of all things'. The whole development of society, starting with economy and ending with the ideological-spiritual sphere is oriented toward the satisfaction of man's needs, toward its multilateral development, all these being done trough the work, creation, energy of the people themselves" (Gorbaciov: 1988c, 90). For an old Bolshevik like Viacheslav Molotov, post-Bolshevik Leninism closely resembled the "Bukharinist deviation". He loudly and prophetically condemned this kind of humanism that was outlined by Khrushchev as "petty bourgeois philistinism" (Chuev: 1993, 362) and unambiguously declared, proving his revolutionary-Leninist formation: "There can be only one range goal if we are to move forward: only international revolution. There is nothing, no alternative, more reliable than this" (Chuev: 1993, 389-390).

To conclude, post-Bolshevik Leninism tried to preserve institutional Leninism while renouncing its fundamental revolutionary sense: world revolution. It succumbed to "bourgeois" morality, or, better said, it joyfully adopted it and, simultaneously abandoned "democratic centralism", the Leninist principle that states that, within the framework of the (Bolshevik) party, criticism and debates are allowed, even encouraged to a certain extent, but only until a decision is made. After that, criticism is strictly forbidden because it weakens the party and its "unity of action", disorientates it and gradually drives it away from its final aim: revolution and, subsequently, global revolution. In the backwash of Soviet collapse, Gorbachev even abolished the CPSU; institutionally, this was his most post-Bolshevik gesture (Judt: 2008, Brown: 1997). These are the main reasons that led me to conclude that, in the Gorbachev era, Leninism became post-Bolshevik. Citing Archie Brown once again, "Gorbachev retained an idealized view of Lenin while departing more and more from the essentials of Leninism" (Brown: 1997, 223).

In the Soviet Union's collimator: Romania and Eastern Europe under the aegis of post-Revolutionary Leninism, (1945-1955)

The calibration of the East-European political regimes on the ideological coordinates of the 'Moscow centre' (Jowitt: 1993, 159) represented a fluctuant, meandric and difficult process, despite the liberties Stalin extracted from his future 'former' allies, Great Britain and the United States. But the powerful rural parties and the resistance of the majority of populations from the region have permanently obstructed the Soviet plans to enroll them in the race for world revolution, even if the power ratio between the two parts was, of course, highly unbalanced.

On the other hand, postbellic communism or post-revolutionary Leninism, to use the notion advanced in the previous chapter, benefited, in this unequal struggle, from several major advantages. Economically, capitalism was associated in Eastern Europe and in many other west-European states with the 1929-33 crisis which made possible the emergence of fascist movements and thus substantially contributed to the triggering of the greatest conflagration of the 20th century. The Soviet state-guided economy appeared therefore as a viable alternative to the much detested capitalism. Moreover, the task of reconstructing the postwar east European states seemed to be facilitated by the existence of a strong state, and in this respect, the Soviet Union was advantaged. Ideologically then, the postwar communist program did not insisted on the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', the intensification of class struggle or the edification of communism, but on the 'need to make a common front against fascism, objectives that could be shared by all of good faith'. Last but not least, the East European aristocracies and small-bourgeoisie, often 'composed of Jews or Germans', the main ideological enemies of communism, represented the social categories most affected by war (Crampton: 2002, 241). On short, the Soviet Union's image capital improved considerably during the second world war, as one of the main enemies of Nazi Germany. (Soulet: 1998, 14-16; Crampton: 2002, 241).

In the political and geopolitical conditions existent immediately after 1945, the communization of Eastern Europe may seem unavoidable. But the reality was much more nuanced. Of course, Stalin needed to secure the Soviet borders, especially the Eastern ones. The brutal experience it had with Hitler's Germany convinced him to do so. One must not forget also the ideological resort of Soviet foreign policy, the world revolution, a task from which the Soviet Union has made, despite the replications it made with the de-Stalinization process, the cornerstone of its almost entire existence. But Moscow never had a clear plan to integrate Eastern Europe on the Soviet geopolitical orbit (Crampton: 2002, 240-241; Soulet: 1998, 17). On the contrary, it speculated the indecision and the conciliant diplomatic tone of Western powers,

managing to impose, trough a large panel of manipulatory techniques, its own interests in Eastern Europe.

The path of Romanian and East European communism between 1945 and 1955 is presented, in the official discourse of the regime, as a double metamorphosis. The stage of 'popular democracies', meaning the gradual conquest of power and the abolition of the vestiges of the 'bourgeois-landowner' regime, which took place between 1945 and 1947, will slowly leave way for the stage of 'socialist revolution'. The transformation is highly important, because only from this moment the genealogy of Romanian communism becomes superimposable with reference to the legitimizing experience of the founding Leninism. Now, Romanian communism can use and implement concepts like 'dictatorship of the proletariat' or the 'alliance between the working class and the working (Dej: 1960, 20-24). In other words, the Romanian Workers Party (RWP) pretends to have initiated the 'construction of socialism' as an intermediary stage within the clearly delimitated teleological itinerary: communism.

The 'popular democracy' – 'socialist revolution' typology is subsumed to one of the analytical angles of power consolidation trough 'nation-building strategies' proposed by the American researcher Kenneth Jowitt. Their occurrence is limited to the non-democratic political regimes. 'Nation building' consists in two phases, each incorporating a political, respectively an axiological component. In the phirst phase, that of 'breaking-trough', the new political elite aims the 'alteration or decisive distruction of values, structures and baheviors perceived (…) as containing or contributing to the real or potential existence of alternative power centers'. Here, the political is above the axiological, at least as a way of action. In the next phase, that of 'political integration', the relation between the two components balances, the accent moving from the conquest and consolidation of power to the 'type of political community being created' (Jowitt: 1971, 7-8). 'Penetration' and political integration' are rather interdependent than consecutive, because the regime, which's cohesiveness deserves a special analysis, is peremptory confronted, even after the dismantling of competitor political structures, with the possibility of an alternative power centre emerging; reversely, the ideology mobilizes the 'political revolutionary elite' along its entire existence, especially during the political ascension and the elimination of competitors.

Ideology represents the moving force of Leninist type regimes, even if it is tempered by practical political considerations, always justified with reference to the 'dictatorship' of the founding ideas. Furthermore, as mentioned, Leninism is not dissociable from power, understood as 'revolutionary discipline' and in the same time as a gradual project of replacing the 'bourgeois' reality with the political eschatology of utopian revolutionaries, communism.

Another typology advanced by Jowitt for a better understanding of communist regimes

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that came to power in preponderantly rural societies is that of the 'insulation-transformation' binomial, named 'combined substitution': a regime like this must 'insulate' in the first phase, with reference both to the international environment and the society it governs. After that, it will begin the social change according to its ideological principles (Jowitt: 1993, 46). As a 'derivative, not 'autonomous' Leninist regime, Jowitt's model can be perfectly applied to the Romanian communism in the first half of the Gheroghiu-Dej regime. The problem will appear when the Soviet Union, the main autocephalous Leninist regime, will pretend that the 'derivative' regime from the Romanian Popular Republic (RPR) to implement transformations that went beyond the limits which it was willing to assume. It will be outlined in this way a behavioral model which the Bucharest regime will later fully use, that of 'simulated change' (Shafir: 1985): paradoxically, Romanian communism will end up 'insulating' with ratio to the 'mother' Soviet regime itself, miming afterwards major changes both towards non-communist political regimes, to which it opened after a certain point, and towards the society it governed.

In the context of the metamorphoses of the relations within the 'socialist camp' once Nikita Khrushchev took power in the Soviet Union and the 'intra-systemic' perspective was replaced by the 'inter-systemic' one, meaning a relaxation of the centre-periphery relations which constitutively influenced the political evolution of east European (Shafir: 1987, 156-157) – the Bucharest regime tacitly opts for keeping economic and political Stalinism. regimul de la Bucureşti optează tacit pentru păstrarea stalinismului, atât economic, cât şi politic. The choice will lead to future frictions with Moscow, but Dej had sufficiently consolidated its political position to successfully face them.

The identity imagined by the communist regime in order to auto-define itself and imposed to the society trough day to day discursive practices was radically innovative with reference to the identitary palimpsest which the society had developed until then. The new identity categories, 'classes', are affirmed trough 'power acts' initiated by the regime trough an assiduous propaganda. Different from the 'hard', coercive manifestations of communist power, these aimed to penetrate and mould the society according to the Leninist ideocracy (Morar-Vulcu: 2007, 32). Society, on its turn, resisted to the identitary assault exercised 'from above' (illustrative in this sense is the title of Ioan Lăcustă's book, *The Popular Republic and Romania, 1948-1952*), at first actively, then more and more passive, as communism seemed to become irreversible. Not only in the interval that this study has take into account, but trough its entire existence, Romanian communism tried to rearticulate the society through the prism of the official propagandistic discourse, conferring it an abstract and malleable identity, proportional with the metamorphoses it experienced on its turn.

In his famous work *The New Class. An analysis of the communist system*, Milovan Djilas identifies, starting from the Soviet experience, tree successive types of communism: revolutionary (Lenin's period, characterized by enthusiasm and a certain ideological openness), dogmatic (Stalin's period, when the revolutionary feeling becomes gradually extinct, leaving in place a rigid and reductionist ideological system) and, finally, non-dogmatic (Khrushchev's period, characterized by a partial relief of the state-society ratio – 'state of the entire people' – respectively between the regime and the 'imperialist camp'). If we apply this interpretative model to Romanian communism we can observe that, not only during Gheorghiu- Dej's leadership, but along its entire existence, it was a dogmatic, Stalinist one; being, as mentioned, a 'derivative' communist regime, the absence of the revolutionary stage is understandable. But the rejection of non-dogmatism or Khrushchevite reformism becomes intelligible only if it is juxtaposed over the ambitions and fears of the Bucharest regime, but even then only partially: communist regimes from Hungary, Poland or Czechoslovakia, 'derivative' on their turn, were able to operate unquestionable reforms, without remaining integrally captive to the Stalinist specter.

We have observed, in this chapter, the itinerary of implementing a post-revolutionary Leninist regime in Romania, its main orientation in the international problems that directly appealed to him, but also the process of its internal stabilization. Regarding the post-Stalinist challenge, RWP managed to use it economically, 'simulate' it politically and elude it ideologically. We shall see next how the regime will respond to the turbulences the Moscow centre will experiment and project in the entire camp due to the process of ideological reinventing it will trigger. Once the Khrushchevite leadership was consolidated, post-revolutionary Leninism will give way to Europeanized Leninism. De-Stalinization, which marks the entrance on the stage of the new form of Leninism at the level of the Soviet Union, will confuse the post-revolutionary Leninist East European regimes. I will analyze next several effects produced by this confrontation within the 'socialist camp', stressing the balancing that the Bucharest regime was able to put in practice with undisputable ability.

From post-revolutionary to Europeanized Leninism: the reinventing of socialism. Romanian Popular Republic and the challenges of de-Stalinization

Studying the relationship between the 'radicality' of a 'mass-movement regime' and its political status, Robert Tucker reaches the conclusion that the two are inversely proportional: as much as the movement, (in this case, a communist party), is stronger and less fearful with reference to its real or imaginary enemies, both external or internal, its tendency to 'de-radicalize' accentuates.

In this way, Tucker argues, 'when society begins to give a certain degree of acceptance to a radical movement', this can repercutate on the cohesiveness of the movement and on the 'strong sense of alienation towards the world and the engagement of a future order which characterized the movement in its early stages'. From an administrative angle, 'the growth of the party as an organization weakens the attachement towards the revolutionary objective. Because the revolutionary action can only endanger the position of a party that has reached mass adherence, a birocracy, a tresorery, and a network of financial and moral interests extended over the whole country' (Tucker: 1969, 187-188). Therefore, de-Stalinization represents, according to Tucker's concept, a de-radicalization' of the classical Bolshevik movement, which's existence came to be questioned after the Stalinist purges (Tucker: 1971, 132-135).

Using the typology proposed by Kenneth Jowitt in his excellent work *New world disorder. The Leninist extinction*, each communist regime experiments, along its existence, tree successive stages: transformation, consolidation and inclusion (1993, 220-221). In the first case, the party progressively transforms society, with reference to which it also isolates itself in order to maintain the purity of its revolutionary ideal – according to its own ideological principles and local particularities. Then, the regime consolidates its power within the society trough a variety of techniques. Finally, in the inclusion stage, the regime tries to integrate the society, not reversely, and to imprint it the revolutionary desideratum as much as possible, as they advance together, more and more indistinctely, to the 'construction of socialism' and communism.

One can observe that the de-Stalinization initiated by Moscow affected profoundly the interests of Romanian communism. While the Soviet Union tried to advance, troug the ideological platform of CPSU's 20th Congress, from the consolidation to the inclusion stage, the RPR and the other 'popular democracies' had barely reached the process of consolidating their own power. De-Stalinization was therefore dephased with reference to the situation and the priorities of East-European communist states and the periphery was not being able to deal with the challenges of the inclusion stage which the centre started, considering itself sufficiently consolidated. From this angle, the events in Poland and Hungary can be satisfactorily interpreted as reactions of hostile societies against regimes that did not insulate and consolidate themselves with ratio to them.

Kenneth Jowitt argues that "In both liberal and Leninist regimes (in contrast to peasant-status societies), social action is primarily orientated to impersonal norms. What is particular about Leninist regimes is that impersonality is not expressed in procedural values and rules (i.e. due process), but rather in the charismatic impersonality of the party organization. The novelty of Leninism as an organization is its substitution of charismatic impersonality for the procedural impersonality dominant in the West". Jowitt continues: "Lenin took the fundamentally

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conflicting notions of individual heroism and organizational impersonalism and recast them in the form of an organizational hero – the Bolshevik Party", a process that lacks "historical precedents". (Jowitt, 1993, 1-3). I agree with Jowitt's argument, but only to a certain point: the "charismatic impersonality" of the Bolshevik party Lenin created reflects, to a great extent, the charismatic personality of Lenin himself. Even the label "Leninism", derived from Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov's revolutionary nickname proves it. In Leninist regimes, the relation between party and leader is not at all asymmetric; on the contrary, it is interdependent. Robert Tucker underlines convincingly the constitutive role of the dictatorial personality within what he calls "mass-movement regimes" (Johnson în Johnson: 1970, 1-32). Very useful in order to clarify the relation between party and ruler in Leninist regimes is Chalmers Johnson distinction between "autonomous communist regimes", which obtain power by own means (the Soviet Union, China, Yugoslavia) and "derivative communist regimes", which owe their political success to "autonomous regimes" that helped them conquer power (Johnson: 1970, 1-32). In my opinion, within "autonomous regimes" one encounters a relative balance between party and ruler, while within "derivative regimes" the balance inclines – very often due to lack of popular support and revolutionary traditions – toward the leader.

De-Stalinization ended, *de facto*, in 1958, after Khrushchev had managed in the previous year to eliminate the prominent members of the conservative faction of CPSU, Viaceslav Molotov, Lazar Kaganovici and Dmitri Shepilov, backed by the former prime-minister Gheorghi Malenkov. Khrushchev's personality had suffered a change for the worse: his liberal tendencies, 'simulated' and limitated to a great extent, gradually left way to a more and more despotic behavior (Taubman: 2005, 365). Even if at the 22 CPSU Congress the attack on Stalin was relaunched with vigorous intensity, the short soviet thaw was over. The leading role of the party was strongly affirmed in all domains of social life, and the cultural and linguistical rights granted until then to minorities were soon retreated (Mendel: 1961, 371-486).

In the RPR, de-Stalinization ended before it begun. Until December 1989 Romanian communism was, except several short periods of strategic semi-liberalizations, essentially Stalinist. The retreat of the Red Army was followed by an intense repressive campaign against the population. The juridical constrains grew, and the punishments for political crimes were amplified to the point of reintroducing the capital punishment. In this period, the main parameters of Dej's autonomous post-revolutionary Leninism and later Ceausescu's romantic Leninism were drawn. The main argument in favor of this thesis is not the retreat of the Soviet troops, but, although it received retrospectively this connotation, but, the nationalist distorsion of the Hungarian revolution, aiming to boost the anti-Magyar prejudices of the population and win its trust and support. But it failed. This sporadic national-communist episode was not continued

at the end of the 50's, and was resumed only at the beginning of the next decade, when Moscow's geoeconomic aspirations threathened, the Bucharest leadership considered, Romania's industrial development and implicitly political independence. But its importance is tied to the practice of manipulating symbols and national prejudices trough which the regime wanted to complete the transition from the transformation to the consolidation stage.

As it is known, Tito's Yugoslavia has offered the first example of national communism. It was followed by Enver Hodja's Albany, Gomułka's Poland and the list can continue with China and North Korea. In Romania, the resorbtion of nationalism in the ideological texture of the regime was progressively amplified, reaching a grotesque fascistic Stalinism (romantic Leninism), xenophobic in its last years of existence. Without distinguishing between its national and ideological (Shafir: 1989, 3), the Ceausescu regime ended up hated both by capitalist and 'brotherly' countries, in a world it did not understood and with which had no longer a common ground. But let us not forget that the basis of this orientation was outlined in the last years of Dej's regime and they have appeared as a prophylactic reaction to the intersystemic consequences of the ideological avatar of Moscow's centre. The traps of deStalinization were finally overcome by the RPR, along with the challenges of post-Stalinism. But the regimes' legitimacy crisis was never overcome. The proof lies in the fact that, along its entire existence, the regim never managed to pass the consolidation stage. The inclusion, even if it would not have had the anticipated success, as it happened in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia or China, remained permanently an impossible objective for Romanian communism.

With ingenuity and ability, the RWP leadership had managed to 'simulate' the implementation of Europeanized Leninism, but especially to gain Moscow's tolerance trough its consistent contribution in ending the Hungarian revolution. Also, internally, it managed to gain a larger maneuver space and a certain popularity after the Red Army was retreated. In that moment, however, the problem of drifting aside from Moscow was not on on the agenda. Next, I will analyze the process of Romanian post-revolutionary Leninism's autonomization following the premises and, dimensions and consequences it entailed in the first half of the 60's.

Economical divergences and geopolitical opportunities. Romanian foreign policy in the last period of the Gheorghiu Dej's regime

Nothing anticipated in 1960, at the third Congress of Romanian Workers Party (RWP), the sudden cooling of Romanian-Soviet relations which will occur after only two years. With this occasion, Gheorghiu-Dej, the prime-secretary of RWP, expressed himself turgid towards the

most important socialist state, servilely insisting upon Moscow's international merits, which it considered 'a model of Leninist policy through the consistency with which promotes the principles of coexistence, through its scientific character based on the profound analysis of all international factors, through the firmness and principledness it unmasks the followers of international tensions, through the perseverance with which it militates for the union of peace forces' (*Congresul al III-lea al PMR*: 1960, 99). Truly, there were no palpable political or economical animosities between Bucharest and Moscow that year; the dissident foreign policy (not independent, because the Romanian state never withdrawn from the economical and security structures of the 'socialist camp') of Romania will begin, as I intend to prove, only in 1962, with Bucharest's opposition towards the attempts of supranationalization the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), guided by the Soviet Union (Shafir în Schöpflin: 1986, 364; King: 1980, 141-142; Moraru: 2008, 92; Braun: 1978, 4; Jowitt: 1971: 198-199) – not at all in 1956, as some Romanian authors argue (Constantiniu: 2002, 467; Brucan: 1992, 72; Fischer-Galați: 1998, 174-175, 183; Anton: 2007, 101).

Surely, the successful economical and implicitly political defying of Moscow would have not been possible in the absence of the Sino-Soviet conflict (Shafir: 1985, 177; Fischer Galați în London: 1966, 268-269; Burks în London: 1966, 96). Speculating with ability the dispute between the two colossus of the communist world, the Popular Republic of Romania, (RPR) will consolidate both its economical position and its international political orientation. Of course, it will not manage to really mediate the conflict between Beijing and Moscow, as it tried to pose in order to ameliorate its image within the communist world; it will obtain, however, a growing weight in the internal affairs of the 'socialist camp' and a increasingly good reputation in the West, which it will massively exploit in the years to come.

We cannot approach the RPR-COMECON dispute and Bucharest involvement in the Sino-Soviet conflict without a previous sketch of the tumultuous international context from the late 50's and early 60's. In this period, events like the Berlin crisis or the Cuban missile crisis will profoundly alter the global geopolitical landscape, having also powerful implications for the internal affairs of both superpowers. Consequently, the United States will initiate a more combative security policy with reference to the one existent during the Eisenhower administration, aiming to respond firmly and aggressively, if the case, to the Soviet challenges, while the Soviet political elite, dissatisfied with the failed economic and administrative reforms of Khrushchev, both in the Western world and the 'socialist camp – will replace him in the autumn of 1964 with the conservative and tern Leonid Brezhnev.

'The main thing is that we go together'. With this sentence did the Soviet ambassador I.K. Jegalin end its conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej on the 21 of June 1964, immediately after the

Romanian leader affirmed: 'Differences of opinions can exist, but, if I do not agree with a problem, that must not be considered anti-Sovietism (sic!)' (Moraru: 2004, 51). As a consequence, regardless of how one understands the metamorphosis of Romanian foreign policy at the beginning of the 60's – as 'simulated permanence' (Shafir: 1985, 175), partial alignment' (Farlow: 1971, 54-63), 'autonomy', (King: 1980, 136; Gross: 1966, 16), calculated dissidence' (Copilaş: 2010) – the distancing of Bucharest from the socialist camp was not completed, Romania remaining a member of COMECON, respectively WTO, despite the fact that its range of international action widened considerably. David Floyd considers that, from an economical point of view, Romania became truly independent, its autonomy being limited only to the political sphere (Floyd: 1965, 114). His assumption can be contradicted both from an empirical and from an ideological perspective. In the first place, the commercial relationships that Bucharest developed with the West, although substantial, could have never substituted the economical ties with the communist world, which were even reinforced in the 80's. In fact, due to this policy of massive industrialization, RPR's economy was substantially 'complementary' compared to the Soviet eonomy, even since the end of the 50's. With other words, Bucharest was economically dependent on Moscow, despite the dissonances with a pronounced political character which had occurred between the two parts (Montias: 1967, 182). Then, within communist regimes, the economic is always subordinated to the political, even with the price of its efficiency, in order to maintain under supervision and shortly eliminate any source of independent thinking or activity and therefore a potentially hostile one. The separation of the two domains is not as feasible and relevant as in the case of non-communist regimes, being preferable to avoid it. Extrapolating the argument at the level of foreign policy, the economical dependency of RPR to the Soviet Union was implicitly translated into a certain political dependency, a fact which invalidates the presumable independence of Bucharest on the stage of international relations: it remained neither more nor less than an autonomous actor.

Beside economical or ideological reasons, Dej's antipathy towards Khrushchev contributed to a great extent to the distancing of Romanian politics from Moscow. 'The contacts between Gheorghiu-Dej and Khrushchev were always tensed', remembers Paul Sfetcu, the former secretary of the RWP's leader. The two communist rulers never had 'sincere, clear, open discussions, each having its own reserves' because their political objectives with reference to the 'socialist camp' din not coincide (Sfetcu: 2008, 327; vezi şi Deletant: 2001, 214-215; Fejtö: 1979, 176).

The first manifestations of RPR's economic dissidence regarding COMECON were faced in the West with with reserves and even skepticism, the country being known 'for a long time as one of the most docile «satellites» of Moscow' (Gross: 1966, 16-17; Burks în London: 1966, 93).

But, because of the divergent interests and due to the political flair of Gheorghiu-Dej, 'the Romanian national deviation' (Burks: 1966, 93) was shortly impossible to ignore. Randolph Braham wrote with humor in the summer of 1964 that 'if the present position of the Chinese communists will ever prevail in the international communist movement, Gheorghiu Dej could easily prove that he was a Stalinist all along' (Braham: 1964, 16). And so it was indeed. The calculated dissidence of Romanian communism, which followed, in orthodox ideological terms, its self-consolidation, regardless of the provenience of the resources put into service of this desideratum, became the filigree of the international orientation of the regime until its violent end, consumed in December 1989.

This chapter was centered on the autonomization process of Romanian post-revolutionary Leninism. I have operated a synoptical analysis of its causes, components and effects, aiming to prove the inconsistency of the theses that advance the hypothesis of an authentic independence of Romanian communism which would have begun in this period. In the next section of the thesis I will try to prove how the post-revolutionary Leninism gradually left way for *romantic Leninism*, an ideological mixture specific to the 'Ceausescu era', where the Leninist scaffolding was progressively stuffed with elements of German and French philosophic romanticism, Maoism ad even fascism – and what were the consequences of this ideological metamorphosis over the international orientation of Romanian communism.

West's favorite: Ceausescu, the Romanian Socialist Republic and the process of configuring romantic Leninism (1965-1971)

Looking at what he calls 'Leninist regimes', Kenneth Jowitt reaches a series of interesting and scientifically fertile conclusions. In his acception, communist parties can be understood as 'fortresses' that insulate themselves to the exterior world in order to maintain their revolutionary purity and trying in the same time to extend it over the society in which they act and, after that, over the whole world. The ideological component of Leninist parties and, in case they reach power, regimes, represents the quintessence of the way in which they think and act: legitimacy is always placed in a future that only the party is entitled to know and build, manifesting itself as a depository of the 'scientific laws' and 'historical forces' that implacably govern human development. The Leninist phenomenon considers itself and pretends to be considered scientifical, but it only proves its pseudo-scientific character, as Alain Besançon shows. Unlike fascist regimes, were the leader, (führer) represents the main guarantor of the party, which exists and acts only like his institutionalized will, in the Leninist regimes, the party is on the first place (Jowitt: 1993). Of course, in the case of the majority of Leninist regimes, the role of the party has

progressively estompated with reference to its general secretary; furthermore, having to survive in an ideologically hostile world were the chances of the global revolution diminished in geometrical proportion, Leninist regimes have encompassed nationalist elements, pretending to have epurated it from its 'bourgeois' excrescencies. In this sense, the adaptation of different Leninisms to an invariable 'bourgeois' world translates itself to their progressive, conscious or unconscious, fascization.

By romantic Leninism I understand the ideology of the Romanian communist regime after 1965, visible especially after 1971, the year of the 'July theses'. Unlike other types of Leninism, which renounced the revolutionary spirit and preferred to live together with 'imperialism', which they approached more politically than ideologically – romantic Leninism has gradually radicalized itself, and isolated itself in order to be protected from the 'bourgeois' ideological flux from the second half of the 20th century, which undermined its revolutionary project. Why romantic? Ceausescu had a permanent romantic vision over Romania's past, composed in his optic by heroes which articulated great and glorious moments in order to affirm the Romanian presence in European politics and culture, possessing also an extreme nationalism. He often compared RCP with 'Prince Charming', fighting an epic battle against 'the dragons of the modern world', all subsumed to the much detested imperialism (*Plenara Comitetului Central...*: 1971, 66-68). But romantic Leninism is not equivalent to Ceausescu's thinking, although it was massive boosted by its psychology. No. The entire propagandistic apparatus of the RCP, the military thinking developed in the RSS, on its turn nationalistic, the nationalist prejudices of the population itself – all these categories are part of romantic Leninism, an ideological construct 'from above', based on the recovery and the 'Leninization' of some mental structures that incorporate to the present day a persistent nationalism, matured over the centuries – therefore 'from below'. Even if many of the RCP activists were, using the vocabulary of the time, opportunists, the permanent propaganda, developed over decades, has surely inoculated them romantic Leninist cognitive patterns. Furthermore, Ceausescu knew how to plan in advance its political ascension. Responsible, at the beginning of the 60's, with the personal policies of the regime, the future general secretary of RCP benefited by the advantages of its important position, placing in key posts, both at party and state level, his protégées. After coming to power, Ceausescu transformed this practice into a basic rule of political advancement in the RSR. In this way, the nomenclatura had the interest to support him in order to keep and increase its privileges. During this time, official propaganda was, beside an instrument of power, adapted to the political necessity of the moment, RCP's Weltanschauung.

Romantic Leninism, a combination f Leninism (the sacrosanct role of the party, the material and ideological construction of socialism, permanently projective) and nationalism

(usually named 'revolutionary socialist patriotism', but which, without possessing the power to convince the population of its differences with ratio to the 'bourgeois' nationalism and appealing, in the same time, paradoxically, just to the latent and funciar nationalism of the society, ended up in a paranoid and vulgar xenophoby) – tried to offer a new identity to the Romanian society in order to ermetize it with reference to the scale the 'bourgeois' spirit took outside the borders of the country, even in the other Leninist regimes like Yugoslavia, Hungary or the Soviet Union during Brezhnev's and especially Gorbachev's leadership. A 'paramodern' identity, in which material modernity (economical and technological development, positivist attitudes) coexists with values of German romanticism (a movement that, one century later, anticipated fascism), totally antimodern: social and axiological hierarchy, the perceivement of politics as a organic relations between rules and ruled, based on 'love', the lifting of individual heroism and the constitution of a world of moral and spiritual heroes etc (Râmbu: 2001). Exactly what the formation of the 'new man' aimed, having a 'socialist consciousness', capable and willing to construct socialism in the romantic-Leninist version.

On the other hand, romantic Leninism was always pragmatic, massively collaborating with capitalist states. But in this case, what mattered was not the collaboration I itself, but the possibility that its advantages would transfor RSS in an 'average developed coutry', internationally stronger and therefore able to resist the challenges of an essentiallt 'bourgeois world. For Ceausescu, as for Mao, the revolutions of the third world seemed the basic political force of the future, which could eventually overcome 'imperialism'. Ideologically, romantic Leninism has made permanent efforts to counter the international 'bourgeois' threat, visible especially during the 70's trough the human rights concept.

Between 1965 and 1989, Romanian foreign policy was based on two major coordinates. The first, calculated dissidence, was already discussed in the previous chapter. The concepts refers to the exploitation of Bucharest's autonomous policy within the 'socialist camp' in order to obtain image capital, fonds and political support from the West, along with this support to force economic concessions and political tolerance from Moscow. But, progressively, especially in the last decade of the regime, calculated dissidence reversed its landmarks: as the human rights obtain a more and more important position on the international stage, and most communist countries tacitly tolerate them, within certain limits, in their original, 'bourgeois' sense, the RSS will maintain its Leninist acception over the concept, romantically indulging itself in this perdant posture. The West is no longer willing to have commercial relations with a dictatorial regime, which hardly respects its payments and which, despite the abundant democratic rhetoric it offers on any occasion, stubbornly refuses to obey it practically. Trying to ensure the resources for a hypertrophied industry, Ceausescu will shyly reaproach the Soviet Union. But the 'wondering

son' will not really return home: it will rather walk in front of the garden, pretending sulky that it will enter only when it could impose its own rules. In other words, in the 80's, Ceausescu's dissidence was aimed rather towards the West (considered always an enemy) than the 'socialist camp', where it tried on every occasion to impose its 'independent' point of view. But the 'brotherly countries' did not forget Bucharest's chicanes in foreign policy, and were not having a special interest to welcome in the 'camp' a state which did not admit any behavior standards but its own. Furthermore, Gorbachev deprived Ceausescu of its reformist image. Thus, alculated dissidence will end up loosing its sense and being hostile to both the 'imperialist', respectively 'socialist camp'.

On the other hand, prestige diplomacy represents on its turn a relatively independent component of calculated dissidence, but without having its pragmatic substrate. An example in this sense is Romania's decision to get involved in the Vietnam War as mediator. 'One day, when I was working with Ion Gheorghe Maurer at his home', Paul Niculescu-Mizil remembers, 'N. Ceausescu called and informed on new events in Vietnam, events which wrer the object of our analysis. Without my will, I have attended to that telephonic converstion. Ion Gheorghe Maurer offered the solution on spot: «I have understood, we need to be in the area» (emphasis in original)'. For Mizil, the expression was a pun and it was utilized 'when the situation did not allow us to stay impassible and asked for new measures, respectively our presence in Vietnam or USA' (Niculescu-Mizil: 2008, 32). By 'being in the area' I understand something else. Namely, RSS's intention to be present in the majority of hot spots on the globe without having the possibility to truly contribute with solutions to the problems. Actually, Bucharest's intention was very different: to be as most visible as possible on the international relations stage and to derive as many advantages as possible from this aspect. Last but not least, the heroic-romantic posture which the regime displayed externally corresponded both to the image it will make of itself and to the image it wished to 'sell' the West.

The independence obsession. Romantic Leninism in the search of international affirmation and national mobilization

Once the phase of conceptual and political consolidation was over, trough the passing from symbolic to manifest, romantic Leninism will make everything possible to make its presence felt in the world. It will try to amplify and improve its image in the West, miming democratic ideas and values in order to undermine the 'imperialist' discourse, turning them into weapons inserted into its own ideological logic. Also, it will try to affirm itself especially in the Third World,

trying to become a non-Western developmental model and competing in this way, although at a lower level, with much more imposing Leninist regimes, as the Soviet Union or China.

Over the eight decade of the previous century, the international orientation of tehRSS kept its pragmatic print: calculated dissidence ca be considered in this period as the main moving force of Bucharest's foreign policy. But, progressively, the end of the 70's brings forward a visible deterioration of the regime's global image. The persecution of the few dissidents and the Western asyle of Ion Mihai Pacepa, the head of Romanian intelligence service, will contribute to the partial worsening of Ceausescu's international prestige. Furthermore, Jimmy Carter's presidency revalorized human rights as an American instrument of foreign policy. These ideological boost of 'imperialism' will shake the scaffolding of romantic Leninism, consuming it slowly. Human rights will be legitimized, in their 'bourgeois' version, by the 'socialst camp' once the Helsinki accords were signed in 1975. International communism made therefore a major concession to Western philosophy, gaining in return the recognition of the postwar geopolitical statu-quo, namely the official acceptance of Eastern Europe's communization. But on long term, the ideological price will turn out to be greater than the geopolitical benefits, as the Leninist regimes, although lacking by now the revolutionary impetus, were dealing harder and harder with their societies claim to confirm human rights: the 'bourgeois' internal tendencies obtained a new impulse.

With all these, the reputation of RSS's foreign poicy in the West will be truly damaged only in the next decade. But during the 70's, RSS will multiply its economic relations with the United States and the European Community, with the World bank and te Monetary International Fund; politically, it will try to impose itself in the Third World. Regarding its contacts with Moscow and the East-European Leninist regimes, there are no major difference with ratio to the orientation already assumed: calculated dissidence will maintain its positions. One major problem romantic Leninism had to face in this decade resided in the impossibility to successfully counter the tendencies, information sources and the atractivity of the West, which fully manifested within the society. The process lead to the ideological strengthening of romantic Leninism, which's intransigence towards the 'bourgeois' spirit will consequently amplify. RSS's position at the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and with reference to the Helsinki accords confirm this. Unlike systemic Leninism, which only rected to the Western ideological offensive, therefore proving the loss of its revolutionary substance, romantic Leninism successfully took the terms of Western discourse and gave them a new sense. Romantic Leninism articulated a counter-discourse in order to de-legitimize the Western discourse, using its terms in a Leninist sense, not 'bourgeois' sense, as they were originally intended. In other words, romantic Leninism did not resign in front of the Western ideological

advance, as systemic Leninism did, but acted against it with every means. It preserved therefore its revolutionary substance, and in time, instead of losing it, as the other east-European Leninist regimes did, amplified it: Ceausescu's personality cult represented, as Mary Ellen Fischer has noticed (1989), only a prophylactic reaction against the stubborn society which did not accept its projects: romantic Leninism therefore narrows its action base, restraining its ideological terrain around the 'conscience' and 'revolutionary vigilance' of its main architect, Nicolae Ceausescu.

The end. Romantic Leninism, a pariah for both Cold War 'camps'

In the last decade of existence, RSR entered in obscurity from the international policy point of view, while in the internal policy, PCR was experiencing new and unsuspected stages of radicalization. *A fortiori*, romantic Leninism, the regime's official ideology, became more revolutionary as the communism principles were eroding themselves fast in the Eastern Europe and, starting the second half of the 80's, in The Soviet Union itself.

In this period, the RSS will see itself confronted with a large and varied series of dilemmas. Externally, the Polish crises, which will begin in 1980 and will end in December 1981 with the declaration of the martial law by the new leader of Warsaw, general Jaruzelski – it will concern Bucharest, he was still hopping in a typical ending for such situations in the Leninist regimes: the brutal intervention of the leadership, the arresting of the protagonists and intimidation of the population for preventing the incidence of such gestures in the future. What has really happened, in the first phase; but after, the situation will take an insolate turn, inconceivable for the PCR leadership: Solidarity syndicate will undermine gradually and effectively the legitimacy pillars of the Polish Leninism, becoming to be invited, in few years, at the discussions for making a new government. Ceausescu was totally confused by the evolution of what it might be called the polish problem. Violating the foreign policy principles under which he gained the foreign reputation, " different ways of building the socialism", "non-interference in internal affairs", "quitting at force or threat with force" etc. -   the PCR leader suggested to Gorbachev to intervene armed in Poland to eliminate the threat of removing from power the communist regime.   The same way, he gave Jaruzelski to understand that he is willing to send military contingent to stabilize the situation and defend the polish socialism. Both refused him, fact which certainly strengthened the Romanian leader believes that "the socialist camp" knows a process of metamorphosis which puts into question his own existence. Consequently, the romantic Leninism will become more intransigent, concomitant with the rapid retrospective dissolution of global Leninism.

The greatest international and ideological threat for romantic Leninism will come from the part of the Gorbachev's regime or of the post-Bolshevik Leninism. In the first case, the Soviet leader will adopt the same kind of pacifist speech in the foreign policy plan but, unlike his Romanian counterpart, he will inspire a new content, "bourgeois", social democratic rather than Leninist (see Brown: 1997, 115-116, 138). Which meant that Gorbachev was going to agree with 'imperialism' *hic et nunc*, not condemn it preemptory for political, propagandistic and ideological reasons. In the vocabulary of the young and energetic successor of Konstantin Cernenko, "democracy", "freedom" and "human rights" were irretrievably losing their Leninist sense, embracing the "bourgeois" one. Finding the possibility of a discursive common denominator with the Occident, Gorbachev eclipsed Ceausescu, faithful until the end to the Leninist *Weltanschauung*. In addition, the fact that the new soviet leader renounced in silence at the global revolution principles, at the "democratic centralism" and, last but not least, at the army guaranty of the East-European regimes stability, the most important element in understanding the revolutionary journey consumed in 1989 – profoundly intensified the fears of Ceausescu.

Finally, the romantic Leninism will turn into a pariah both for the "imperialist camp", because of its hostility declared to the democracy and the humanitarian principles, and for the communist world, where the Leninist ideology, recalibrated over seven decades in the case of Moscow and have of century for the satellite regimes, was disintegrating fast. The philosophy of "bourgeois" won, and the "fortress" parties (Jowitt: 1993) made after the Bolshevik pattern were becoming more and more some simple groups sharing commune doctrinal sympathies. But not PCR. In a world that it couldn't understand it anymore (if it ever did), the romantic Leninism was making desperate efforts to maintain on the barricades. It will not succeed; however the national and international impact that its fail trained will offer the measure of an inflexibility and of a real "multilateral developed" dogmatism. The Romanian revolution doesn't make the object of the present chapter or paper, offering only tangential the confirmation of the ideological exacerbation of the regime and the frustrations accumulated by the population over the decades.

Instead of conclusions: what kind of social construction? Theoretical evaluations

„Theorizing is not an activity separated by the analyze of the empirical data. The analysis can be made only with theoretical propositions and schemes. On the other hand, analysis of some events and processes have to include, as a starting point, an entire series of specified values of some variables on which base it can be explained how (sic!) it had reached at the final results. To offer the historical explanation in a clear way, often you have to cross over the presentation of the formal interrelations between the variables.

Consequently, it is often justified to review of the material in the closure, at a brief and abstract level. No doubt it has to be useful to the reader. But it is even more important for the author, because it impose a certain rigor in analyze, whose absence could pass unnoticed in the multitude of details (Wallerstein: 1992, vol. II, 279).

I subscribe with no hesitation at the analytical model proposed by Wallerstein. The international policy of the Romanian communism, in the sense of the events' succession, it is preferable to be analyzed separately from the theoretical point of view. Sure, this is how it point out the above mentioned sociologist, the empirical material cannot be submissive to the research in the prior absence of some rigorous theoretical criteria; but they are not always explicit. On the contrary, it is indicated that theorizing is to be considered an autonomous, final part of the research, where are made the central conclusions of the entire approach, presented by then, most often in the terms of simple clues.

On the other hand, it was impossible to follow the configuration of the romantic Leninism and its international dimension, the main points of this study, without the instrumentation, *ad hoc*, of some theories belonging to the historical and politological register. Already mentioned in the methodological section of the study, the comparative historical analyze and the ideological analyze make together, besides the occasional sociologic interventions, very important theoretical instruments in the sense of printing some directions and objectives of specific research with which the concept of romantic Leninism could be individualized ideologically in relation to the main varieties of Soviet-style Leninist phenomenon. On the other hand, and with this occasion I hope to demonstrate, at the outline of the main stake of the researched historical itinerary contributes in the first place the international theorizes briefly analyzed at the beginning of the study. Sure, the RI theorizes and the political ideologies (in the scientific sense, not the partisan one) are practically interdependent, being largely different facets of the political theory applied, in the first case, in the foreign orientation of the countries, respectively, in the second case, in the internal one. Finally, it cannot be drawn a firm distinction between the two parts; they are interdependent. That doesn't mean that they are not autonomous in the terms of methodology and objective ones, nor being perfectly superimposable, fact which stands out especially in the socio-constructivism case, theory of the RI which can be claimed also by the socio-democrats, but also by the egalitarian liberals which claim from the rawlsian tradition.

To engage the methodological model dominant in RI, the one of images and analytical levels, the present study places itself between the simplistic explanations of psychological type, respectively the determination of the foreign policy of a state by the international structure.

Between the levels one and three of analyze (the leader's psychologies, respectively the structural pressures of the international medium), in other words. The romantic Leninism, both in what concerns the internal policy foreign policy, represented an ideologist social construction that imposed a certain political-administrative structure through some rules and standards by which it hoped to establish, in time, upon the society that was assaulting in the end, a type of hermetic socialization, militant and heroic, shaped to use an expression from the Bible, "after its image and likeness". It can be reduced to a single individual – Ceausescu, though it was, somehow, his stone "hard" - or, nighters mechanically, to the pressures of the international system. The romantic Leninism desired permanently the transformation of RSR in a "medium" power and in the first place an independent one. Even though it didn't have success in the limits he proposed – for the political and geopolitical situation of RSR, largely discussed in the previous chapters, the effective deployment of Moscow represented an ideal hardly reachable – the romantic Leninism yet resisted obstinately to the international pressures, especially in the last decade of its existence, in the 80's. We remember that Bucharest fully paid its foreign debt in 1988, renounced at the most favored nation clause (although without any doubt would have lost it), condemned aggressively the international reactions against the discrimination of national minorities and systematization of rural projects, particularly those inhabited by ethnic Hungarians. It acted the same in the precedent decades, once Ceausescu took power, only that, unlike in the 80's, when the Romanian leadership rejected both the Humanitarian critics of the West, and the ideological and administrative critics of the Soviet Union led now by Michael Gorbachev – in the 60's and 70's Moscow was considered the main danger for the internal stability of the Bucharest regime. Romantic Leninism, revolutionary in the post-revolutionary Leninist acception of the term – did not want to accept the constrains in favor of the statu-quo imposed by systemic Leninism, which's revolutionary impetus had disappeared in favor of the material benefits that could be extracted from the 'bourgeois' world.

The pluralist evaluation of the international dimension of romantic Leninism
Internationally, pluralism, the ideological equivalent of liberalism, affirms the constitutive values of this ideology. Let us mention the most important: individuality, respect and guarantee of human rights, political participation, tolerance, interculturality, free market, the limitation of state power. Beside these, pluralism stresses upon commerce as a pacifying force and also a creator of positive sum games, an idée enounced even from the beginning of 19th century by Benjamin Constant (2001) – but also on the educational and factual role of international conflicts in preventing and managing global conflicts.

How many of these principles would have appealed to romantic Leninism? The ideology that articulates it is totally incompatible to 'bourgeois' liberalism. First of all, the importance of the individual is secondary for romantic Leninism. If it did not obey party principles, the individual was, as we have seen, 'class enemy', 'counter-revolutionary', lacking 'patriotism' and manipulated by exterior 'enemy forces' like 'imperialism or international 'bourgeoisie'. The revolutionary project of romantic Leninism did not distinguish, externally, but also internally, between its ideological and its national enemies. A 'xenophobic' attitude, as Michael Shafir observes (Shafir: 1989, 1-12). Even when the individual was convinced by the justness of romantic-Leninist principles, developing therefore a 'revolutionary conscience' it was in the same inferior ration with RCP. Within Leninist regimes, Robert Tucker argues, social dynamics articulated on ideological principles is dominant: the community, the party in this case, or, better said, its intransigent nucleus, is more important than the party member. Consequently, the whole is more important than the part, a premise to which no liberal theorist would subscribe. Regarding the romantic-Leninist vision over human rights, the present thesis discussed it over a whole subchapter, from which clearly emerges its animosity towards the 'bourgeois' notion of human rights. Liberalism, the political philosophy from which human rights emerged, insists on the individual and civic character of them. Within romantic Leninism individuality is disconsidered, with the exception of the single possible hero, Nicolae Ceausescu. Human rights functioned here as social disciplinary instrument, not as a guarantee of individual freedom and dignity. And the obtaining by citizens of the 'revolutionary consciousness' would have revealed something else: the 'bourgeois' variety of human rights was nothing but a masquerade, a surrogate of the authentic and plenary rights of humans, which's individuality was circumscribed to a collective framework; the trues affirmation of human personality would have been possible only in the post-capitalist world, were the social and material reality would have been restructures on very different onthological coordinates.

The Marxist evaluation of the international dimension of romantic Leninism
As we have seen in the theoretical chapter, the filiation between Marxism and Leninism is unquestionable. Certain topics from Marx's theories were reinterpreted in an ideological sense, an evolution that the German thinker would have surely not approved. We have seen, on short, the main social, economic and philosophical premises of Marxism: emancipation, the overcoming of the capitalist mode of production, respectively the abolition of the objectification of human creation and the annulment of the ratio between subject and object specific to the capitalist historic stage, were the last becomes autonomous and even superior to the first. Marx's

revolution signifies the abolition of this dualism and mankind's regaining control over itself as a whole, especially its productive activity

Lenin, on the other hand, was less interested on Marx's social and conceptual revolution in favor of the political one. Bolshevism imposed itself in an agrarian country, when Marx expected the developed countries to nurture the revolutionary process, because they have already entered the capitalist stage that offers the material conditions for revolution; the last ingredient was the development of the 'revolutionary' conscience of workers, which would have united them into a single, transnational class. Marx's predictions did not come true, but they have contributed enormously to the 'humanization' of western capitalism. In Russia, on the other hand, Marxist ideas were turned from empirical instruments with a declared emancipator role into weapons for which the social practice did not count as the absolute landmark, but the enemy which had to be moulded in the name of pseudo-religious and pseudo-scientific principles, as Alain Besançon had wonderfully proved (1993). Marx's material socialism, originated from the social-activity in itself, and which could have confirmed or infirmed the theoretical evaluations of its author, and consequently transforming them – is abandoned by Lenininsm, especially post-revolutionary Leninism, in the name of dialectical materialism. This is no longer a product of practice and experience, but is independent with reference to empirical reality, which it aims to reconstruct according to its ideological principles. (see Kubálková, Cruickshank: 1980). Or, as I have argued in the last chapters of the thesis, 'socialist conscience' is no longer, as Marx saw it, an emanation of 'social existence', but a corrective of it. Marx and Engels however warned it *The German Ideology* 'For us, communism is not a state which has to be created, an ideal which has to guide reality. We name communism the real movement that suppresses the actual statu-quo. The condition of this movement result from the existent premises' within the structure, not superstructure, we could add (Marx, Engels: 1956, 32; Emphasis in orig.).

If Soviet Leninism distorted Marxism so much, politicizing and ideologicizing it, romantic Lenininsm went even further in this direction because, beside the Leninist reinterpretations of Marxism, we have to deal in this case with romanticism, nationalism and fascism. Marx knew and went against the first two ideological currents, considering them ideologies that keep mankind captive to the 'idealistic' specter and diminishing its chances of progress. The havocs of fascism remained unknown to him, but he would have surely denounced him in its own way, both vehement and scientific.

The heroic posture in which romantic Leninism imagined itself internally and externally, appealing to militant historic mythologies, wrapped in an extremely complex and sophisticated propagandistic package, would have never obtained Marx's approval. On the contrary, it would have been denounced and ridiculed with the characteristical precision of the author of *Capital*.

The rigid internal hierarchy and the exacerbated external ambitions, combined with the ideologization of society in a manner similar to the 'organicism' and 'love' which the romantic Germans valued and postulated as basis of the relation between monarchs, models of virtue, and citizens, which would hopefully find the necessary amount of inspiration in them – beside the fact that imprint romantic Leninism with a distinct ideological shape, would have again been condemned by Marx, which wrote and acted all his life against such recrudescences of the Dark Ages, wherever they appeared. If the German philosopher presented himself often as not being 'Marxist', we can only imagine how it would have reacted to the romantic-Leninist distortion of its theories.

Regarding the analysis of romantic Leninism trough contemporary Marxist currents, the result is not at all improved. For Immanuel Wallerstein, classical Marxism would be put into practice, as its original authors argued, at the level of the nucleus. But Leninism could have not been born somewhere outside the periphery. The motives are clear: in the developed states, the proletariat had a better way of life and more diverse and attractive options to spend its free time, a fact which negatively influences the development of militantism and class conscience; then, excepting Germany and Italy, the first two fascist states, nationalism, which partially contributed, camouflaged under the form of 'anti-imperialism', to the success of Leninism in Russia, making, along with appeals for class struggle, the promise of economic development and social prosperity – was not as developed within nucleus states as to successfully mobilize societies in revolutionary directions, the appeal of class struggle being insufficient in this regard, as the behavior of European socialist parties during the first world war proves it; last but not least, as an anti-systemic movement, Leninism would have been harder to put in practice within the nucleus states, where the 'reaction' was all powerful. And the same regarding the Third World, insufficiently developed at the level of infrastructure and industry to manage all by itself the revolutionary scale for a process like this. The unique solution thus came from semiperiphery, a category in which tsarist Russia fully integrated (Wallerstein: 1991, 88).

The realist evaluation of the international dimension of romantic Leninism
Both in the Gheorghiu-Dej period and the 'Ceausescu epoch', Romania's foreign policy has characteristics than can easily include it in the realist approach of international relations: systematic and less risky strategies to create contacts and possible partnerships with states and international institutions that could prove useful for the regime's objectives, the careful analysis of the balance of forces in the regions it planned to act, the permanent struggle for its national interest, of the independence and suveranity of the Romanian state, the clear delimitation between internal and external affairs – although, as we have seen, internal and foreign affairs

were united by ideology – the greater importance ascribed to the state and nation compared with social classes, and the list can go on. Why is then realism insufficient to profoundly analyze romantic Leninism's internationalism?

First of all, because it does not take into account the ideological subsidiary of the foreign policy of Leninist regimes. Even if, in a 'bourgeois' world, they have borrower more and more realist characteristics, they have kept however a distinct ideological identity (Lynch: 1989, 31). In other words, realism homogenizes international actors, taking into account only their external behavior in some circumstances and classifying it according to rigid and inflexible formulas.

If the other Leninist regimes became more an more 'bourgeois', leaving their guard down in front of their old 'class enemy', romantic Leninism also suffered 'bourgeois' influence, but from different reasons. More exactly, due to its constitutive nationalism or 'revolutionary socialist patriotism' that structured it. Although conceptually different from 'bourgeois' nationalism, 'chauvinistic' and 'aggressive', the romantic-Leninist nationalism entailed just this type of attitudes and practices, both within RCP and at the larger level of society. Due to romanticism that was ideologically and politically expressed trough a heroic, mystical and virulent nationalism, but also due to the ideological advance of the 'bourgeois' ontology in the second half of the 70's, romantic Leninism became extremely nationalist in its attempt to isolate itself from this threatening tendency. This led to the exacerbation of the nationalist component of romantic Leninism, insufficiently matured in Leninist terms: 'bourgeois' nationalism made a forceful comeback to take the place of 'socialist revolutionary patriotism'; beside their ideological difference, in social practice both parts had the same type of effects. And if one takes into account that realist, conservative regimes, even liberal ones, are on their turn nationalist, it can disover a powerful common denominator between romantic Leninism and realist conservatism, insufficient however to proclaim the two parts as being equivalent.

Second, realism is, generally, a philosophy of the international statu-quo, appreciated and practiced especially by the great powers which dominate the international environment at one moment. Its temporal orientation takes into account the present, legitimizing itself, in a conservative tradition, from the past. Romantic Leninism is far from those characteristics. RSS did not legitimize the international statu-quo, but permanently and vehemently contested it, if we take into account the messages that proposed the 'simultaneous liquidation of military blocks', identifiable in almost every discourse of the regime's officials. Of course, in this point could be brought into discussion Ceausecu's incalculable ambition to become the leader of an appreciable European power and its regret for not ruling one of the superpowers of the day. Is this not the equivalent of masked realism? However, we have here the example of the Soviet Union. None of the Soviet Leninism can be considered realist, not even systemic Leninism, because, to put it

simply, to act in accordance to the international environment's pressures does not equate with its acceptance. Realism and Leninism express to highly incompatible ideologies which, although they have influenced themselves reciprocally along the 20th century, they have never confounded one another.

The social-constructivist evaluation of the international dimension of romantic Leninism

If realism, pluralism and Marxism are all positivist theories, based on the distinction between researcher the the object of research, respectively between facts and values, social-constructivism proposes a radically different analysis which transforms it into a new social theory, a new onthology, being thus more than a simple theory of international relations.

In any Soviet type, Leninism represented a social political construction, meaning a 'from above' socialization. Romantic Leninism is no exception. Benefiting from the anteriority of several forms of Soviet Leninism, which's experience and direct intervention (post-revolutionary Leninism) brought a constitutive contribution to its intellectual and political gestation, romantic Leninism is influenced, at least as much, by a different ideology, nationalism. Aiming to convert society to its own revolutionary project, romantic Leninism's direction of action was always 'from above'. This is a first motive, common to all Leninist regimes, for which romantic Leninism represents a special social construction: due to its intellectual isolation and the radical and intransigent atmosphere in which it was born, both contributing to its ideological ossification and to the sketching of the only way of action it knew and utilized: the political, 'from above' one.

In order to apply the onufian constructivist model to romantic Leninism, we must start from the norms and rules valuable in RSS. We know from Onuf that norms and rules lye between actors and structures, representing means actors use in order to follow their interests in the sense of using as much available resources as possible; acting, actors reproduce, trough their behavioral dispositions, the social structures they belong to (Onuf: 1989). When social inequalities are major, Onuf warns, rules became dictatorial (*rules make rule*). This problem does not affect romantic Leninism, which's beginning itself lies under the totalitarian aegis. In this case, we can reverse the elements in Onuf's equation and affirm that dictatorship (rule) creates its own rules and norms (rules) which do not reflect the conditions of social existence, but its own ideological objectives. Therefore the dictatorship created its own normative-legislative system and imposed it to the population, both for enrolling it and to reproduce itself. Of course that the RCP's ideologues were aware of the apathy and passivity of the population with ratio to the official ideology – here lied the necessity for the 'July these' and Ceausescu's attention for this chapter – but they hoped that, in time, the population will be attracted by the nationalist principles the

regime professed (a relatively successful prediction) and 'the wooden language' would be further integrated into the popular language, contributing to the creation of the 'socialist consciousness'.

The unconditional obeyance of the party's decisions and the existing system of laws and 'the growth of the leading role of RCP', along with all the ideological norms and their ideological, economic and social facets – all contributing to the 'construction of socialism', romantic-Leninist style – constitutes or so it should, the link between the regime and society. The social actors would have used the juridical framework to achieve their purposes, becoming, in the same time, part of the romantic Leninist structure, which's their actions confirmed and reproduced. The problem that lies here, constituting in the same time the major drama of romantic Leninism is that it did not become eventually a structure and continued to behave as an agent. To become a structure, the regime lacked social legitimacy, something it never had, being imposed externally and from above'; furthermore, as we recall, Leninist regimes consider societies ideological enemies which must be educated in order to develop 'socialist conscience', indispensable for 'building socialism'. The paradox is that romantic Leninism was both structure and agent in ratio with the social structure which stubbornly refused to be enrolled and develop the so much needed 'revolutionary conscience'. An insufficiently structurant political-ideological structure with reference to the social structure it 'assaulted', to paraphrase Anthony Giddens.

Close related to the romantic-Leninist norms and rules are some 'speech acts' theorized by Onuf. We remember that 'speech acts' were of tree types: 'assertive (based on instructions, neutral with ratio to the transmitted information), directive (or imperative, entailing mandatory submission) and, last but not least, engaging, thus implying different promises and their fulfillment (Onuf: 1989; Onuf în Kubálková, Onuf, Kovert: 1998, 58-78). Within romantic Leninism exist only the last two types of 'speech acts', the directive and the engaging ones. The unconditional obeyance of the party and state decisions and the conviction that they are just, the avoidance as much as possible, of contacts with strangers, the denunciation of deviations from the 'socialist morale', the 'sabotage of socialist property', the remedy of the insufficient ideological training and the instilment of revolutionary impetus, to name just a few – are directive 'speech acts' the officials and propagandists of the regime used on every party meeting or public manifestation. The costs of not obeying these norms were known to the population. On the other hand, they were engaging 'speech acts', identifiable in the first place within the messages that promised, always in the future, general social welfare based on adequate industrialization and an equitable way of production, which would eliminate the division of work, responsible, as Marx had predicted, for the appearance of capitalism. But getting there required lots of work, abnegation and heroic dedication from all citizens to the revolutionary project of the party; 'revolutionary combativeness', firmness, intransigence and vigilance in

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order to 'unmask' internal or external 'class enemies', more and more as romantic Leninism was getting inadequate to an expanding 'bourgeois' world. One could say that the RCP used the 'stick and carrot' leading technique. But, as the carrot got smaller, the stick increased. Repression was amplified in the last decade of the regime's existence, while the resources diminished and the population became more and more dissatisfied and distant regarding RCP's ideological postulates. Confronted with increased hostility, within and outside the country as well, romantic Leninism comprised and adopted a very aggressive posture that could be named, as I have argued in the previous chapter, insular-repressive.

It is interesting to observe that, internationally, the regime adopted the same 'speech acts', even in the same order – directive, respectively engaging – stressing upon the need to practice a 'new international order' trough the restructuring of international institutions and commerce and, trough disarmament and the renunciation of nuclear weapons, objectives which, if on the international agenda, would have gathered the unconditional support of RSS. One must mention that, if in internal affairs romantic Leninism was something between a structure and an agent, inclining however towards a structure, in external affairs, as we know from Harry Gould (1998, 79-100), social-constructivism approaches states as agents with ratio to the international structure (institutions, organizations, balance of forces etc.), treating them internally as structures that reproduce themselves trough the actions of social actors, to which they make available a system of rules trough which they maximize their interests with minimal costs. So, in order to adapt to the international system and extract a maximum of benefits from it, romantic Leninism used a type of discourse somehow similar to the 'bourgeois' ones, but Leninist in essence and nationalist in strategies. Using the same 'speech acts', apparently cosmeticized and impregnated by 'bourgeois' terms in order to be used as a counter-discourse in the competition with the dominant, 'bourgeois' ideology, romantic Leninism fully proved the continuity between its internal and international policy, both articulated by a unitary ideology, negatively fascinating trough its simplicity and coherence and the stubbornness in affirming its own, distinct identity.

Because identity is the main topic here, and the way romantic Leninism imagined and constructed itself, inviting others to perceive it in the same way. Constituted by the combining of two ideologies, Leninism, and romantic nationalism, romantic Leninism was animated and tried to impose the Romanian society a paramodern identity (paramodernity is borrowed from Matei: 2007). Paramodern because it has one foot in the past and the other in the future. The antimodern dimension of romantic Leninism resides in its elitist, archaic, romantic character, trough which present was rejected in the name of heroic mythologies in which Prince Charmings destroyed the modern dragons of 'imperialism', making Romania a respectable power and a global opinion leader. The modern dimension of romantic Leninism has two components: a material an

ideological one, both Leninist. Massive industrialization, building infrastructures and the enlargement of the urban locative space represent the material component of the modern dimension of romantic Leninism. The ideological component is given by the classical principles of Leninism, discussed in the whole thesis. Of course, its characterization as modern implies several risks because, as we have noticed, Leninism can be considered rather a parricidal offspring of modernity in the sense that it destroys it by pretending that it only puts it into practice according to its authentic purpose of ensuring equality in the same extent it ensures freedom. Unable and unwilling to perfectly guaranteeing both of them, the reproaches Leninism makes modernity are much beyond its powers and objectives.

Romantic Leninism ended in the same way it existed: in a world it did not understood, or it understood only in the extent it needed in order to assault it. But in December 1989, the society went against the regime, in a revolutionary flare that Marx would have probably saluted, especially because it seemed the application of a principle it enunciated in the *18ᵗʰ brumaire of Louis Bonaparte:* '*Better a horrific end, than an endless horror!*' (Marx: 1949, 317; subl. în orig.).

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