The change of Ceauşescu’s policies from the point of view about political diplomatic relations with North Korea

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Key Words

The whole world is on the threshold of a new period that connects to the 21st century and that is expressed in two words: globalization and the revolution of information. In the 21st century, it has been got beyond the idealist thinking according to which Koreans’ unification should be done on an open conflict, and the new thinking wants the achievement of a peaceful Korean unification. In reality, South-Koreans’ thinking about Korean unification is considered possible in present due to the relaxation of tensions within Korean Peninsula. In this circumstance some question could appear in South-Koreans’ thinking, like some that can be reminded, as for instance: “What is North Korea for South-Koreans?”, “How is North-Korea seen?” and “Is North Korea the enemy or the compatriot for South Koreans?”

De facto, North Korea is in hostile relationships with South Korea. It is considered South-Koreans’ enemy from the point of view of security in Korean Peninsula, because North Korea maintains an excessive military force: the nuclear weapon that may completely devastate Korean Peninsula.

But de jure, North Korea is a “compatriot of destiny” which South Korea unconditionally accepts for a peaceful unification, so in South Korea there is this dualist recognition regarding North Korea. In this situation, I South-Koreans’ attention would be drawn only to the military menace of North Korea; this hostile inter-Korean relationship can not be simply solved. On the contrary, if the recognition through which North Korea is a compatriot of the unification is
excessively underlined, a vague illusionism on the unification that disregards the reality of the relationship between South and North may envelop South-Koreans.

In order of accelerating the unification process in Korean Peninsula, that becomes more and more unlikely, it is imposed to make numerous studies based on objectives researches on North Korea. In other words, the research concerning North Korea must not be sustained by the preconceived idea against communism, but it has to be developed in such way to observe “north Korea as it really is”. In fact, prior to the end of the Cold War, ideological restrictions put many pressures on the scientists who wanted to make researches about communist countries, North Korea included. In the case of South-Korea who still confronts North Korea, there are difficulties in collecting information regarding the present enemy, North Korea. It is normal that the scientific intention of studies on North Korea who is the present enemy cannot elude the ideological restriction of ensemble.

But the start of a new period that springs the reconcilement and collaboration between South Korea and North Korea must be applied in the field of scientific research regarding North Korea. In order to accomplish an objective analysis of the North Korean society, it must be retained the observation through standardized lenses that had been formed by hostile historic experiments as the tragedy of the Korean War.

If we, South-Koreans would be most appropriately prepared for North Korean perspectives for the future by objective analysis, historical costs and exhausting efforts for the future confrontation could be reduced.

If present situation would be almost similar to a contemporary experience from the past, the problems issued during this experience may be analyzed and those analyses may generate a much more profitable option for the present day. This type of analysis, by comparison to a
certain model, may be seen as imperfect but it may offer an important orientation for the analysis. From the comparative analysis with a certain model, from the point of view of divergent angles, it is selected the result that makes possible the perception of the political orientation and of the perspective for the future of North Korea. “Which political group or State may be an appropriate model to make the comparison with North Korea?”; this question is the start basis of this work, meaning this question is the reason for the process of developing this work.

From the numerous perspectives and scenarios regarding North Korea’s future, the historical expertise during Ceausescu is the most appropriate for the comparison with North Korea. In this work, the resemblances between the two countries are mentioned for justifying the comparison between Romania and North Korea. It may be found the resemblance between the communization process, of the effort in developing a close and direct relationship between the Communist Party and the popular masses and that of the stage of delayed development of the civil society in the two countries.

The communization process of the two countries was done by direct help (intervention) of Soviet army. In fact, the Communist Party in Romania and North Korea was a politically weak group, which could not exercise a visible influence on the politic scene up to the end of World War 2. Although genuine communists in those countries were not sufficiently sustained by the popular mass, they managed to take over the preponderant power on the politic scene by means of Soviet Union intervention.

Communist Parties in the two countries maintained the fabulous number of partisans. In all communist states, each leading group keep an idea according to which the “state”, “the party” and “the people” are equal, namely they maintain the conception type of the “trinity”, uniting the
three elements from above: ‘state’, ‘party’ and ‘people’. So the fabulous number of partisans in Romania and North Korea may be considered as a result of the efforts of the leading group to materialize a conception, ‘trinity’ among ‘party’, ‘people’ and ‘state’. It may be considered that the Communist Party in those states convinced or forced the people to join the communist party in order to transmit more efficiently the political direction of the leading group (or leader’s) to the popular mass. During the communist period, Romania and North Korea tried to build the system by means of a direct relationship between the leading group and the popular mass; this system could cause a decrease of the intermediation power. Moreover, due to the capacity of this system to directly connect the people to the leading group, it is more easy to be installed a structure of cult of personality. So, the effort of the two countries for developing the close and direct relationship between the communist party and the popular mass that has been analyzed through some statistic data mentioned in this work regarding the number of partisans could make Romania a communist state possibly more appropriate for the comparison to North Korea.

Since the introduction of ‘de-Stalinization” most of the communist states, Soviet Union included, began to be change from the point of view of divergent angles, establishing of the collective leading structure, the movement of peaceful reconciliation from the perspective of international relationships. In June 1953 took place the popular rebellion against Soviet Union, in Berlin. And “The Revolution in Hungary” exploded in October 1956. During the year 1968 anti-communist movements appeared, “The Spring from Prague”. This chain of resistance movements in Eastern Europe suggests that despite Stalinist regime, certain social and economic influences acted and denied the communist structure. The analysis of this chain of rebellions in Eastern Europe may be more efficiently developed by understanding the civil society. Civil society may be considered an intermediary existence that is placed between the State and the
private sphere. Due to energetic action of the civil society, there were possible citizens’ claims in certain authoritarian communist states from Eastern Europe. But it was not created a remarkable movement of rebellion against the authoritarian regime in Romania and North Korea, during the period of ‘de-Stalinization’. Generally, citizens’ positive participation to the civil society is closely related to the economic situation. But Romania and North Korea were underdeveloped from the economical point of view, compared to Hungary, Czechoslovakia and East Germany where issued liberal rebellions against the authoritarian regime that maintained the status of developed economy. The two countries, Romania and North Korea had no conditions favorable for the development of civil society, which could exercise divergent influences on the authoritarian regime.

Finally, we may reach to the conclusion that Romania during communist period may be compared to North Korea. By this comparison results the perspective of future for North Korea from the point of view of the experience of communist regime in Romania

In Chapter 2 it is concisely analyzed the basis of communism, so Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism. Because “Juce idea” and “Ceausism” from the two countries came out from the combination between a fundamental ideology – Marxism-Leninism – and each distinct situation, it is necessary to analyze the basis of each communist ideology. In order to comprehend more efficiently the ‘Juce idea’ and ‘Ceausism’ we must concisely examine the common origin of each communist state, namely Marxism. Marxism is an ideology of resistance. In addition, Leninism has a feature of resistance ideology and in the same time a feature of ideology of domination. So, Leninism may be considered fundamental, an ideology of resistance and besides this it is practically characterized, including a feature of ideology of domination. Stalinism may be considered an ideology of domination for the practical leadership of the country. The comparison
Leninism – Marxism may be understood as a theoretical link. On the contrary, the relationship between Leninism and Stalinism may be considered a practical link. In other words, Marxism was turned Russian by Lenin in Russia, so the “Russified Marxism” may be simply considered Leninism. Lenin mixed the universality of Marxism with Russia’s particularity. But Stalin destroyed the universality of Marxism, consolidating and excessively increasing the particularity. Therefore, the relationship between Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism may be considered a process of changing from a pure ideology of the revolution to a practical ideology of domination. The ideology of domination of the two states, “Juce Idea” and “Ceausism” would be one of the results of the process of succession and development of certain communist ideologies, Marxism, Leninism and Stalinism.

In Chapter 3 is researched the historical background of North Korea, namely the Stalinization process of North Korean territory, which may be the first button in the process of analyzing North Korea’s society, especially “Juce Idea” as an ideology of domination in North Korea. Moreover, certain cultural, historic and economic backgrounds that influenced the communization of North Korea are introduced. The history of North Korea may be put on periods according to the stages of the revolution, changing of the structure of the leadership (of political change), the stages of the economic development, etc. From these methods of putting on periods, the method of putting in periods on the phases on the revolution is considered the most general modality of research on the history of North Korea. In this chapter, the contemporary history of North Korea is explained, being put on period on some stages as it follows: (1) The process of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution, (2) The generation of the dictated-proletarian government and the War from Korea, (3) The end of the War from Korea and the process of building up Kim Ir Sen’s unitary leadership, (4) Rising of “Juce Idea” from the ‘de-
Stalinization’ process and (5) consolidation of Kim Ir Sen’s unitary leadership. The fourth and the fifth stages include the period of internal and external crisis on Kim Ir Sen’s leading system and those of starting the current of personality cult, for the consolidation of Kim Ir Sen’s unitary leadership. The fourth stage refers particularly to the internal and external background of the emergence of the ‘Juce’ idea. In this chapter, it is underlined the fact that the ‘Juce’ Idea was introduced in haste against the process of ‘De-Stalinization’ and it can be seen as a simple variation of Stalinism. In order to observe the political changes of North Korea with regard to this process, the newspaper of the communist party in the country, ‘Rodong Sinmun’, is used as reference here. The political changes of authority in that period were reflected in this newspaper. Moreover, the manifestations concerning the idolization of Kim Ir Sen were indirectly infiltrated in ‘Rodong Sinmun’.

In Chapter IV the ‘Juce’ idea is presented in detail. The most important key in understanding the nature of the North Korean society is linked to the correct understanding of the ‘Juce’ idea. The communist ruler uses a device, an ideology, as a resource in the ruling process in order to enhance his own political power. The ideology in each communist state is used in a valuable way as a resource of legitimately guaranteeing the politics, in order to take over the leadership to the detriment of the rival regime and in order to justify the inhuman brutality in the process of ascension to power. The process of formation of the ‘Juce’ idea can be attributed to some external and internal factors. In the 1950s, North Korea’s authority regarding the diplomatic pro-Soviet activities began to change. The 20th Congress of the Communist Party took place in February 1956, where Hrusciov objected to Stalinist politics. For the same reason, he introduced some measures of de-Stalinization, although not approved by Kim Ir Sen. The authority in North Korea who promoted the reinforcement of Kim Ir Sen’s unitary leadership structure could not
approve this anti-Stalinist movement. Moreover, the conflict between China and the Soviet Union became more serious. The disagreement between the two communist countries exerted a great influence on the process of formation and systematization of the ‘Juce’ idea. It was under this ideological conflict within the communist bloc that Kim Ir Sen officialised the four major politics of ‘Juce’ idea: ‘the subject of ideology’, ‘independence in politics’, ‘self-sustenance in the economy’ and ‘self-defence in national defence’, making all efforts in maintaining independent the scene of activity. The Vietnam War had as well a considerable influence on the process of stabilization of the ‘Juce’ idea. Kim Ir Sen began to doubt the Soviet Union and China. North Korea’s authority was deceived by the two communist countries, previously loyal to North Korean. Kim Ir Sen would begin to doubt the possibility of military intervention by the Soviet Union and China, in the context of the increasing national crisis in North Korea. The Vietnam War certainly broke out after the introduction of the ‘Juce’ conception in the North Korean society by Kim Ir Sen. We can say however that the negative reactions of the states major in this war would have greatly influenced on Kir Ir Sen, from the point of view of the stabilization of the ‘Juce’ idea. Moreover, we can mention some internal factors in the process of formation of the ‘Juce’ idea. Kim Ir Sen intended to completely get rid of the opponents within the party, by the stabilization of his structure legitimacy. The self-sustenance in the economy by an efficient popular mobilization was necessary. Since 1962, the financial assistance of the Soviet Union in North Korea has been completely blocked. The systematization of the ‘Juce’ idea was accomplished, while the unitary power of Kim Ir Sen was strengthened. Moreover, the cult of personality of Kim Ir Sen materialized the ‘Juce’ idea on the North Korean political stage. The intensification of the phenomena related to Kim Ir Sen’s cult of personality is closely linked to the process of systematization of the ‘Juce’ idea. The cult of personality of Kim Ir Sen in
North Korea presented the three specific aspects: (1) The idolization of the ruler’s dominant power, (2) The emphasis on the loyalty to the ruler. From the three characteristic aspects, (3) The idolization of the mythical family of the ruler had no precedent in the history of communist movements. Stalin was referred to as “Father of the Popular Mass”, “our Sun”, “Great Master”, etc. But, neither Stalin nor Mao tried to extent this worship over the family of the ruler. The North Korean society can be viewed as a great family based on the patriarchal Confucianism. This conception may explain how Kim Ir Sen and his son Kim Jång Il managed to maintain the absolute rule, by applying the politics of the cult of personality to the Kim family.

In chapter V the process of communization imposed by the Soviet Union in Romania is explained. This chapter, just like Chapter III, confirms the fact that the process of communization in the two countries took place under the direct intervention of the Soviet Union. <Table 5-2> from page 123 describes precisely the steps of the process of communization of Romania’s territory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>The happenings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>August 23, 1939</td>
<td>The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed in Moscow – A secret additional protocol by which Germany approved the annexation of Bessarabia to the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 1940</td>
<td>The Government of Romania publicly announced the annexation of Bessarabia and Bukovina to the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 30, 1940</td>
<td>North-western Transylvania was annexed to Hungary by the Vienna Dictate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 22, 1941</td>
<td>Romania joined the war, on the side of Germany and against the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1, 1944</td>
<td>The Frontul Unic Muncitoresc (F.U.M) was organized by a coalition between P.C.R. and P.S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 23, 1944</td>
<td>King Michael, with the support of other political parties, including P.C.R., dismissed Antonescu from power, announcing the breaking off with Germany.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept-Oct 1944</td>
<td>B.N.D. was replaced by Frontul National Democrat (F.N.D.) – This was a new political coalition, lead and controlled by the Communist Party.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 9, 1944</td>
<td>Churchill and Stalin met in Moscow and drafted the percentages agreement. In Romania the soviet influenced was established to 90% by the acceptance of the West alliances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 6, 1945</td>
<td>The pro-communist regime: the Groza government, member of the Communist Party, was formed under the pressure of the Soviet Union.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 16-26, 1945</td>
<td>A conference was held in Moscow, where the government of Groza was recognized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 19, 1946</td>
<td>The first parliamentary elections were held – F.N.D. became preponderant (347 out of 383 parliamentary seats).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>The communist in Romania undertook concrete actions in eliminating political opponents – P.N.T. leader, Iuliu Maniu, was arrested in July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 30, 1947</td>
<td>King Michael abdicated under the pressure of communists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 30, 1947</td>
<td>The Popular Republic of Romania was established.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 21-23, 1948</td>
<td>P.C.R. and P.S.D. unified – The new party, Romanian Workers’ Party (Partidul Muncitoresc Roman – P.R.M.) was created, becoming the unique political party in communized Romania.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 27, 1948</td>
<td>F.N.D. became the Popular Democracy Front (Frontul Democratiei Nationale – F.D.N.), an electoral alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 28, 1948</td>
<td>Parliamentary elections were held – F.D.P. won 93.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 13, 1948</td>
<td>The Parliament adopted a new constitution, a copy of the Stalinist constitution from 1936.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moreover, the process of the revolution of 1848 is concisely mentioned here because ‘Nationalism’, which was efficiently used as a political tool on the Romanian political stage, penetrated the Romanians’ minds with the revolution of 1848. Ceausescu, as well, used ‘nationalism’ as a tool to stimulate the nationalist sentiments in order to justify the enhancement of unitary power in Romania. For example, Ceausescu declared in a speech from 1971 that “nation has a great influence on destiny and on world’s progress in history’s development process and nation will continue to exist as a dynamic and positive factor for the future of
communism”. Unlike in other communist countries in Eastern Europe, the process of ‘De-Stalinization’ did not take place on the Romanian political stage. This sequence of events is related to Ceausescu’s policy concerning the cult of personality. Moreover, in this chapter it is mentioned Ceausescu’s trying to adopt in Romania a program inspired from the Asian realities, namely the ‘cultural mini-revolution’, an imitation of the ‘cultural revolution’ from China, after official friendly visits in some Asian countries including China (June 1-9, 1971) and North Korea (June 9-15, 1971). Ion Iliescu, the president of Romania between 1990- November 1996 and December 2000 - December 2004, accompanied Ceausescu in his visits in Asia in 1971. He mentioned that “Ceausescu was very impressed by North Korea. Unlike China, where there was an enormous chaos caused by the ‘cultural revolution’, North Korea, the disciplined society created by a unitary ruler, Kim Ir Sen, stood as a perfect totalitarian model for him. Short after his returning, Ceausescu established a local system following the North Korean model.” As in North Korea, Ceausescu’s cult of personality and the politics based on nepotism transformed Romania into ‘the Ceausescu dynasty’ for the rest of the world. This controlled orientation of Ceausescu caused Romania’s international isolation.

In chapter VI, the diplomatic relations between Romania and North Korea are analysed, using internal proximity as a research method. The first concrete reference to North Korea in the newspaper ‘Scânteia’ is said to date from 1950, when the Korean War broke out. After Ceausescu’s official visit in 1971, the way in which North Korea was mentioned in ‘Scânteia’ was more detailed, friendly and more positive. This could be interpreted in various ways, but it shows that the communist authority in Romania tried to justify the enhancement of unitary governing by positively referring to an ideal model state – North Korea. In this chapter, Ceausescu’s New Year Messages published in ‘Scânteia’ are also closely studied. The political,
economic and diplomatic directions of every year were directly or indirectly infiltrated in these messages. As time went by, the content of the New Year Messages was modified. For example, these front page messages published in ‘Scânteia’ became longer and longer. Moreover, Ceausescu’s picture accompanying the message was modified, becoming clearer and more explicit. All this could demonstrate the stabilization of Ceausescu’s power on the political stage. These phenomena can be attributed to Ceausescu’s cult of personality. Every New Year Message had three parts: one part evaluating the past years, one focusing on the economic and social area and one focusing on foreign policy. The dimension of every part was not always the same. For example, when there were problems related to foreign policy, especially with the Soviet Union, that part’s length increased considerably. Moreover, the autonomous diplomatic line was highly emphasized. This could reflect Romania’s delicate situation in terms of foreign policy at that time, although Ceausescu did not speak about it directly. Sometimes he pointed out the instability of international order in his New Year Messages. This can also be viewed as a political effort made by Ceausescu in order to enhance the structure of unitary governing as well as to suppress opposition to the cult of personality.

In chapter VII some possible options for North Korea are introduced and attentively examined. Firstly, North Korea’s regime could survive in its present form. This means that international pressure on North Korean communist regime would increase, which would maintain the international isolation of this regime. Secondly, it could survive adopting a system similar to that of China that has successfully reached economic reform, while maintaining a communist political system. China, the biggest communist country in the world, consented for a socialist capitalism suited to the Chinese context, adopting the concept of “a country, two systems”. This scenario could provide a favourable international context for North Korea and it
could cater for a constant and quick development of the economy with the active support of the international society including South Korea. A third possible scenario for the regime in North Korea is to fall as the one in Romania. The process of transition in Eastern European countries could be a good example for North Korea’s present situation. Some of these states where active democratic movements took place in the past, succeeded a ‘soft landing’ with no great impact, and only a part of them registered loss of human lives. The previous example raises the possibility of bloodshed in North Korea in the near future, as in the case of Romania because the way in which the North Korean authority controls the people by means of oppression and fear is more present nowadays as the economic situation is becoming more and more difficult. The case of Romania could be a good example for North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Il.

It is certain and clear that the fall of the Ceausescu regime was caused by obvious internal problems. But there are a few suspicions to mention relating to the fall of Ceausescu. For instance, Ion Iliescu, which had been exempted from the Communist Party in the ’80 by Ceausescu, reappeared as a leader immediately after the Revolution from 1989. That is to say that Ceausescu would have been a victim in the struggle for power within the Communist Party. The foreign intervention is to be mentioned, namely the foreign conspirator involved in the bloodshed from 1989. According to the SRI report (Romanian Intelligence Service), there was concrete evidence referring to foreign involvement in the revolution, more precisely referring to soviet interference. After the 9th of December 1989, the number of soviet tourists travelling by car increased considerably from about 80 per day to 1000. The majority of them were men aged from 25 to 40. They were travelling to Yugoslavia, but they were impelled to enter this country since arms were found in the cars, so they remained close the city of Timisoara. One thing is for sure, during the events in Timisoara in 1989, there was a great number of soviet tourists.
Ceausescu represented an obstacle for Gorbaciiov, who tried to improve the relations with the West by a restructuration and opening at the moment. If we consider the position of a big communist country, as China, which wants itself to be an international leader by its improved relations with the West, the possibility of Chinese involvement and intervention in North Korea might exist.

Surprisingly, Ceausescu’s evaluation would be distorted in some ways. For example, according to a survey carried out in 2009, 31% of the interviewed opined that Ceausescu should be regarded as a man who made a lot of god to Romania; while 52% opined that he did equally good and harm. Particularly in the rural area, only 9% of the people see Ceausescu as a man who made more harm than good to Romania. Moreover, Ceausescu has been rumoured to have possessed secret accounts abroad, but their trace was never found. His wage was 1200 dollars a month, and Ceausescu deposited monthly a third of that sum at the CEC, in his children’s account. Objective and accurate evaluation regarding the revolution of 1989 and Ceausescu would be the future mission of historians. We can say as well that our information regarding North Korea could be distorted by the western world.

All research method in this paper tries to be objective. In addition to this, any preconceived idea against communism is eliminated, the priority of this paper being very clear. It is presented from an objective point of view in order to suggest a political orientation for North Korea compared to a model state – Romania under Ceausescu’s regime. By this comparison with a similar experience from the past, that is Romania’s situation, an efficient response can be found to any unexpected events related to North Korea.