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TEZA DE ABILITARE

SUMMARY

Starting with my doctoral research on Husserl's concepts of noematic sense and intentional modifications in Husserl's *Ideas I*, the most significant results of my research career purport to the phenomenological theory of constitution. As Husserl conceived them, constitutive analyses aim at describing and elucidating various forms of objectivity. And still the main concerns that plight them to this day are their capacity to address the modes in which the subject manifests himself and usually operates and their ability to describe and elucidate the singular phenomena of our times.

I systematized the results of my research in two major groups: the first group points to fundamental aspects of the theory of constitution, while the second one "applies" the phenomenological method to particular topics. The first Section of the thesis, entitled "Transcendental Constitution, Openness and Transformation", will deal with topics related to the multi-level phenomenological constitution of objectivity in Husserl's writings and attempts to provide a preliminary answer to the question how the subjective and egological evidence becomes objective and intersubjective. The description of the lowest and most elementary levels of constitution is not an end in itself; it only contributes to the bringing to light of a genetic, "universal" schema that captures in an essential way the form and content of pure experience according to altogether new dimensions. It also underlines that the genesis of objectivity in Husserl depends on the entire "system of constitution".

The key element of the phenomenological constitution is, from this perspective, how a (sensible) unity is constituted in spite of the heterogeneity of sensory fields and of the (potential)

infinity of multiple series of sensible appearances. On one hand, the phenomenological constitution ends with the full apperception of the “transcendent object”, but on the other, it involves genetically multi-leveled apperceptions and therefore an infinite apperceptive system that can be seen also as habitus. Through peeling back the experience’s layers, constitutive analyses uncover not only the transcendent object, but also the transcendental reality of the subject as willing and acting. The “world of appearances” becomes a “world of spirit”, animated and structured by interests (practical, then theoretical) of specific persons and communities of persons. It appears, ultimately, as a world of meaning, i. e. susceptible to receive new ontological dimensions. The world reveals itself both as a constituted world and an open « order of the world » (R. Bernet), while the (human and non-human) subject reveals himself as a power to inscribe himself in it, not only as a dweller, but mostly as a co-participant to its lines of force, to its constraints and its freedom. As subjects, we are always integrated in a network of everyday needs and concerns, in a continuous exchange with our environment. Should we take into account either the fulfilment of vital needs or the complacency to routines, the world of everyday life is characterized by a sort of urgency which alternates with periods of calm: a rhythmic monotony. The concept of normativity, which is another major concern of this research, will be thus explained by taking into account the ways in which the individual subject reacts and cope with the everyday urgency as a proto-type for the capacity to deal with various forms of imposition. Everyday life will appear thus as a form of transformative power.

The second Section will be consecrated to a series of investigations located at the crossroads of (constitutive) phenomenology and social and human sciences. The hypothesis underlying its first chapter is that the Schutsonian understanding of normativity opens a path for an innovative phenomenological approach to law and legal practices in a modern judicial society. Thus, phenomenological descriptions has to be complemented by a practical-hermeneutical approach. Dealing with the interpretation of legal texts cannot therefore exclude the interrogation of texts as burdened with a special kind of validity expressed in an eminently practical and practically lived context. It is my belief then that a legal hermeneutics which is sustained by a (phenomenologically disclosed) subjective practice of reason is able to generate the internal point of view of the law and to illuminate thus what is inherent in the very act of judging (as both interpreting legal texts and reasoning in legal terms).

Affording subject (transcendental or otherwise) a central place in the understanding of practices in our society may have a significant impact not only on the reconstruction of highly formalised ones, but also on the very ways of conceptualizing them. In the second chapter I will direct, therefore, my investigation on those phenomenological paths that might lead to, and circumscribe the experience of addiction and I propose an analytical framework based on three major phenomenological perspectives: descriptive, genetic and inter-relational. I'll argue in favour of a definition of addiction that makes no reference to a form of failure, psycho-somatic or existential, and that does not encourage "judging" people. On the contrary, there is a need to adopt a definition of addiction which holds at its core the idea of empowering people, of reconstructing their capacity to take decisions about their own lives.

Relying both on my expertise in the field of phenomenology and on my experience in projects involving professional ethics within the framework of a trans-disciplinary approach, I will discuss in the third chapter the need and the possibility of (re)inserting an ethical dimension into professional practice. Assuming that there is a connection between practice positivism and moral conformism, the individual's capacity to deliberate in moral matters will be seen as an antidote to the pervasiveness of positivistic, bureaucratic-like behaviours. This task implies first of all a descriptive and prescriptive reassessment of reflective methods in professional ethics.

Ethical issues are not exclusively internal to the individual; they can or should be solved by the individual self in his or her confrontation with the external (public) moral instances that s/he recognizes as valid according to some ways of reasoning which are broadly accepted. While dealing with moral issues, especially in the context of an organization, the individual is pushed outside his or her limits and encouraged to take into account the points of view of others; he or she leaves then for a moment his or her position and empathizes with other human beings. At a certain point, he or she might realize that employee and manager, for example, as well as all other hierarchies and rules, written or not, are only social constructions, that behind them there are always people, embodied subjects in an endless exchange of ideas and feelings, through which they are continuously reconstructing their living world.